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Univ.  of  California 
Withdrawn 


THE  PROVOCATION  OF 
FRANCE 

FIFTY  YEARS  OF  GERMAN 
AGGRESSION 


BY 
JEAN  CHARLEMAGNE  BRACQ,  LITT.  D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR    OF    FRENCH    LITERATURE    IN    VASSAR    COLLEGE 


'  NEW  YORK 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

AMERICAN  BRANCH:  85  West  32Nn  Street 
LONDON.  TORONTO.  MELBOURNE.  AND  BOMBAY 

1916 


Hl^' 


iX.  1 


Copyright,  igtb 
BY  Oxford  University  Press 

AMERICAN  BRANCH 


kistoryh 


CONTENTS 


Introduction 

I.  Bismarck  Before  the  Ems  Dispatch 

II.  The  Mutilated  Ems  Dispatch     . 

III.  The  Conflict 

IV.  The  Aim  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
V.  The  Kaiser's  Provocations    . 

VI.  A  German  Quarrel  .... 

VII.  France,  Germany  and  Morocco    . 

VIII.  From  the  Algeciras  Conference  to 
Deliverance  of  Fez 

IX.  The  Agadir  Provocation 

X.  The  Alsatian  Question 

XL  German  Militarism  . 

XII.  Germany  and  Russia 

XIII.  Germany,  Belgium  and  England 

XIV.  The  Real  Attitude  of  France 
XV.  Austria  and  the  German  Provocation 

XVI.  The  Initiators  of  the  Great  War 


the 


PAGE 
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29 

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58 
73 
83 

95 
108 
120 

135 
150 
162 

173 

182 

193 


INTRODUCTION 

The  pages  that  follow  merely  describe  acts  and  events 
which  have  taken  place  within  the  range  of  the  author's 
recollections.  He  heard  discussions  as  a  boy,  in  France, 
upon  the  war  of  Italian  liberation,  and  saw  soldiers 
start  for  that  campaign  in  1859.  His  father  and  one  of 
his  neighbors  were  greatly  interested  in  the  Prusso- 
Austrian  war  against  Denmark,  which  they  considered  as 
the  deliverance  of  poor  molested  Germans  in  a  virtual 
German  country.  Later  on,  in  their  own  way,  they 
discussed  the  conflict  between  Prussia  and  Austria.  For 
one  of  these  men,  a  Protestant,  Prussia  was  the  repre- 
sentative of  liberalism,  of  humanism,  of  progress ;  while 
for  the  other,  a  Catholic,  Austria  was  the  custodian  of 
European  order,  of  the  best  conservative  traditions  in  a 
tottering  society,  and  the  great  Power  most  loyal  to  the 
Church.  The  conversations  and  discussions  which  the 
boy  heard  were,  as  a  rule,  inaccurate  in  substance  and 
almost  always  in  their  conclusions,  but  they  created  for 
him  an  interest  in  the  problems  of  central  Europe  that 
has  been  lasting.  The  Franco-Prussian  war  taught  him 
what  to  think  of  the  much  vaunted  liberalism  and  pacific 
spirit  of  the  land  of  Bismarck.  Subsequent  history  has 
revealed  to  him  what  German  leaders,  not  representing 
ethically  the  people,  could  do  to  harrow  the  soul  of  a 
neighboring  nation  and  insult  her  Allies  by  attempting 
to  discredit  them.  The  writer  is  conscious  of  the  ster- 
ling qualities  and  of  the  attainments  of  the  enemies  of 
his  native  land,  but  it  is  their  unjust,  their  aggressive 


vi  INTRODUCTION 

and  their  provoking  course  that  he  has  wished  to  bring 
out  as  well  as  the  casuistry  with  which  German  writers 
have  justified  the  duplicity  of  their  leaders.  He  has  used 
as  a  guiding  thread  the  editorial  opinions  of  the  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  which  have  always  been  the  work  of  mas- 
terly minds  such  as  Michel  Chevalier,  Charles  de  Mazade, 
the  Vicomte  Georges  d'Avenel  and  Francis  Charmes. 
These  chroniqiies  are,  as  a  whole,  the  most  reliable  and 
impartial  interpretations  of  contemporary  history,  during 
the  last  half  century,  with  which  the  author  is  acquainted, 
while  the  principal  French  books  devoted  to  the  most 
burning  international  questions  first  appeared  in  this 
review.  His  recent  re-reading  of  these  luminous  and 
honest  statements  of  contentions  among  various  peoples 
has  convinced  him  that  they  constitute  a  collection  of 
facts,  bearing  upon  the  question  at  issue,  of  the  greatest 
value.  He  has  secured  his  evidence  from  varied  and 
reliable  sources.  Without  surrendering  his  critical 
independence,  he  confesses  his  readiness  to  accept,  as 
reliable,  the  statements  of  the  noblest  representatives 
of  France,  of  Lavisse,  of  Sorel,  of  Monod,  of  Taine,  of 
Renan,  of  Fouillee,  while  even  the  more  emotional  af- 
firmations of  E.  Caro  and  of  Pasteur  seem  to  him  trust- 
worthy. He  has  consulted  the  best  sources  available  to 
him,  and  among  these  he  cannot  pass  over  in  silence  Le 
Temps,  which,  for  nearly  a  third  of  a  century,  has  proven 
to  him  the  best  instrument  of  information  upon  France 
and  Europe.  This  is  not  a  book  of  erudition.  It  is  the 
simple  putting  together  of  facts  which  scarcely  anyone 
denies  today,  yet  which  point  to  an  almost  constant 
aggression  against  France.  It  does  not  bring  out  the 
acts  of  chance  individuals,  but  of  the  rulers  and  govern- 
ing classes  beyond  the  Rhine.     At  the   same   time,   it 


INTRODUCTION  vii 

attempts  to  show  that  if  France  has  not  always  been 
blameless,  for  she  has  also  her  militants  and  her  mili- 
tarists (this  does  not  refer  to  her  heroic  soldiers),  as 
a  rule  her  purpose  has  been  international  good-will  and 
peace.  She  faithfully  endeavored  to  avert  the  present 
colossal  tragedy.  Whatever  she  has  accomplished  during 
the  last  twoscore  years  she  has  done  it  in  the  face 
of  an  almost  constant  and  exasperating  provocation. 
Her  attitude,  however,  has  been  such  that  she  can  calmly 
await  the  judgment  of  history. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  THE  EMS  DISPATCH 

That  most  remarkable  woman,  Madame  de  Stael,  did 
fatal  work  for  France  when  she  idealized  the  Germans  in 
her  masterpiece,  De  I'Allemagne.  The  book,  rendered 
popular  among  the  liberals  of  France  by  the  antagonism 
of  Napoleon,  had  a  firm  hold  upon  the  national  mind. 
Her  pictures  of  German  character  and  life  were  accepted 
as  real  and  as  worthy  of  imitation  by  her  countrymen. 
The  romantic  movement,  to  whose  rise  she  greatly  con- 
tributed, acted  in  the  same  direction ;  and  the  writers  of 
the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  in  its  early  days,  increased 
the  tendency  to  an  extreme  idealization  of  the  trans- 
Rhinean  people.  Heine  in  De  I'Allemagne  warned 
Frenchmen  not  to  take  the  pictures  of  the  Sidtane  de  la 
pensce  too  seriously,  not  to  trust  these  good  neighbors 
too  much ;  but  the  countrymen  of  Voltaire,  so  sensitive  to 
literary  influences,  continued  to  think  of  the  Germans  as 
disciples  of  the  author  of  Eternal  Peace,  men  athirst 
for  the  invisible  realities  of  the  universe,  virtual  philo- 
sophical Quakers.  Towards  the  sixties  Victor  Hugo 
speaks  of  "  that  august  Germany."  ^  About  1865,  Miche- 
let,  Janet,  Taine,  Renan,  About,  and  all  the  French 
liberals  looked  upon  them  as  embodying  the  greatest 
amount  of  moral  rectitude,  of  idealistic  serenity,  of  sci- 
entific calm  and  ethical  excellence  yet  attained  by  men. 

^  Les  Misirables,  vol.  Ill,  p.  63. 


2  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

In  their  eyes  the  expansion  of  Prussia  meant  the  spreading 
of  these  idylHc  virtues. 

The  war  of  1870  was  the  rending  of  the  illusory  veil 
which  opened  up  to  these  Germanophiles  a  new  view  of 
the  countrymen  of  Kant — men  of  iron — led  against 
France  by  an  indomitable  hatred,  prepared  by  years  of 
Spartan  military  discipline  and  of  aggressive  purpose, 
men  who  waged  war  with  a  harshness  and  a  brutality 
that  defy  words.  The  psychological  reaction  was  as 
depressing  as  it  was  sudden.  There  was,  furthermore,  the 
sense  that  they  had  been  deceived  by  the  Prussians  as 
Napoleon  III  had  been  by  Bismarck.  At  first,  under  the 
impression  that  the  French  Emperor  had  been  the  provo- 
cator,  they  accepted  their  defeat  with  a  certain  con- 
trition; but  when  it  became  evident  to  them  that  the 
war  had  been  desired,  planned  and  carried  on  with  a 
remorseless  intent  by  Bismarck,  and,  what  was  worse, 
that  the  terrible  man,  to  their  dismay,  represented  the 
spirit  of  Prussia,  there  was  a  violent  revulsion  of  feel- 
ing. The  people  east  of  the  Rhine  appeared  in  a  new 
light  in  the  eyes  of  their  western  neighbors.  So  great 
was  the  disappointment  of  eminent  Frenchmen  that  their 
attitude  toward  most  foreigners  was  seriously  modified 
by  the  recoil  of  their  feelings  after  the  war.  Yet  the 
philosophical  minds  remained  fairly  calm,  though  they 
were  deeply  hurt,  not  only  by  the  injustice  and  horror 
of  the  recent  Franco-German  clash,  but  by  the  sense  of 
the  deep  deception  perpetrated  upon  them  by  the  coun- 
trymen of  Bismarck  and  by  Bismarck  himself.  They 
had  come  to  loathe  the  heavy  complimentary  words  which 
they  had  heard  from  the  Prussians,  the  honeyed  talks 
of  their  public  men,  and  all  the  flatteries  of  Bismarck- 
ian  insincerity.     They  had  ignored  the  depths  of  racial 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH    3 

antagonism  that  lay  dormant  in  the  Prussian  heart, 
ever  ready  to  be  called  forth  by  the  Chancellor  and  his 
supporters. 

Prussia,  gradually  risen  from  the  Mark  of  Brandenburg 
to  her  present  state  by  sheer  military  effort,  and  by 
the  prominence  given  to  her  soldiers,  endeavored  to 
deceive  everyone.  She  maintained  at  this  time  more 
soldiers  proportionally  than  any  other  Power  in  Europe. 
France,  according  to  Renan,^  was  far  from  aggressive. 
She  "  had  become  the  most  pacific  country  of  the 
world.  .  .  .  The  military  career  was  abandoned.  .  .  . 
All  activity  was  in  the  direction  of  the  social  question." 
When  she  appeared  militant  it  was  because  of  the  action 
of  Prussia  creating  a  mighty  military  Power  in  the 
heart  of  Europe.  Germany,  in  general,  and  Prussia,  in 
particular,  were  hostile  to  everything  French,  notwith- 
standing their  unctuous  attitude  and  their  flatteries. 
Four  or  five  times  in  a  century  they  attempted,  and 
accomplished,  invasions  of  French  territory. 

The  Kaiser,  who,  in  his  speeches,  constantly  refers  to 
Napoleon  as  if  he  had  been  the  sole  enemy  of  Germany, 
and  ever  mentions  the  battle  of  Leipsic  where  Bonaparte 
was  defeated,  never  says  that  during  eight  years  the 
King  of  Prussia  was  the  ally  of  the  Corsican  to  the  great 
harm  of  German  states.  All  through  the  early  nineteenth 
century  Prussia  was  watching  all  possible  chances  for 
aggressions  and  territorial  extension.  Not  to  speak  of 
other  examples,  in  1850  Prussian  troops  entered  Hesse 
to  fight  the  states  representing  the  authority  of  the 
Diet.  The  Emperor  Nicholas  of  Russia  stopped  them 
when  he   said,   "  I  shall  fire  on  the  first   who   fires."  ^ 

*  La  reforme  intellectuellc  ct  morale.  1871,  p.  24. 

'  Lowe,  Charles,  Prince  Bismarck,  N.  Y.  1886,  vol.  I,  p.  108. 


4  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Then  there  were  the  wranglings  of  Prussia  with  the 
Diet,  which  she  used  when  it  served  her  purpose,  and 
discarded  in  the  same  way.  Prussia  was  feared  and 
hated  by  most  of  the  other  states  of  the  country,  while 
at  home  the  miUtary  class  was  detested  by  those  who 
wanted  political  freedom.  Those  representing  tradi- 
tional ideas  advocated  the  use  of  arms  to  repress  the 
spirit  of  independence  among  themselves,  but  found 
in  external  aggressions  a  better  way  to  attain  their  aims. 
In  1856,  they  were  burning  to  fight  Switzerland,  a  con- 
flict which  was  prevented  by  the  kindly  action  of  England, 
and  the  hostility  of  Austria.^  During  the  Crimean  war 
Prussia  remained  neutral,  thereby  gaining  the  good-will 
of  Russia.  During  the  Austro-Italian  war  in  1859,  she 
was  watching  her  chances.  Bismarck  was  not  yet  at  the 
helm  of  state,  but  he  was  already  bent  upon  fighting 
Austria,  and  driving  her  out  of  the  German  Confedera- 
tion. As  he  said  then,  "  if  it  is  our  aim  to  exclude  her 
from  Germany,  we  can  only  profit  by  Austria  first  being 
weakened  by  France."  ^  He  urges  Prussia,  at  this 
juncture,  to  take  the  lead  of  the  German  Confedera- 
tion.^ This,  as  he  cynically  says,  will  have  to  be  done 
ferro  et  igni,  by  the  sword  and  by  fire,  already  the 
Bismarckian  method. 

Neutral  in  pretension,  Prussia  called  up  all  her  troops, 
and  it  looked  for  a  while  as  if  Napoleon  III  would  have 
to  fight  on  the  Rhine  as  well  as  along  the  Po,  inasmuch 
as  the  Prussians  had  "  bound  themselves  by  word  of 
mouth   to   assist   Austria   in   any   circumstances   if   she 

'  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  220. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  391- 
'  Ibid.,  p.  239. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH         5 

should  be  attacked  by  France  in  Italy."  ^  If  the  ItaHan 
war  was  suddenly  ended  and  Venetia  was  kept  by  the 
Hapsburgs  it  was  largely  due  to  Berlin.^  For  some  years 
Bismarck,  either  at  the  Diet  in  Frankfurt  or  as  ambas- 
sador to  Russia,  had  prepared  the  ground  for  his  bellig- 
erent policy.  He  had  won  the  neutrality  of  Russia. 
When,  in  1863,  after  he  had  become  prime-minister, 
an  insurrection  took  place  in  Warsaw,  he  made  arrange- 
ments with  the  Czar  to  help  stamp  it  out.^  While  there 
were  deep  governmental  affinities  between  the  Russian 
spirit  and  that  of  Bismarck  he  did  this  under  the  sense 
of  the  value  of  the  co-operation  of  St.  Petersburg.  For 
years  he  had  conquering  designs  upon  Schleswig- 
Holstein.  This  is  evident  from  constant  references  to 
it  in  his  correspondence. 

In  1859  he  goes  to  Paris  to  gain  the  friendly  attitude 
of  the  French  Government.  The  war  which  he  desired 
and  planned  against  Denmark,  he  hypocritically  repre- 
sents as  a  conflict  for  the  relief  of  oppressed  Schles- 
wig.*  It  was  a  "  national  duty  of  honor "  .  .  .  "  to 
protect  the  German  subjects  of  the  King  of  Denmark 
against  the  oppression  and  constitutional  wrongs  "  which 
they  suffered.  How  tender  the  man  who  later  on  was 
to  distinguish  himself  by  his  inhuman  treatment  of  the 
franc s-tireitrs,  of  the  Poles  and  of  the  Alsatians !  He 
had  the  Duchies  invaded  by  12,000  Saxons  and 
Hanoverians,  followed  by  the  Prussians  and  Austrians, 
but  once  the  Danes  defeated,  and  terms  of  peace  made 
for  the  exclusive  advantage  of  Prussia  and  Austria, 
Bismarck  invited  both  Saxons  and  Hanoverians  to  march 

*  Prince  Bismarck's  Letters,  p.  147. 

*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  259. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  304. 
*lbid.,  p.  227. 


6  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

home,  whether  they  were  wilHng  or  not.^  It  is  not 
astonishing  that  he  was  the  man  most  hated  by  Hberal 
Prussians  and  by  most  Germans.  Then  Austria  and 
Prussia  remained  sole  disposers  of  the  Duchies  ceded 
to  them  by  the  King  of  Denmark. 

In  securing  these  results,  there  was  not  a  country, 
an  international  organization,  or  a  ruler  that  the  Iron 
Minister  did  not  mislead  or  deceive.  England,  France, 
Denmark,  Hanover,  Saxony,  the  London  Conference, 
the  Diet,  Christian  IX  and  the  Duke  of  Augustenburg, 
all  were  hoodwinked  and  mystified  by  the  Prussian 
leader.^  He  practiced  without  scruple  what  in  com- 
merce and  in  the  policies  of  most  countries  would  be 
methods  of  a  sharper,  a  cutpurse,  but  he  speaks  of  his 
acts  with  pride.  "  When  I  was  made  a  prince,"  he  says, 
"  the  King  insisted  upon  putting  Alsace-Lorraine  into 
my  coat  of  arms.  But  I  would  much  rather  have  had 
Schleswig-Holstein ;  that  is  the  campaign,  politically 
speaking,  of  which  I  am  proudest."  ^ 

After  this  he  found  the  opportunity  of  carrying  out 
his  purpose  to  oust  Austria  from  Germany  as  well  as 
from  the  newly  conquered  territories.  For  that  purpose, 
immediately  after  his  coming  to  power  "  the  number  of 
infantry  was  doubled,  and  the  cavalry  regiments  were 
increased  by  ten."  *  The  army  was  the  particular  object 
of  his  solicitude,  as  he  wished  to  make  it  able  to  cope 
with  the  Empire  which,  as  he  puts  it,  "  kept  his  country 
in  a  state  of  vassalage."  To  that  end  he  had  already 
courted  the  French  Government,  which  was  quite  un-* 

'  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  343. 
^  Headlam,  J.  W.,  Bismarck,  pp.  192-225. 

'  Busch,  M.,  Bismarck.     Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  Historyt 
vol.  II,  p.  171. 
*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  289. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH    7 

friendly  to  Vienna,  and  tried  to  secure  its  neutrality  in 
the  struggle ;  this  was  granted  by  Napoleon.^  He  then 
turned  toward  Italy  and  began  to  humor  her  by  making 
with  her  a  generous  commercial  treaty.  Though  he  had 
not  the  least  sympathy  with  the  aspirations  of  the 
Venetians  toward  independence  in  1859,  and  his  Govern- 
ment had  prevented  it,  he  now  proposes  that  consumma- 
tion as  an  inducement  for  the  countrymen  of  Garibaldi 
to  unite  with  the  Prussians  against  Austria.  As  his 
advances  were  accepted,  the  Italian  Government  sent 
General  Gavone  secretly  to  Bismarck  and  concluded  a 
treaty  of  aggression  against  Austria.  Then,  according 
to  the  dispatch  of  the  Italian  Envoy,  Bismarck  said, 
"  Which  of  us  is  now  going  to  apply  fire  to  the  pow- 
der?" To  Count  Barral,  the  Italian  Ambassador,  he 
said,  "  You  would  do  us  excellent  service  by  attacking 
first."  2 

Such  was  the  malignant  and  wicked  design  of  the 
great  Prussian  Mephistopheles.  "  Before  the  '  first  shots 
fell,'  in  1866,  he  tried  a  last  resource  to  obviate  that 
war,  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  the  King,  by  propos- 
ing an  Austro-Prussian  dualism  in  Germany,  and  an 
Austro-Prussian  alliance  against  France  for  the  re- 
conquest  of  Alsace."  ^  The  war  took  place  nevertheless, 
and  the  unspeakable  stupidity  of  the  Hapsburgs  led 
Austria  to  take  the  offensive.  Thus  he  had  first  made 
the  war  inevitable  and  then  succeeded  in  making  Austria 
appear  as  the  aggressor.  She  was  signally  defeated  at 
Sadowa.  Bismarck  allowed  the  Italians,  defeated  at 
Custozza  and  at  Lissa,  to  settle  their  own  matters,  and 

'  Lowe,  vol.   I,  p.  284. 
'Ibid.,  p.  376. 
®  Ibid.,  p.  500. 


8  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

made  a  most  profitable  peace  with  Austria.  This  war 
cost  Prussia  10,000  men,  and  Austria  22,000.*  The 
ambition  and  tortuous  plans  of  the  Iron  Man  had  cost 
32,000  lives,  not  to  speak  of  the  multitudes  that  were 
mutilated. 

Hanover  and  Hesse-Cassel  shared  the  fate  of  Austria. 
This  campaign  ended,  as  almost  all  the  wars  of  Prussia 
always  did,  by  territorial  extension  and  indemnities. 
Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel,  Nassau,  the  free  city  of  Frank- 
furt and  Schleswig-Holstein  became  a  part  of  Prussia, 
What,  perhaps,  was  the  most  important  in  all  this  was 
the  securing  of  Kiel  as  a  naval  base. 

Having  just  concluded  a  war  undertaken  in  the  spirit 
of  buccaneers,  Prussia  now  divided  the  spoils.  Bismarck 
received  400,000  thalers,  Roon,  the  Minister  of  War, 
300,000,  and  Moltke,  the  General-in-chief,  200,000.^ 
Thus  Prussia  has  ever  rewarded  her  war-makers.  A 
further  result  was  the  triumph  of  political  absolutism. 
Since  1848,  some  of  the  noblest  sons  of  Prussia  had 
protested  against  the  royal  tyranny  and  the  despotic 
spirit  of  ministers — mostly  against  the  Iron  Minister — 
but,  after  the  policy  of  fire  and  sword  had  been  so  suc- 
cessful, public  opinion  changed.  "  Of  Bismarck's 
treachery  and  Straffordism,  and  all  the  rest,"  says  Lowe, 
"  there  was  now  no  more  talk ;  in  less  than  a  week, 
success  had  made  his  policy  not  only  pardonable  but 
adorable."  ^ 

The  aggressive  brutal  Prussian  spirit  had  triumphed. 
The  intellectualists  of  the  land  began  to  laud  the  army 
and  to  prepare  the  nation   for  the  greater  cultivation 

'  Lowe,  vol.   I,  p.  391. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  412. 
•  Ibid.,  p.  385. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH         g 

of  the  Bismarckian  spirit  and  the  wider  application  of 
Bismarck's  poHcy. 

Up  to  this  period,  there  was  no  obsequious  comedy 
that  the  celebrated  Prussian  Minister  had  not  been  will- 
ing to  play  in  order  to  secure  the  good-will  and  the 
neutrality  of  France.  He  went  to  Paris  to  consult  with 
Napoleon  about  the  possible  Prussian  attack  on  Switzer- 
land ;  ^  he  was  there,  as  a  minister,  attempting  to  pave 
the  way  for  the  future ;  he  was  there  many  a  time,  under 
all  kinds  of  pretexts,  but  always  courting  the  favors  of 
Napoleon  to  help  his  future  plans.  He  had  urged  his 
Government  to  form  an  alliance  with  Paris.^  He  went 
so  far  in  this  direction  that  he  was  accused  of  being 
an  accomplice  of  the  Tuileries.  To  this  he  replied,  doubt- 
less with  a  sardonic  smile,  "  If  I  have  sold  myself  to  a 
devil,  it  is  to  a  Teutonic  and  not  a  French  one."  ^ 

He  succeeded  in  winning  Napoleon  completely  over. 
He  had  signed  a  treaty  favorable  to  France  and  made 
to  Napoleon  promises  of  future  unmolested  conquests 
so  as  to  maintain  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  and 
satisfy  the  imperial  vanity.  Unquestionably  he  had 
agreed  to  let  him  take  Luxemburg;  later  on  he  tried 
to  have  him  turn  toward  Belgium,  but  that  Bismarck 
had  made  pledges  and  duped  Napoleon  is  not  doubted 
now  by  any  candid  investigator.  In  1866,  the  question 
of  Luxemburg  brought  the  two  peoples  on  the  verge  of 
a  conflict  which  was  averted  by  a  European  Conference. 
This  did  not  prevent  the  King  of  Prussia  from  being 
the  guest  of  Napoleon  at  the  time  of  the  Exposition  in 
1867.     When  the  King  left  at  the  end  of  his  visit,  he 

*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  220. 
'Ibid.,  p.  235. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  260. 


lo         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

embraced  the  French  Emperor,  with  great  expression  of 
friendship,  saying,  "  Adieu,  dear  brother  and  friend."  ^ 

Bismarck  "  went  about  feehng  the  national  pulse  and 
preparing  the  future."  ^  While  he  was  maturing  his 
plans  to  attack  France,  he  claimed  to  have  reduced  his 
army  to  an  absolute  peace  footing  ^  and  that  he  was 
only  pursuing  moral  conquests  and  the  natural  expansion 
of  Prussia,  while  at  that  time  his  country  had  three  per 
cent,  of  her  population  in  the  army.  Notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  this  population  was  but  two-thirds  that  of 
France,  her  army  was  numerically  equal  *  and,  in  train- 
ing, far  superior.  Lowe,  often  echoing  the  ideas  of 
Bismarck,  speaks  of  the  Exposition  as  ''  that  hollow  and 
high-sounding  Carnival  of  Peace."  ^  It  would  have  been 
a  great  Festival  of  Peace  had  not  the  Iron  Count  been 
bent  on  war.  For  fifty  years  Prussia  has  been  the  great 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  translating  the  best  feelings  of 
mankind  into  the  sane  and  normal  relations  of  peace. 

Bismarck  continued  to  work  in  every  direction  to 
carry  out  his  design.  He  controlled  and  managed 
all  the  great  forces  of  Prussia,  and  to  a  certain 
extent  of  Germany,  to  arouse  feelings  against  the 
"  hereditary  enemy "  France.*^  Never  did  a  chief  of 
government  have  his  fingers  so  completely  upon  the 
organs  of  public  opinion,  if  we  are  to  believe  Maurice 
Busch  and  other  German  writers,  and  no  one  ever  made 

^  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  445. 
'  Ibid. 

*  III,  7J,  51.  References  like  this  refer  to  the  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondcs.  The  Roman  numbers  indicate  the  series,  those  in  italic 
the  volume  and  the  other  or  others  the  page  or  pages. 

*  HI,  52,  8. 

*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  445. 

*  in.  73,  390. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH       ii 

a  more  unscrupulous  use  of  them.  Thus  the  French 
Ambassador  handed  him  a  note  in  reference  to  the 
Treaty  of  Prague  in  which  he  had  made  a  promise 
that  never  was  kept.  The  next  morning  all  the  Bis- 
marckian  papers  were  on  fire  against  France. 

He  excelled  in  circulating  those  half-truths  which  are 
the  worst  form  of  falsehoods.  In  1867,  the  National 
Gazette,  inspired  by  him,  alarmed  the  population  of 
Germany  by  the  statement  that  France  had  concentrated 
from  60,000  to  70,000  men  in  the  eastern  departments, 
but  kept  silence  upon  the  75,000  Prussian  soldiers  who 
were  close  to  the  French  lines  and  who,  upon  a  sudden 
mobilization,  would  have  numbered  120,000.^  "  Each  of 
Bismarck's  wars,"  says  Professor  Ramsay  Muir  of  the 
University  of  Manchester,  "  was  preceded  by  a  marvel- 
ous '  mobilization  of  public  opinion  '  through  the  press."  ^ 
He  thereby  succeeded  in  isolating  France.  He  encircled 
her  with  a  ring  of  suspicion  and  hostility,  misrepresent- 
ing her  real  aims  while,  by  intimidation  and  misrepresen- 
tation, he  was  making  treaties  with  German  allies, 
many  of  whom  were  reluctant  to  join  him  now  and  at 
the  crucial  moment. 

Meanwhile,  French  opinion  had  been  affected  by  the 
development  of  Prussia,  her  virtual  hegemony  of  Ger- 
man states,  and  the  well-nigh  formation  of  a  great 
military  German  Empire  at  the  gates  of  France.  There 
were  Chauvinists  who  wanted  compensations,  and,  at 
times,  Napoleon  had  been  influenced  by  them.  There 
were  those  also  who  spoke  of  natural  frontiers,  that  is 
the  Rhine  as  the  Franco-German  line,  but  most  French- 
men sided  with  the  Emperor,  who  was  forced  to  recognize 

'  III,  74,  404. 

'  Britain's  Case  against  Germany,  p.  29. 


12  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

that,  though  Bismarck  had  duped  him,  he  had  done  so 
by  carrying  out  in  practice  the  great  hobby  of  Napoleon, 
the  principle  of  nationalities.  In  the  territorial  divisions 
and  ethnological  redistributions  which  took  place  in  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  globe,  looking  at  the  peoples  who  were 
absorbed  by  another,  France  did  not  ask,  "  What  lan- 
guage do  you  speak?  "  "  To  what  race  do  you  belong?  " 
(those  have  been  German  tests  of  nationality)  but,  "  To 
what  nation  do  you  wish  to  belong?"^  Annexations, 
if  any  are  legitimate,  must  be  made  with  the  consent  of 
those  most  concerned.  The  soul  of  national  morality,  the 
will,  must  be  the  supreme  determinant.  The  French, 
the  Italians  and  the  Germans  of  the  Swiss  Confedera- 
tion, representing  three  ethnological  groups  and  four 
languages,  the  Flemish  and  the  Walloons  in  Belgium, 
must  be  allowed  to  form  a  nation  if  they  so  choose.  All 
new  political  accretions  must  be  made  after  the  free 
choice  of  the  annexed. 

Led  by  these  principles  the  French  Emperor  had  en- 
couraged and  helped  Italy  to  secure  her  independence, 
thereby  strengthening  Prussia,  helping  her  ultimately  to 
secure  the  leadership  of  German  states.  Napoleon  was  also 
in  favor  of  the  gradual  unification  of  Germany,  though 
it  must  be  recognized  that  he  insisted  upon  compensa- 
tions to  counterbalance  the  great  Power  which  was  just 
created.  Dishonest  and  dishonorable  as  were  the  bar- 
gains between  Bismarck  and  himself,  in  reference  to  the 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg  ^  he  ever  clung  to  the  doctrine  that 

'  H.  91,  387. 

"  Bismarck  denied  that  he  had  made  this  promise.  Queen 
Victoria  said  to  the  Prince  de  la  Tour  d'Auvergne:  "  Je  sais  ce 
qui  s'est  passe.  M.  de  Bismarck,  bien  qu'il  le  nie  aujourd'hui, 
vous  a  lui-mcme  encourages  a  reclamcr  le  Luxemburg,"  Rothan, 
G.,  L'Allemagne,  p.  342. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH       13 

peoples  have  the  right  to  dispose  of  themselves.  Bis- 
marck was  bent  upon  using  the  sword  to  realize  Ger- 
man unity  and  that  under  the  domination  of  Prussia. 
Napoleon  gave  him  a  free  hand,  under  the  impression 
that  he  was  advancing  the  cause  of  international  liberal- 
ism in  that  part  of  the  world.  Duped,  and  ever  duped, 
by  the  Prussian  Minister,  he  clung  all  along,  with  some 
inconsistencies,  to  his  favorite  doctrine.  After  Sadowa, 
when  he  mediated  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  he  se- 
cured the  insertion  in  the  Treaty  of  Prague  of  article  V, 
which  stipulates  that  "  the  people  of  the  northern  district 
of  Schleswig,  if  by  free  vote  they  express  a  wish  to  be 
united  to  Denmark,  shall  be  ceded  to  Denmark  accord- 
ingly." ^  This  important  article,  signed  by  the  Prussian 
Government  "  In  the  name  of  the  Holy  and  Indivisible 
Trinity,"  -  which  contemplated  fair  play  and  justice  to 
the  Danes,  never  was  executed,  although  again  and 
again  Napoleon  endeavored  to  have  it  done. 

In  the  great  national  movement  of  Italy  the  masses 
desired  unity.  In  some  parts  of  the  country,  when  the 
people  met  one  another  they  raised  the  forefinger  of  the 
right  hand  for  their  salutation  and  said  iina,^  thus  by 
their  greetings  expressing,  in  a  symbolic  way,  their 
deepest  national  hopes  of  unity.  His  share  in  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  Italian  ideal  is  one  of  the  few  noble  achieve- 
ments of  the  Coup  d'etat  man.  He  seconded  their  efforts 
in  carrying  out  the  national  purpose,  but  with  incon- 
sistencies and  contradictions  at  times,  so  that  he  neither 
satisfied  the  Itahans  nor  the  French.  Thiers  and  Guizot 
represented  this  as  an  act  of  signal  folly,  to  help  the 

'  Treaty  of  Prague,  Aug.  20,  1866. 

*  Ibid. 

•  Maxime  du  Camp,  Expedition  des  Deux  Sidles,  p.  28. 


14  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

building  up  of  a  great  state  next  to  France  in  the  Italic 
Peninsula.  He  had  also  to  face  the  opposition  of  the 
national  clergy,  who  never  forgave  him  the  sacrifice  of 
the  temporal  power  of  the  Pope.  He  trusted  the 
Risorgimento  because  it  was  the  spontaneous  rising  of 
a  people  testifying  to  its  sense  of  oneness  and  of  a 
common  historic  purpose.  It  asserted  its  desire  in  a 
democratic  way,  by  the  ballot.  Italian  unity  was  built 
upon  plebisciti. 

He  acted  similarly  at  an  earlier  date,  when  Savoy 
and  Nice  were  annexed.  The  Savoyards  were  French 
and  the  Nigois  mostly  so.  They  lived  on  the  west  side 
of  the  Alps,  which  seemed  a  natural  boundary.  Napo- 
leon had  the  power  to  take  these  territories,  yet  there 
was  a  consultation  of  the  people,  who,  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority,  expressed  their  wish  to  be  an  intrinsic 
part  of  France.  Would  Bismarck  have  dared  to  have 
a  plebiscitum  in  Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel,  Nassau,  Frank- 
furt and  Schleswig  when  he  annexed  them?  His  princi- 
ple of  national  movements  was  might.  For  Danton's 
motto:  De  I'audace,  encore  de  I'audace  et  toujours  de 
I'audace,  he  would  have  substituted,  "  The  Sword,  the 
Sword  again,  the  Sword  forever." 

After  Sadowa  Napoleon  had  lost  many  of  his  illusions 
in  reference  to  Bismarck's  determination  to  secure  Ger- 
man unity  and  Prussian  domination  at  any  cost.  The 
French  Emperor  was  not  more  honest  than  his  antago- 
nist; he  was  at  this  period  a  timid  and  idealistic  dreamer. 
At  times,  he  was  talking  and  acting  like  a  pacifist,  though 
the   name   had   not   yet   been   invented.^      Had    he   not 

'  The  honor  of  coining  that  term  belongs  to  a  Frenchman,  M. 
Emile  Arnauld,  notary  at  Luzarches,  Seine-et-Oise,  who  has  been 
indefatigable  in  the  cause  of  the  judicial  settlement  of  interna- 
tional difficulties. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH       15 

proposed  the  reunion  of  an  international  congress  to 
settle,  in  a  friendly  way,  all  the  great  pending  questions 
of  the  times  ?  ^  Bismarck,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  hard, 
harsh,  unscrupulous  and  realistic  statesman  marshaling 
press,  clergy,  scientists  and  intellectualists,  society  and 
commerce  like  a  general.  "  His  statesmanship,"  says 
Lowe,  "  is  of  the  military  order."  ^  His  combativeness 
is  constant.  The  man  who,  as  a  student,  fought  twenty- 
eight  duels,^  remained  an  unscrupulous  fighter  all  through 
his  career.  He  fought  Prussian  intellectuals,  fought 
Prussian  democracy,  fought  the  Pope,  fought  the  Orders, 
fought  socialism.  He  had  long  since  decided  to  fight 
France.  That  seemed  to  him  an  essential  part  of  his 
colossal  plans,  and  yet  he  wished  to  hide  the  fact  that 
he  was  the  provocator.  As  Sorel  puts  it,  "  To  unify 
Germany,  to  dominate  the  Southern  states,  to  secure  the 
vote  of  military  credits,  to  obtain  the  help  of  Russia 
he  needed  to  be  attacked.  War  w^as  indispensable  to 
him  and  he  could  not  undertake  it."  * 

The  movement  of  German  unity  was  losing  ground ; 
a  conflict  with  the  "  hereditary  enemy  "  would  revive  it, 
but  it  was  essential,  says  again  Sorel,  that  the  war 
should  be  declared  by  France.  In  his  Memoirs,  speak- 
ing of  the  cause  for  which  he  damned  his  soul — if 
man  ever  did  that — Bismarck  tells  us  that  he  had 
reached  the  conviction  that  "  the  gulf  which  diverse  dy- 
nastic and  family  influences  and  different  habits  of  life 
had,  in  the  course  of  history,  created  between  the  South 

*  Novicow,  J.,  L' Alsace-Lorraine ,  obstacle  a  I'expansion  alle- 
tiiande,  191 3,  p.  48. 

'  Vol.  II,  p.  478. 

*  Vol.  I,  p.  17. 

*  Sorel,  A.,  Histoire  de  la  guerre  Franco- AUemande ,  1875, 
vol.  I,  p.  49. 


i6         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

and  the  North  of  the  Fatherland,  could  not  be  more  effec- 
tually bridged  over  than  by  a  joint  national  war,  against 
the  neighbor  who  had  been  aggressive  for  many  cen- 
turies." ^  He  wanted  the  unity  under  the  control  of 
Prussia.     The  end  justified  the  means. 

"  So,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,"  says  J.  Novicow, 
"  the  greatest  obstacle  to  the  unification  of  Germany 
came  from  Prussia.  H  Prussia  had  been  a  liberal  state, 
the  unity  of  Germany  could  have  been  secured  much 
sooner  and  much  better.  But  when  the  Germans  heard 
a  King  of  Prussia  declare  that  the  imperial  crown  offered 
to  him  by  the  Parliament  of  Frankfurt  had  been  picked 
up  in  the  mud,  because  it  was  offered  by  the  delegates 
of  the  German  people,  there  were  reasons  to  doubt  the 
possibility  of  realizing  German  unity."  ^  The  greatest 
obstacle  was  indeed  the  humiliation  of  democratic  Ger- 
many, irritated  by  the  contempt  of  a  King  by  divine  right 
who  referred  to  the  "  imperial  crown,"  so  offered,  as 
"  the  iron  fetter  whereby  the  descendant  of  four  and 
twenty  Sovereigns,  the  ruler  of  16,000,000  subjects,  and 
the  Lord  of  the  loyalest  and  bravest  army  in  the 
world,  would  be  made  the  mere  serf  of  the  Revolu- 
tion." 3 

A  Prussian  sovereign  can  rarely  ever  be  taken  at  his 
word.  The  fact  is  that  on  that  same  day  the  news  of  the 
victory  of  Austria  at  Novara  reached  Berlin.  The  fear 
of  Austria  this  day  was  the  beginning  of  Prussian  wis- 
dom. However,  the  obstacle  to  German  unity  was  not 
in  France,  but  in  Prussia  itself  and  among  the  German 
states.     Bismarck  would  unite  all  the  recalcitrants  by  a 

*  Bismarck,  the  Man  and  the  Statesman,  vol.  II,  p.  99. 
»  Op.  cit.,  p.  87. 

*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  89. 


BISMARCK  BEFORE  EMS  DISPATCH       17 

war  with  France.  That  he  did.  As  Mr.  James  W. 
Headlam  states  it,  Bismarck  "  boasted  that  but  for  him 
there  would  never  have  been  a  war  with  France."  ^ 

'  Bismarck,  p.  460. 


II 

THE  MUTILATED  EMS  DISPATCH 

The  late  King  of  Rumania,  in  his  autobiography,  has 
related  for  us  how  Bismarck  had  endeavored  to  direct 
him  toward  the  throne  of  Spain  and  how  he  refused  to 
move  in  that  direction.^  When  the  candidacy  of  Prince 
Leopold  of  Hohenzollem  to  the  throne  of  Spain  was  an- 
nounced Bismarck  expressed  surprise,  but  we  know 
now  that  he  advocated  it  and  did  all  he  could  to  push  it 
forward.^  On  this  account  the  Governments  of  Paris 
and  Berlin  were  brought  to  explanations.  The  King 
equivocated  by  saying  that  this  was  not  a  political  but  a 
family  afifair.  Bismarck  speaks  of  what  he  called  a 
simple  family  gathering  to  decide  the  matter,  but  we 
know  that  at  this  meeting  there  were  the  King,  his  son 
Frederick,  Antony  and  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern,  Bis- 
marck himself,  Roon,  Moltke,  Schleinitz,  Thile  and 
Delbriick.  As  M.  Matter  says,  "  this  resembles  a  council 
of  war  rather  than  a  family  affair."  ^  The  Governments 
of  France  and  Prussia  were  then  brought  to  the  verge 
of  war,  and  finally  to  war  itself. 

Bismarck  maneuvered  to  bring  this  about  while  causing 
Prussia  to  appear  before  public  opinion  as  on  the  side 
of  reason  and  justice,  and  France  as  the  aggressor.  To 
judge  of  his  success,  one  has  only  to  open  such  books 

Mil,  128,  684. 

'  Matter,  P.,  Bismarck  et  son  temps,  vol.  Ill,  p.  13. 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  23. 

18 


THE  MUTILATED  EMS  DISPATCH         19 

as  Washburne,  E.  B.,  Recollections  of  a  Minister  to 
France,  N.  Y.,  1887,  or  the  files  of  British  and  American 
newspapers.  The  moral  condemnation  of  France  was 
unanimous.  He  knew  the  political  value  of  moral  ap- 
pearances. The  King  was  as  just  as  a  Hohenzollern 
could  be  and  more  pacific  than  his  Minister,  hence  he 
yielded  to  the  complaints  of  France;  but,  unfortunately, 
by  the  unreasonableness  and  stupidity  of  the  Tuileries, 
Napoleon  fell  into  Bismarck's  traps  and  asked  for  the 
renunciation  to  the  Spanish  candidacy  for  all  time.  Even 
then,  circumstances  favored  the  French  Emperor,  and 
the  last  interview  at  Ems  of  the  King  with  the  French 
Ambassador  was  such  that  Bismarck  regarded  the  matter 
as  virtually  settled.  King  William  sent  him  a  dispatch 
which  embodied  such  a  conclusion  and  great  was  Bis- 
marck's dismay.  He  has  related  with  an  unblushing 
cynicism  the  way  in  which  he  made  the  Franco-German 
war  unavoidable.  The  three  documents  in  which  he  con- 
fessed his  crime  harmonize  well  with  all  the  evidence 
which  we  possess  upon  this  supreme  misdeed. 

At  the  crucial  moment,  in  the  controversy  between 
Berlin  and  Paris,  Bismarck,  who  was  on  his  estate  in 
Varzin,  rushed  to  Berlin.  On  his  arrival  he  received 
dispatches  showing  him  that  the  two  Governments  were 
on  the  way  to  a  fair  understanding.  He  invited  to  dinner 
Count  von  Roon,  the  Minister  of  War,  and  Count  von 
Moltke,  the  General-in-chief,  who  shared  his  desires  for 
a  war  with  France.  At  the  time  of  the  Luxemburg 
Aflfair,  Moltke  was  in  favor  of  an  immediate  attack. 
"  Today,"  he  said,  "  we  would  have  fifty  chances,  in 
one  year  from  now  we  would  no  longer  have  more  than 
twenty-five."  ^ 

'  Rothan,  G.,  L' Affaire  du  Luxembourg,  1882,  p.  297. 


20         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

The  three  men  had  a  common  aggressive  aim.  When 
they  heard,  by  a  dispatch,  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  candi- 
dacy of  Prince  Leopold  Hohenzollem,  and  of  the  really 
peaceful  spirit  of  the  King  and  of  the  French  Ambas- 
sador, Benedetti,  they  were  dismayed,  and  ceased  to  eat. 
Bismarck  took  the  dispatch  and  mutilated  it  in  such  a 
way  as  to  arouse  the  French  and  the  Germans  alike.^ 
"  It  will  be  known,"  he  says,  "  in  Paris  before  midnight, 
and  not  only  an  account  of  its  contents,  but  also  an 
account  of  the  manner  of  its  distribution,  will  have  the 
effect  of  a  red  rag  upon  the  Gallic  bull  ...  it  is  im- 
portant that  we  should  be  attacked,  and  this  Gallic  over- 
weening and  touchiness  will  make  us  (appear)  .  .  . 
that  we  meet  the  public  threats  of  France."  ^  He  ex- 
pected a  similar  effect  from  the  telegram  in  Germany, 
and  it  did  follow.  When  Bismarck  had  thus  transformed 
the  King's  dispatch  his  guests  "  recovered  their  pleasure 
in  eating  and  drinking  and  spoke  in  a  more  cheerful 
vein."  3 

This  virtual  forgery  was  cleverly  sent  to  the  press 
everywhere,  except  to  Paris.  Special  editions  of  the 
North  German  Gaaette  containing  the  inflammatory  mes- 
sage were  distributed  gratis  in  Berlin.*  "  The  telegram 
was  published  at  nine  o'clock  and  by  ten  the  square  in 
front  of  the  Palace  was  crowded  with  an  excited  multi- 
tude cheering  the  King  and  shouting,  '  To  the  Rhine ! 
To  the  Rhine ! '  "  ^  Very  soon  the  poor  mistaken  crowds 
in  Paris  yelled,  "A  Berlin!   A  Berlin!"    The  trick  was 

'  Busch,  Bismarck.  Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History,  1898, 
vol.  II,  p.  174. 

'  Bismarck,  Autobiography,  p.  lOl. 
^  Ibid.,  p.   102. 

*  Lowe,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  514. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  515. 


THE  MUTILATED  EMS  DISPATCH         21 

played.  The  people  of  Germany,  even  those  that  hated 
Bismarck  and  Prussia,  were  made  to  believe  that  France 
forced  war  upon  them,  and  Frenchmen  that  their  Am- 
bassador had  been  insulted  at  Ems. 

Nothing  is  more  instructive  than  Bismarck's  direct 
statement  when  he  wished  to  vindicate  his  claims  as 
maker  of  the  German  Empire.  "  The  King,"  he  says, 
"  was  at  Ems.  I  was  at  Varzin  when,  in  Paris,  there 
was  the  outcry  against  the  candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold 
Hohenzollern  to  the  throne  of  Spain.  The  French  acted 
entirely  like  men  who  had  lost  their  head :  I  speak  partic- 
ularly of  the  Government,  with  Emile  Ollivier  at  the 
helm.  Ollivier  was  in  no  way  at  the  height  of  the 
situation,  and  he  did  not  dream  of  the  harm  which  he 
did  in  the  Corps  legislatif  with  his  imprudent  bravadoes. 
The  situation  was  then  extremely  favorable  for  us.  We 
were  really  challenged,  and,  as  for  a  long  time  we  had 
been  convinced  that  we  would  have  to  settle  our  quarrel 
with  France,  the  present  moment  seemed  to  us  marked  to 
unsheathe  our  sword.  I  therefore  left  Varzin  for  Berlin 
to  consult  there  with  ]\Ioltke  and  Roon  upon  important 
questions.  On  the  way  I  received  the  following  telegram, 
*  Prince  Charles  Antony  of  Hohenzollern  has,  for  the 
sake  of  peace,  withdrawn  the  candidacy  of  his  son 
Leopold,  everything  is  all  right.' 

"  I  was  greatly  surprised  at  that  unexpected  solution, 
for  I  asked  myself  the  question :  '  Will  there  ever  be 
such  a  favorable  opportunity?  '  (to  fight.) 

"  As  soon  as  I  was  in  Berlin,  I  called  Rolandt  and  said 
to  him,  '  Telegraph  to  my  house  that  I  will  return  in  three 
days.'  At  the  same  time,  in  a  dispatch  addressed  to  His 
Majesty  at  Ems,  I  sent  my  pesignation  as  Prime-minister 
and  as  Chancellor  of  the  Confederation.     In  answer,  I 


22  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

received  a  reply  whereby  the  King  called  me  to  Ems. 
For  a  long  time  I  had  clear  ideas  upon  this  situation 
and  I  said  to  myself,  '  If  I  go  to  Ems  everything  will 
come  to  nought.  At  most  we  shall  reach  a  rotten  com- 
promise, and  the  only  great  solution  (war  with  France) 
will  escape  us.  I  must  do  everything  in  my  power  to 
have  His  Majesty  come  to  Berlin.  Here  better  than  at 
Ems  the  King  will  feel  the  pulse  of  the  nation.'  I 
therefore  exposed  to  him  in  the  most  respectful  manner 
the  motives  which  prevented  me  from  going  to  Ems ; 
my  presence  in  Berlin  was,  at  that  time,  absolutely  in- 
dispensable. 

"  Happily,  the  French,  short-sighted  and  arrogant,  did 
at  that  time  everything  that  they  could  to  sink  the  new 
chariot  deeper  into  the  mire.  They  asked  to  have  the 
King  sign  a  document  which  would  be  tantamount  to  a 
profound  humiliation.^  The  King  asked  my  advice  by 
telegraph.  I  answered  him  with  a  good  conscience,  '  It 
is  impossible  to  sign.' 

"  I  had  invited  Moltke  and  Roon  to  dine  on  the  evening 
of  July  14th,  and  we  spoke  of  all  eventualities..  We  all 
shared  the  hope  that  the  senseless  course  of  France,  that 
the  unheard-of  invitation  addressed  to  our  King,  would 
set  aside  the  danger  of  a  weakish  transaction  without 
glory.  (That  is,  a  peaceful  solution.)  Then — we  were 
still  at  the  table — came  a  dispatch  from  Ems  which  began 
as  follows : 

"  '  The  news  of  the  renunciation  of  the   Hereditary 

'  Unreasonable  as  Benedetti's  request  was,  he  did  not  use  the 
brutal  forms  which  are  implied  in  Bismarck's  words.  There  is 
a  gentleness  in  Benedetti's  language  which  contrasts  with  the 
Teutonic  harshness  of  the  Chancellor.  Had  the  acts  of  the 
French  Ambassador  been  all  that  Bismarck  says,  that  even 
would  not  have  justified  a  step  which  meant  war. 


THE  MUTILATED  EMS  DISPATCH         23 

Prince  of  Hohenzollern  having  been  officially  communi- 
cated by  the  Spanish  Government  to  that  of  France,  the 
French  Ambassador,  at  Ems,  has  again  addressed  to  His 
Majesty  a  request  to  be  authorized  to  telegraph  to  Paris 
that  His  Majesty  the  King  pledged  himself  forever  to 
refuse  his  consent  in  case  the  Hohenzollerns  should 
resume  their  candidacy.' 

"  There  followed  a  long  statement,  the  sense  of  w^hich 
w^as  that  the  King  referred  to  what  he  had  already  said 
to  Count  Benedetti,  who  had  received  his  answer  with 
gratitude  and  that  he  would  communicate  it  to  his 
Government. 

"  Thereupon,  Benedetti  asked  again  to  be  received  by 
the  King,  were  it  only  to  hear  once  more  from  the  lips  of 
His  Majesty  the  confirmation  of  what  he  had  said  in  the 
promenade.     Then  the  dispatch  added : 

"  '  However,  His  Majesty  refused  to  receive  once 
more  the  French  Ambassador  and  sent  him  word  by 
the  aide-de-camp  that  "  His  Majesty  has  nothing  more 
to  communicate  to  the  Ambassador."  ' 

"  After  I  had  read  the  dispatch,  Roon  and  Moltke  in 
a  similar  way  dropped  their  knives  and  forks  upon  the 
table,  and  pushed  back  their  chairs.  There  was  a  long 
silence.  We  were  all  profoundly  depressed.  We  had 
the  feeling  that  the  affair  was  sinking  in  the  sands. 

"  I  then  turned  to  Moltke  and  asked  him  this  question : 
*  The  tool  which  we  need  for  the  war,  our  army,  is  it 
really  good  enough  so  that  we  could  begin  war  depending 
upon  the  greatest  probability  of  success?'  Moltke  had 
a  confidence  as  firm  as  a  rock :  '  We  never  had  a  better 
tool  than  at  the  present  moment,'  he  said.  Roon,  in  whom 
it  is  true  I  had  less  confidence,  fully  confirmed  what 
Moltke  had  said. 


24  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

"  '  Very  well,  then,  continue  to  eat  undisturbed,'  said  I 
to  my  two  guests.  I  seated  myself  at  a  little  round  marble 
table  which  was  at  the  side  of  the  one  where  they  were 
eating.  I  re-read  the  dispatch,  took  my  pencil  and 
scratching  out  deliberately  all  the  passage  in  which  it  was 
said  that  Benedetti  had  asked  for  a  new  audience,  etc.,  I 
allowed  to  remain  only  the  head  and  tail.  Now  the  dis- 
patch had  an  entirely  different  air.  I  read  it  to  Moltke 
and  to  Roon  in  the  new  form  which  I  had  given  it. 

"  They  both  exclaimed,  '  Splendid !  That  will  produce 
its  effect.' 

"  We  continued  to  eat  with  the  best  appetite. 

"  I  ordered  immediately  that  the  dispatch  be  sent  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  by  the  telegraph  offices,  to  all  the 
papers  and  to  all  the  missions.^  And  we  were  still  to- 
gether when  we  began  to  receive  the  desired  information 
upon  the  effect  the  dispatch  had  produced  in  Paris.  It 
had  burst  like  a  shell.  After  having  made  a  most  humili- 
ating request  to  our  King,  the  dispatch  made  the  French 
believe  that  their  representative  had  been  treated  rudely 
by  him.  All  the  loungers  of  the  boulevard  were  of  the 
opinion  that  such  a  thing  could  not  be  endured.  The 
shout  '  To  Berlin !  to  Berlin '  was  uttered  by  those 
howlers  of  the  crowd.  There  was  the  effect  in- 
tended. 

"  The  effect  was  the  same  here  as  there.  The  King, 
who,  yielding  to  my  pressing  representations,  interrupted 
his  cure  at  Ems  and  returned  to  Berlin,  was  completely 
surprised  by  the  clamorous  joy  which  the  people  mani- 
fested everywhere  as  he  passed.  He  did  not  understand 
what  had  taken  place.  The  indescribable  enthusiasm 
which  burst  with  furor  in  Berlin  seized  and  shook  deeply 
'  To  all  the  representatives  of  Prussia  abroad. 


THE  MUTILATED  EMS  DISPATCH         25 

our  old  master.  His  eyes  grew  moist.  He  recognized 
that  this  was  truly  a  national  war,  a  popular  war  which 
the  people  demanded  and  had  to  have. 

"  Even  before  our  arrival  in  Berlin  we  had  received 
from  the  King  the  authorization  of  mobilizing  at  least 
a  part  of  our  army.  When  the  Prince  Royal  left  the 
train,  he  purposely  spoke  very  loud  in  the  station  of  the 
mobilization  at  hand ;  the  enthusiasm  increased  even 
more.  When  we  reached  the  Castle,  His  Majesty  was 
disposed  to  mobilize  all  the  army. 

"  The  sequel  you  know.  There  is  a  point  in  it  con- 
cerning which  Gramont,  in  his  Memoires,  expresses  his 
sincere  astonishment.  He  could  not  see  the  reason  why, 
after  things  had  taken  such  a  pacific  turn,  the  belligerent 
current  had  triumphed.  '  A  sinister  apparition  came 
to  view.  Suddenly  everything  is  changed.  What  had 
happened?  Here  was  Bismarck  (arriving)  in  Berlin!' 
That  is  just  about  what  one  reads  in  the  Memoires  of 
de  Gramont.  I  quote  from  memory.  In  any  case,  I 
was  the  '  sinister  apparition.' 

"  I  add  that  I  was  authorized  to  make  what  erasures 
seemed  to  me  absolutely  necessary.  I  had  the  freedom  to 
publish  the  dispatch  in  extenso  or  by  extracts.  I  have 
not  regretted  to  have  made  extracts."  ^ 

The  following  conclusions  grow  out  of  Bismarck's 
accounts : 

1.  Bismarck  left  Varzin  because  he  wanted  the  war. 

2.  He  was  cast  down  when  he  heard  of  the  withdrawal 
of  Prince  Leopold's  candidacy. 

3.  He,  von  Moltke  and  von  Roon  were  dejected  when 

^  The  author  was  not  able  to  get  access  to  the  Vienna  Free 
Press  of  Nov.  20,  1892.  The  text  here  given  is  from  Le  Temps 
of   Nov.  2Z. 


26         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

the  Ems  dispatch  arrived,  and  showed  that  the  question 
with  France  was  virtually  settled  along  the  lines  of  peace, 
or  might  be. 

4.  He  would  not  go  to  Ems  because  he  had  not  worked 
up  those  around  the  King,  while  in  Berlin  his  press  and 
his  followers  had  done  the  work  of  excitement. 

5.  De  Gramont  and  Emile  Ollivier,  bombastic  and 
swashbuckling  as  they  were,  never  used  in  the  Corps 
legislatif,  even  by  exception,  such  language  as  that  of 
Bismarck  in  the  Reichstag  during  the  subsequent  years 
that  he  remained  in  power.^ 

6.  A  fact  which  proves  that  Benedetti  was  not  provok- 
ing or  arrogant  is  that  he  received  the  King's  answer 
"  with  gratitude." 

7.  The  King  not  only  did  not  insult  the  French  Ambas- 
sador, as  the  mutilated  dispatch  had  reported  it  to  the 
French,  but  he  was  courteous  to  him,  and  at  last  did 
really  receive  him  in  keeping  with  the  Ambassador's 
respectful  request.^ 

8.  The  intent  in  mutilating  the  dispatch  is  that  it  was 
"  an  opportunity  that  never  would  recur  again  "  to  fight. 

9.  He  kept  only  "  the  head  and  the  tail  "  of  the  dis- 
patch, leaving  out  what  was  essential  to  its  understand- 

^  In  a  conversation  with  Lord  Loftus,  Ambassador  of  Great 
Britain  to  Berlin,  Bismarck  gave  him  to  understand  that  he  was 
about  to  address  a  challenge  to  France  on  account  of  the  utter- 
ances of  de  Gramont  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Letter  of 
Lord  Loftus  to  Lord  Granville.  July  13,  1870.  Had  not  the 
Ems  dispatch  expedient  succeeded,  he  would  have  found  other 
pretexts  for  a  war. 

°  Mr.  James  W.  Headlam,  speaking  upon  this,  says,  "  Both 
were  anxious  to  avoid  war,  and  the  King  to  the  last  treated 
Benedetti  with  marked  graciousness ;  he  had  while  at  Ems  in- 
vited him  to  the  royal  table,  and  even  now,  the  next  morning 
before  leaving  Ems,  granted  him  an  audience  at  the  station  to 
take  leave."    Bismarck,  p.  338. 


THE  MUTILATED  EMS  DISPATCH         2-7 

ing.  It  was  a  fraud  and  a  practical  forgery  which  he 
did  not  date  from  Berlin  but  from  Ems.  It  was  sent 
as  the  King's  dispatch. 

10.  Without  forgetting  the  stupid  levity  of  the 
Tuileries,  as  the  noisy  agitation  of  small  F"rench  cliques, 
we  must  assert,  as  Bismarck  has  done,  that  he  was  the 
great  decisive  personal  factor  that  brought  the  war  about. 
"He  was  proud  of  it.  As  he  says,  "  I  have  never  regretted 
to  have  made  extracts." 

As  the  war  began,  the  would-be  aggressor  of  Switzer- 
land, the  author  of  the  Danish  war,  the  manipulator  of 
the  Austro-Prussian  war,  the  mutilator  of  the  Ems  dis- 
patch followed  his  sovereign  to  the  battlefield.  He  "  had 
some  days  previously  partaken  of  the  Sacrament  in  his 
own  room."  ^  After  performing  this  act  inaugurated  by 
Him  who  said,  "  Do  this  in  remembrance  of  Me,"  he 
entered  the  war  of  his  own  making  which  cost  the  lives 
of  200,000  Germans  and  of  300,000  Frenchmen,  maimed 
multitudes  for  life,  and  tore  away  2,000,000  people  from 
the  land  they  loved.  In  a  moment  of  despondency  and 
probably  of  remorse,  October  21,  1877,  he  said,  "  There 
is  no  doubt,  however,  that  I  have  caused  unhappiness  to 
great  numbers.  But  for  me  three  great  wars  would  not 
have  taken  place,  80,000  men  would  not  have  been  killed 
and  would  not  now  be  mourned  by  parents,  brothers,  sis- 
ters and  widows."  ^  "  Eighty  thousand  men  .  .  .  killed  !  " 
How  difficult  for  Bismarck  to  tell  the  truth !  Busch 
relates  that  during  the  Franco-German  war  his  chief 
overtook  some  francs-tireiirs  that  were  prisoners.     He 

'  Busch,  M.,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  N.  Y.,  vol. 
I,  p.  8. 

'  Busch,  M.,  Bismarck.  Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History, 
vol.  II,  p.  164. 


28  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

spoke  to  them  with  great  harshness.  "  I  told  them,"  he 
said,  "  You  shall  all  be  hanged,  you  are  not  soldiers,  you 
are  assassins."  ^  These  men  patriots,  though  belonging 
to  free  corps,  defending  their  country  against  invaders, 
and  about  to  die,  were  insulted  by  him  who  had  sent  so 
many  thousands  to  an  untimely  death.  Gladstone  made 
a  signal  mistake  when  he  called  Abdul-Hamid  the  great 
assassin.  When  Vaillant,  the  French  anarchist,  ex- 
ploded a  bomb  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  the  Ham- 
burger Nachrichten  reproached  the  socialistic  organ,  the 
Vorwdrts,  for  the  lack  of  indignation  in  its  columns  on 
account  of  this  crime.  This  paper  answered  that  the 
noted  anarchist  was  less  criminal  than  the  forger  of  the 
Ems  dispatch,  whose  hands  were  stained  with  the  blood 
of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men. 

'  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  p.  6i. 


Ill 

THE  CONFLICT 

French  victims  of  this  act  were  long  in  realizing  the 
extent  to  which  they  had  been  deceived.  The  Affaires 
ctrangcres  made  protests.  Benedetti  gave  his  own  ac- 
count of  what  had  happened  at  Ems.  De  Gramont  fur- 
nished his  version  of  the  events  that  led  to  the  fatal 
war.  Sorel,  in  1875,  made  it  morally  certain  that  Bis- 
marck had  been  the  great  factor  in  rendering  the  war 
unavoidable.  Liebknecht  was  the  first  in  the  press 
to  reveal  the  "  nameless  crime."  Von  Roon  and  von 
Moltke,  with  great  discretion,  gave  an  account  of  the 
night  of  the  supreme  misdeed,  but  the  Germans  con- 
tinued their  accusations  against  France.  At  last,  the 
Iron  Chancellor  himself  made  the  confessions  which  we 
have  placed  before  our  readers.  Of  course  the  men  most 
guilty  in  bringing  about  this  catastrophe,  Bismarck  like 
the  Due  de  Gramont,^  von  Moltke  ^  and  others,  men  of  a 
bygone  age  who  had  not  even  the  excuse  of  belonging 
to  the  fatalistic  school  of  history,  repeated  the  common- 
place statement  that  the  war  was  inevitable.  A  fact  be- 
yond question  is  the  statement  of  von  Sybel,  repeated  in 
the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  that  the  people  of  France 
did  not  wish  the  war  any  more  than  the  people  of 
Germany.^     Sorel  had  pointed  out  the  same  fact.*    The 

'III,  98,  728. 
'  V,  21,  27s. 

•  III,  128,  685. 

*  Op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.   197. 

29 


30  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

act  of  Bismarck  was  at  once  followed  by  a  wide  spread- 
ing of  legends  in  Germany  about  the  insults  and  intended 
humiliation  of  Prussia  by  the  French  Government,  of 
the  discourtesy  of  Benedetti  to  the  King,  all  springing 
from  the  false  impression  created  by  the  Ems  dispatch. 
The  Iron  Chancellor  cleverly  secured  the  same  unity 
among  the  public  men  of  Germany  as  that  which  exists 
now.  There  was  a  general  recital  of  the  horrors  of  the 
old  French  invasions  and  of  their  new  aggressive  aim. 
On  July  i8,  four  days  after  the  horrible  deed,  Bismarck 
issued  a  circular  to  be  sent  to  the  representatives  of 
North  Germany  which  Sorel  calls  "  injures  officielles  in 
the  manner  of  barbarian  heroes  "  ^  who  insulted  each 
other  before  beginning  their  fight. 

Calumny  was  ever  a  weapon  of  the  Chancellor  against 
those  whom  he  wished  to  attack.  During  the  eight  years 
that  he  represented  Prussia  at  the  Diet  of  Frankfurt  he 
keeps  on  denouncing  Austrian  intrigues,^  Austrian  ag- 
gressions, Austrian  representatives.^  He  tells  how  non- 
Prussians  "  gambled  and  drank,  philandered,  intrigued 
and  danced."  *  His  portrait  of  the  Austrian  Count  Thun 
is  equal  to  some  of  Voltaire's  satires  of  his  enemies.^ 
His  sketch  of  Herr  von  Prokesch  is  the  perfection  of  a 
character  seen  through  the  prism  of  Prussian  hatred 
and  drawn  with  sulphuric  acid.^  He  snubs  them,  slanders 
them,  and  when  he  does  not  assail  their  morals,  it  is  their 
dress  or  their  manners  that  he  attacks.'^     The  imperial 

'  Op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  201. 

'  Lowe,  vol.  I,  pp.  122,  123,  125,  157. 

^  Mimroe  Smith,  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  11. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  123. 

°  Ibid.,  p.    122. 

°  Ibid.,  p.  156. 

^  Ibid,,  p.  142. 


THE  CONFLICT  31 

house  of  Austria  does  not  fare  any  better.  "  The  Haps- 
burgs  have  really  been  great  through  plundering  old 
families — the  Hungarians,  for  instance.  At  bottom  they 
are  only  a  family  of  police  spies  who  lived  upon  and 
made  their  fortune  by  confiscations."  ^  In  this  he  was 
imitated  by  other  Prussians.  Treitschke  said,  "  I  am 
German  and  a  Protestant,  do  not  expect  me  ever  to  ap- 
prove a  single  act  of  Catholic  and  despotic  Austria."  ^ 
Slanders  had  prepared  the  work  of  needle-guns  at 
Sadowa. 

In  his  conversations  Bismarck  never  fails  now  to 
blackmail  the  French  whom  in  former  days  he  has  so 
flattered.  Here  are  a  few  Bismarckian  pearls.  "  France 
is  a  nation  of  ciphers."  The  French  "  are  nothing  more 
than  30,000,000  of  Kafifres."  ^  "  They  have  barbarians 
for  comrades,  and  from  their  wars  in  Algiers,  China, 
Cochin  China  and  Mexico,  they  have  become  barbarians 
themselves."  *  "  Strip  off  the  white  skin  of  such  a  Gaul 
and  you  will  find  a  Turco."  ^  Still  speaking  of  the 
French  at  large  they  are  "  an  uncleanly  people,"  '^  "  a 
nation  full  of  envy  and  jealousy  that  had  been  mortified 
by  the  success  at  Koniggratz,  and  could  not  forgive  it, 
though  it  in  no  wise  damaged  them."  ^ 

Frenchwomen  are  not  spared.  "  I  have  traveled  a 
good  deal  through  France,  during  peace,  too,  and  I  don't 
recollect  that  I  ever  saw  anywhere  a  single  nice-looking 

*  Busch,  M.,  Bismarck.  Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History, 
vol.  I,  p.  273. 

Mil,  145,  692. 

'  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  p.  146. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  86. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  153. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  586. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  106. 


32  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

girl,  but  I  have  seen  frightfully  ugly  creatures  often.  I 
believe  that  there  are  a  few,  only  the  pretty  ones  go  off  to 
Paris  to  make  their  market  there."  ^  Did  he  not  go  so 
far  as  to  say  that  he  thought  that  when  Jules  Favre 
went  to  discuss  the  conditions  of  peace  with  him,  "  he  was 
painted  white  "?  ^  The  countess,  his  wife,  writes  to  him, 
"  I  am  afraid  there  may  be  no  Bibles  in  France,  so  I 
will  send  you  a  psalm-book  by  the  first  opportunity,  that 
you  may  read  the  prophecy  against  the  French :  '  I  say 
unto  thee  that  the  wicked  shall  be  rooted  out.'  "  ^ 

The  German  university  professors  were  bitter  beyond 
expression;  they  used  their  vast  erudition  to  unearth 
facts  about  the  past  of  the  French  or  arguments  against 
them.  The  celebrated  men  of  the  country  acted  like- 
wise. Wagner  lost  all  sense  of  truth  and  of  justice. 
Strauss,  speaking  of  the  successes  of  the  German  army, 
considered  them  as  just  chastisements  of  the  French  for 
their  "  thirst  of  rapine."  According  to  him,  it  was  not 
the  literature  only  that  was  corrupt,  it  was  the  very 
nation  itself.  Before  the  war  the  good  Germans  had 
"  no  idea  of  the  rottenness  of  French  society  and  of  the 
dissolution  of  all  moral  ties."  *  This  last  aspersion 
called  forth,  and  deserved,  the  most  pungent  sarcasms  of 
one  of  the  gentlest  of  men  that  France  ever  produced, 
Ernest  Renan.  Mommsen  in  Italy  made  a  similar  on- 
slaught upon  the  hated  Gauls,  when  speaking  of  "  French 
immorality,"  of  "  moral  dissolution,"  "  absence  of  family 
spirit,"  and  of  "  permanent  frivolity."  ^     The  Prussian 

'Busch,  Bismarck.    Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History,  vol  II, 
p.  ii6. 
'  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  p.  i86. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  p.  587. 

*  HI,  97,  548. 

*  III,  40,  269. 


THE  CONFLICT  33 

Machiavel  crowned  his  infamous  course  by  another 
abominable  performance.  In  his  former  diplomatic  con- 
ferences, seeking  the  neutrality  of  France,  he  had  un- 
questionably promised  compensations  along  the  Rhine, 
then  he  threw  over  Luxemburg,  and  finally  led  the  French 
to  turn  their  eyes  toward  Belgium.  He  and  Benedetti 
sought  practical  solutions.  They  reached  conclusions 
upon  this  matter;  Bismarck  asked  the  French  Ambas- 
sador to  write  them  down.  It  was  he  that  had  made  the 
proposal,  Benedetti  had  been  but  a  scribe.  On  the  25th 
of  July,  a  few  days  after  the  declaration  of  war,  he 
published  this  document  as  a  proposal  of  France  to  seize 
Belgium.^  The  effect  of  this  act  was  prodigious  in  dis- 
crediting France.  These  calumnies  did  their  work  among 
neutrals.  The  Russians  were  with  Bismarck  at  the 
time,  but  when  they  learned  the  truth  they  w^ere  greatly 
incensed  against  Prussia.^  So  it  was  later  on  in  Eng- 
land and  in  America. 

The  war  itself  was  a  conquering  march  through 
France.  The  fact  that  France  had  no  treaty  of  alliance 
with  any  Power  shows  that  this  war  was  unexpected  by 
her  and  that  she  had  not  planned  it.^  The  French  were 
unprepared,  but  the  Prussian  campaign  had  been  care- 
fully contrived  long  before.  After  the  Luxemburg 
Affair,  Prussian  officers,  in  many  garbs,  sometimes  as 
peddlers,  as  tourists  and  at  other  times  as  commercial 
agents,  were  studying  the  land,  preparing  maps  that  were 
far  more  perfect  than  those  of  French  officers.  When 
Moltke  went  to  Paris  with  the  King  of  Prussia  he  took 
"  strategic  walks  "  in  the  neighborhood  of  Paris.*     He 

'  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  423 ;  Headlam,  Op.  cit.,  p.  281. 

*  Novicow,  ^p.  262. 

*  Ollivier,  Emile,  L'Empire  liberal,  vol.  XIV,  p.  106. 

*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  445. 


34  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

had  studied  the  year  before  the  whole  French  frontier. 
The  whole  plan  of  invasion  was  carried  on  with  precision, 
with  energy  and  with  indescribable  cruelty.  The  shelling 
of  the  Cathedral  of  Strasburg,  the  almost  complete  de- 
struction of  Chateaudun,  the  burning  of  Bazeilles,  the 
sending  of  bombs  into  the  Latin  Quarter  of  Paris,  the 
disregarding  of  the  Red  Cross  flags  over  the  Hospital 
of  the  Val-de-Grace,  the  striking  of  the  Pantheon,  the 
wholesale  destruction  of  francs-tireurs,  the  systematic 
plundering  in  the  occupied  provinces,  the  trains  loaded 
with  booty  sent  to  Germany,  all  this  is  still  vividly  re- 
membered. Wars,  cruel  in  themselves,  have  always 
traits  of  cruelty  that  make  one  shudder,  but  the  Prussian 
war  by  its  harshness  took  one  back  to  the  methods  of 
warfare  of  bygone  days.  The  army  which,  after 
Sadowa,  had  seen  Bismarck  share  the  spoils  of  war, 
helped  itself  upon  French  soil  most  liberally.  This  has 
been  recorded  by  most  reliable  witnesses,  among  whom 
are  Lavisse  as  well  as  Gabriel  Monod,  men  whose  testi- 
mony is  above  suspicion. 

Bismarck  could  be  petty  in  his  acts.  As  France  and 
Germany  were  in  the  last  days  of  the  conflict,  did  he  not 
endeavor  to  substitute  German  instead  of  French  as  the 
language  of  diplomacy?  All  the  Governments  which  he 
thus  addressed  answered  him  in  their  own  vernacular.^ 
Henceforth  he  sent  his  dispatches  in  French.  This  war 
was  not  only  deprived  of  sincere  motives  but  of  chivalry 
and  of  all  generosity.  Already  at  Sedan  he  had  treated 
Napoleon  with  hardness.  He  would  not  allow  him  to 
see  the  King  until  the  military  commanders  had  exacted 


'  Busch,  INT.,  Bismarck.     Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History, 
vol.  I,  p.  383- 


THE  CONFLICT  35 

from  him  the  severest  possible  terms.^  Similarly  with 
Jules  Favre  when  the  French  })atriot  appealed  for  easier 
terms  and  stood  his  ground,  "  Too  late !  "  he  said,  "  the 
Bonapartists  are  before  you.''  "  We  are  resolved,"  said 
he,  "  to  make  peace  with  the  best  contracting  party  we 
can  find ;  the  Emperor,  the  Prince  Imperial  with  a 
Regency,  or  Prince  Napoleon;  and  if  you  do  not  agree 
to  our  conditions  we  have  in  Germany  about  100,000 
excellent  French  troops  captured  at  Metz,  who  are  still 
wholly  devoted  to  the  Imperial  cause."  ^  This  was  not 
absolutely  true. 

To  Thiers,  who  spoke  of  appealing  to  Europe,  he  re- 
plied, "  If  you  speak  to  me  of  Europe,  I  will  speak  to  you 
of  Napoleon  and  of  the  100,000  bayonets  which,  at  a 
wink  from  us,  would  re-seat  him  on  his  throne."  ^  The 
envoys  had  to  yield  to  what  the  Russian  sociologist, 
Novicow,  calls  the  "  Peace  of  Damocles,"  *  which  he 
characterizes  as  "  one  of  the  most  fatal  turning-points 
of  European  history,"  '^  the  Treaty  of  Frankfurt.  Speak- 
ing to  a  group  of  citizens  of  this  city  on  his  way  to 
Berlin,  Bismarck  said,  "  I  bring  you  a  peace  of  fifty 
years,"  ^  whereby  he  meant  that  France  was  bled  and 
exhausted,  incapable  of  recovering  before  half  a  century. 
He  had  needlessly  humiliated  her,  after  his  obsequious 
attitude  of  former  years,  by  the  foundation  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  at  Versailles.  He  had  unnecessarily  hurt  her 
feelings  by  the  entrance  of  the  German  army  into  Paris. 


'  Busch,  M.,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  pp.  108-110. 

"  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  625. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  632. 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  5. 

'  Ibid.,  p.    14. 

•Ill,  J38,  102. 


36         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

He  demanded  six  and  obtained  five  billions  of  francs  *  as 
well  as  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  When  the  agreement  had 
been  reached  Bismarck  asked  about  future  commercial 
relations;  the  delegates  said  that  their  instructions  were 
to  keep  the  status  quo,  but,  said  Jules  Favre,  "  Bismarck 
opposed  this  with  downright  vehemence,  declaring  that 
he  would  rather  recommence  the  war  of  cannons  than 
expose  himself  to  a  war  of  tariffs."  '  Germany  secured 
the  rights  of  the  most  favored  nation.  Bismarck  almost 
always  showed  his  worst  side  to  his  enemies. 

At  this  time  there  was  genuine  mutual  hatred  between 
the  two  peoples ;  that  of  the  Germans,  was  deepened  by 
traditional  legends  and  falsehoods  recently  circulated  by 
their  Government.  .  The  French  were  still  thinking  and 
talking  of  humaneness,  of  the  higher  laws  of  war,  of 
immanent  justice  which  deepened  their  sense  of  horror 
of  a  war  after  Treitschke's  heart  and  which  ought  to  have 
pleased  Bernhardi.  They  could  only  vindicate  outraged 
justice  and  some  of  them  talked  of  revanche.  The  small 
but  noisy  set  that  was  temporarily  to  win  some  popularity 
had  not  yet  arisen.  The  Derouledes  were  exceptions. 
The  best  citizens  of  the  country,  having  silenced 
every  Miles  Gloriosus  of  the  last  days  of  the  Em- 
pire, were  pondering  over  their  discovery  of  a  new 
Germany  with  its  gospel  of  violence — they  who  had 
thought  her  the  champion  of  reason,  of  justice  and  the 
friend  of  anti-militarism — they  who  had  considered 
Prussia  as  representing  "  the  future  and  Austria  the 
past "  ^ — they  who,  when  the  news  of  Sadowa  reached 

*  As  a  matter  of  fact  Germany  received  5,567,000,000  francs  in 
three  years. 

°  Lowe,   vol.   II,   p.   5. 

*  Napoleon  quoted  by  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  234. 


THE  CONFLICT  37 

them,  made  great  displays  of  flags  and  of  illuminations  ^ 
were  now  burning  with  violent  indignation. 

Bismarck,  mistaken  in  his  policy  in  reference  to  Ger- 
many, and  overexacting  in  reference  to  France,  did 
nothing  to  allay  this  wounded  national  sensitiveness. 
The  Treaty  of  Frankfurt  was  hard.  Had  it  been  more 
oppressive,  Europe  would  have  protested.  Deprecations 
not  a  few  were  already  heard  in  England  and  in  America. 
However,  when  circumstances  demanded  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  Treaty,  he  ever  made  it  harder  than  the  text 
warranted.  He  took  advantage  of  the  Commune  to  assert 
that  the  Germans  would  be  the  judges  of  the  time  of 
their  departure  from  Paris,  though  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  were  explicit.^  He  made  himself  the  only  and 
absolute  interpreter  of  the  text.  Through  General 
Manteufifel,  he  drove  such  a  sharp  bargain  with  the 
French  Government,  for  the  support  of  the  army  of  occu- 
pation, that  millions  were  practically  added  to  the  colossal 
indemnity  and  remitted  to  the  Prussian  and  Saxon  war 
offices.^  The  French  soldiers  who,  during  their  cap- 
tivity, had  committed  some  misdemeanor  and  those 
prisoners  members  of  the  free  corps,  not  under  but  ap- 
proved by  the  French  Government,  were  still  kept  in 
German  fortresses.  Bismarck  showed  no  leniency 
toward  them.^  He  wanted  to  exercise  a  sovereign  fear 
over  Frenchmen.  Two  German  soldiers  had  been  killed 
in  a  brawl,  and  the  juries,  right  or  wrong,  rendered 
verdicts  of  not  guilty. 

'  Lowe,  vol.  T,  p.  392. 

'  I.  9J.  555- 

•  Von  Moltke,  Speech  in  the  Reichstag.  Essays  and  Speeches 
and  Memoirs,  vol.  II,  p.  68. 

*  De  Broglie,  La  Mission  de  M.  dc  Gontaut-Biron  d,  Berlin, 
1896,  p.  14- 


38  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

This  decision  in  keeping  with  the  institution  of  the 
country  were  vahd,  but  Bismarck  threatened  at  once  to 
disregard  it  and  to  do  his  own  poHce.^  He  sent  a  dis- 
patch to  that  effect  to  the  French  Minister  and  at  the 
same  time  gave  a  copy  of  it  to  his  papers,  in  which 
there  were  commentaries  most  galhng  for  France.^  On 
June  i6,  1871,  the  very  day  that  Emperor  WiUiam  made 
his  triumphal  entrance  into  Berhn,  Bismarck  learned  that 
a  zone  which  had  been  reserved  to  the  German  troops 
had,  as  Jules  Favre  stated,  been  entered  by  French 
soldiers  through  a  misunderstanding.  Dismounting  from 
his  charger,  he  scratched  a  note  informing  the  authorities 
that  if  the  troops  were  not  withdrawn  they  would  be 
attacked  at  midnight.  To  the  Chief  of  the  Corps  of 
occupation  he  also  sent  the  following  telegram,  "  H  the 
French  outposts  advance  further,  attack  them."  ^ 

Owing  to  the  habits  of  economy  and  thrift  as  well  as 
the  earnest  patriotism  of  the  people  the  Government 
under  Thiers  was  able  to  pay  the  war  indemnity  before 
the  time  mentioned  in  the  Treaty.  A  clause  of  it 
authorized  this,  but  none  referred  to  the  immediate  re- 
moval of  troops  after  the  payment.  For  the  great  Ger- 
man Shylock  that  was  not  in  the  bond.  Advancing  the 
payment,  it  was  expected  by  the  French  that,  as  a 
corollary,  the  German  soldiers  would  also  hasten  the 
time  of  their  departure,  but  he  demurred.  M.  Thiers 
asserted  that  the  terms  of  payment  and  occupation  were 
inseparable,  as  they  were  extreme  terms — that  if  France 
could  not  defer  the  payment  of  her  obligations  she  could 
anticipate  the  dates  fixed  by  the  Treaty,  and  that  Ger- 

'  De  Broglie,  p.  16. 

'  Matter,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  354. 

'Lowe,  vol.  II,  p.  7. 


THE  CONFLICT  39 

many  being  paid  she  should  remove  her  troops  from  the 
six  departments  still  occupied. 

This  situation  resembled  that  of  the  Prussians  in 
France  after  Waterloo.  They  remained  in  France  until 
1818,  and  would  not  have  left,  even  then,  had  it  not  been 
for  Wellington.^  Strange  to  say,  in  order  to  allow  the 
advanced  payment  followed  by  the  German  evacuation 
of  the  country,  a  consummation  which  by  peaceful 
peoples  would  have  been  devoutly  wished,  Bismarck 
wanted  compensations.^  In  the  steps  taken  for  the 
restoration  of  normal  relations  between  the  two  countries, 
he  ever  reminded  the  vanquished  of  his  might,  of  what 
he  could  have  done  with  it  and  of  what  he  could  do  now. 
For  him  Prussian  might,  then  German  might,  was  right. 

After  this  Bismarck  was  rewarded  with  the  title  of 
Prince  and  with  the  gift  of  the  domain  of  Friedrichsruh, 
officially  valued  at  1,000,000  thalers,  but  which  in  reality 
was  worth  3,000,000.^  His  attitude  toward  France 
hardly  changed.  He  was  rarely  fairer  or  friendlier.  He 
had  all  along  his  fingers  upon  the  Keyboard  of  German 
public  opinion,  in  the  management  of  which  he  was  a 
master.  It  was  not  in  vain  that  early  in  his  career  he 
had  been  intrusted  with  the  management  of  the  Prussian 
Press  Bureau,*  and  had  made  it  a  perfect  tool  of  govern- 
mental purpose.  By  it,  he  so  kept  in  touch  with  national 
feelings  that  the  people  shared  his  aims.  On  reading 
Maurice  Busch's  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War, 
and  seeing  the  extent  to  which  the  Chancellor's  Secretary 
wrote  articles   for  the   press  everywhere,  ever   seeking 

'  I,  96,  308. 

'I,  Q5,  694. 

'  Matter,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  283. 

'  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  153. 


40  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

to  bring  Germans  to  the  aims  of  Bismarck,  one  realizes 
the  extent  to  which  he  had  made  the  press  a  tool  of  his 
policy.  What  most  astonished  Germans  was  that  the 
French  were  not  discouraged,  that  they  paid  no  homage 
to  their  conquerors,  that  they  did  not  passively  accept 
their  defeat  and  become  reconciled  with  their  victors. 
They  were  disappointed  that  the  French  did  not  accept 
the  final  decisions  of  brute  force,  but  appealed  to  the 
immanent  justice  of  the  universe,  the  nemesis  and  the 
rewarder  of  history. 

The  way  in  which  the  bruised  Frenchmen  reasserted 
their  energy,  and  offered  fourteen  times  more  money 
than  Thiers  needed  to  pay  Germany,  a  fact  which  aroused 
the  admiration  of  the  whole  world,  excited  rather  bitter 
feelings  on  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine.  France,  de- 
feated, mangled  and  crushed,  healed  her  national  wounds 
like  a  healthy  being.  The  English  Teutophile,  Charles 
Lowe,  who  so  praised  Bismarck,  speaks  of  the  "  truly 
Antaeus  power  of  her  recuperation."  ^  She  rebuilt  her 
finances,  displayed  a  new  energy,  and  a  new  intelligence 
in  her  education,  reinvigorated  her  moral  ideals,  made 
over  her  industrial  life,  extended  her  colonies,  which, 
later,  became  an  object  of  German  envy,  restored  her 
army  to  an  adequate  condition  in  keeping  with  the 
defensive  duties  of  a  great  Power,  and  by  her  sterling 
worth  resumed  her  place  in  the  councils  of  nations. 
While  the  war  hounds  were  barking  on  both  sides  of  the 
frontier,  though  much  louder  east  of  the  Rhine,  she 
was  devoted  to  the  evolution  of  her  national  life  and  to 
the  framing  of  institutions  in  keeping  with  her  present 
needs.  For  the  third  time  in  her  history,  having  found 
the  monarchical  form  of  Government  inadequate,  she 
'  Op.  cit.,  vol.  II,  51. 


THE  CONFLICT  41 

was  trying  republican  institutions,  with  which  Bismarck 
had  not  the  least  sympathy.  He  would  rather  sign  a 
treaty  of  peace  with  the  impossible  Comte  de  Chambord 
than  with  Thiers.  When  the  heir  to  the  throne  of  the 
Bourbons  declined  to  accept  the  tricolor  flag  and  hence 
could  not  be  King,  Bismarck,  speaking  sarcastically  to 
the  monarchical  French  Ambassador,  said,  "  You  will 
have  to  keep  Adolphe  I  " — referring  to  Adolphe  Thiers. 
Gontaut-Biron  replied,  "  Yes,  provided  he  has  no  heir."  ^ 
Notwithstanding  such  sallies,  half  sarcasm,  half 
humor,  he  continued  to  annoy  France.  At  the  election 
of  Marechal  MacMahon  to  the  presidency,  the  great  Ger- 
man statesman  demanded  that  the  chief  Magistrate  of 
France  should  himself  notify  his  rise  to  power  to  the 
Emperor  of  Germany.  He  further  asked  that  the  Am- 
bassador of  France  have  new  credentials.  He  had  in- 
duced Russia  and  Austria  to  take  the  same  stand.  It  is 
customary  in  monarchies  to  renew  at  the  death  of  the 
King  the  credentials  of  ambassadors,  because  the  sover- 
eignty resides  in  the  monarch,  who  is  its  representative, 
while  in  a  republic  the  sovereign  is  the  nation,  which 
does  not  change.-  The  explanations  given  by  the  Iron 
Chancellor  showed  that  he  was  decided  to  meddle  with 
French  internal  matters.  When  Gontaut-Biron  made 
remonstrances  Bismarck  threatened  to  withdraw  his 
ambassador  from  Paris  and  that  Russia  and  Austria 
would  follow  the  same  course.'  He  went  so  far  as  to  say 
that  he  would  not  recognize  Gambetta  as  president  of 
the  Republic  were  he  elected.*     He  demanded  that  the 

'  Op.  cit.,  p.  69. 

'  Broglie,  Op.  cit.,  p.  109.    Matter,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  375- 

'  Broglie,  p.  in. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  142. 


42  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

French  Government,  which  had  already  warned  French 
bishops  to  be  moderate  in  their  language  if  they  spoke 
of  the  Kulturkampf,  should  pursue  and  repress  them,^ 
Dr.  Windthorst  and  his  supporters  rightly  denounced  the 
Chancellor's  silencing  French  bishops  as  "  an  unjustifi- 
able interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  France."  ^ 
That  he  should  have  been  unfriendly  to  freedom  of  dis- 
cussion in  his  own  country  was  perfectly  proper,  but  that 
he  should  force  a  neighboring  state  to  adopt  the  same 
attitude  is  inadmissible.  The  episcopate  of  France  con- 
stituted an  insignificant  minority  out  of  touch  with  the 
nation.  The  Government  was  unfriendly  to  their 
criticisms  and  to  their  acts,  but  notwithstanding  that  the 
Chancellor  identified  them  with  the  nation  which  he 
threatened  with  war.  "  I  declare,"  he  said,  "  that  if 
France  supports  the  Catholics  in  Germany  I  will  not 
wait  to  have  her  ready.  That  she  will  be  in  two  years :  I 
will  seize  before  that  the  favorable  opportunity."  ^  He 
would  have  done  it,  but  European  sentiment  and  the 
attitude  of  two  European  rulers  saved  her. 

'  Broglie,  p.  163. 

*  Lowe,  vol.  II,  p.  61. 

*  Broglie,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  166,  188. 


IV 

THE  AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE 

As  we  have  already  seen,  before  attacking  Austria  in 
1866,  Bismarck  wanted  that  country  to  join  Prussia  in 
an  aggression  against  France.^  It  was  on  some  of  his 
later  proposals  to  \lenna  that  von  Beust  spoke  of  Bis- 
marck's treaties  of  alliance,  as  des  chiffons  de  papier. 
After  the  Franco-German  war,  the  two  adversaries  upon 
the  battlefield  of  Bohemia,  Emperor  William  and  Em- 
peror Francis  Joseph,  who  had  not  seen  each  other  since 
Sadowa,  met  at  Ischl,  in  Austria,  while  Bismarck  himself 
and  von  Beust  conferred  together  at  Gastein,  preparing 
an  understanding  to  be  followed  by  concerted  action. 
Unconsciously  the  Chancellor  was  working  toward  what 
seemed  a  great  federation  or  federations  of  Europe.  An 
honest  federation  without  any  aggressive  thought  be- 
hind it  would  have  been  a  great  boon  for  the  world,  and 
a  most  gratifying  step  forward  towards  the  union  of 
the  civilized  states  which  is  bound  to  come.  Such  was  not 
Bismarck's  aim.  He  brought  into  that  combination  the 
Emperor  of  Russia.  Thus  the  Hohenzollerns,  the  Haps- 
burgs  and  the  Romanofs  formed  what  was  known  as  the 
"  Three  Kaiser  League."  The  three  rulers  had  met  at 
Warsaw,  in  i860,  to  discuss  the  European  situation.^  In 
1872  they  met  again  in  Berlin,  where  there  were  the 
usual  festivities,  imperial  embracings  and  conferences. 

Mil,  73,  523- 

'  Lowe,  vol.   I,  p.  265. 

43 


44         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Whatever  one  may  think  of  this  trio  of  Powers,  and 
much  good  could  have  been  said  about  it,  one  cannot 
avoid  the  conclusion  that  its  chief  object,  at  this  time, 
was  the  isolation  of  France.  One  of  the  laudatory  his- 
torians of  Bismarck  sums  up  the  character  of  this  re- 
union as  follows :  "  The  Meeting  of  the  three  Emperors 
marked  the  first  stage  in  the  consummate  policy  by  which 
Bismarck  sought  to  isolate  France  from  the  rest  of 
Europe,  and  thus  minimize  the  danger  of  a  war  of 
revenge."  ^ 

This  policy  was  pursued  to  the  bitter  end,  and,  two- 
score  years  later,  it  failed  because  of  its  unjust  purpose 
and  its  subterfuges.  Some  German  writers  said,  ironi- 
cally, that  the  League  was  for  French  happiness,  to  pre- 
vent Frenchmen  from  doing  foolish  things  ^  and  to 
preserve  peace,  which  the  French  were  far  from  disturb- 
ing. On  the  morrow  of  the  war,  the  attorney  general 
Renouard,  in  his  address  at  the  reopening  of  the  Cour  de 
cassation  of  Paris,  spoke  upon  "  Justice  above  Force." 
He  closed  with  these  words :  "  We,  the  vanquished  of 
yesterday,  dare  to  assert,  in  the  face  of  the  world,  wit- 
ness of  our  recent  defeats,  that  the  resentment  of  our 
wounded  pride  does  not  extinguish  in  us  the  intelligence 
of  eternal  verities :  peace  is  good,  war  is  criminal.  Our 
beloved  fatherland  can  give  no  more  striking  sign  of  her 
renascence  than  by  not  sacrificing  to  her  rancor  the  cause 
of  civilization.  Let  her  disdain  from  demanding  to  force 
the  revenge  that  she  hopes;  it  is  worthy  of  her  to  seek 
in  the  supremacy  of  justice  the  reparation  of  her  ills  and 
the  return  to  her  of  all  her  children."  ^ 

'  Lowe,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  II,  22. 

Mil,  122,  954. 

'  Dreyfus,  F,,  L'arhitrage  international,  1894,  p.  Z72. 


AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  45 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  passages  like  this  showing 
the  spirit  of  leading  French  citizens.  In  spite  of  that 
Bismarck  formed  his  League,  which  was  so  strong  that 
its  members  freed  themselves  from  the  most  elementary 
rules  of  international  courtesy.  Their  purpose  was  to 
paralyze  France,  and  paralyzed  she  would  not  be.  She 
so  acted  that  she  soon  regained  the  respect  and  the 
esteem  of  the  Powers,  who  had  begun  to  understand 
Bismarck's  maneuvers,  and  to  know  how  he  had  risen 
upon  the  stepping  stones  of  others'  dead  selves  to  higher 
things — that  his  international  combinations  were  not  for 
the  development  of  the  best  European  life,  but  machines 
subserving  his  ambition.  France  attempted  none,  and 
devoted  herself  to  the  duty  of  building  up  her  republican 
institutions,  for  which  he  did  not  lack  contempt.  "  A 
republic,"  he  said,  "  will,  with  great  difficulties,  find  an 
ally  against  us,  a  Monarchical  Government."  ^  The  genius 
which  was  embodied  in  the  Iron  Chancellor  was  capable 
of  making  some  mistakes.  Nations  cannot  be  indifferent 
to  the  interests  of  their  growing  democracy  whatever  be 
the  form  of  their  Government.  France  needed  peace, 
wished  for  peace,  and  worked  for  peace.  Gambetta  said 
in  1880,  "  If  our  hearts  beat  it  is  not  for  an  ideal  of 
bloody  adventures,  it  is  that  what  remains  of  France 
should  remain  entire,  and  that  we  may  depend 
upon  the  future  to  see  if  there  is  an  immanent  jus- 
tice which  comes  on  its  chosen  day  and  at  its  chosen 
hour."  2 

Frenchmen  were  in  constant  fear  of  seeing  the  hel- 
meted  men  reappear  in  the  East.  Menaces  were  fre- 
quent, not  to  say  constant.    In  1874,  von  Moltke,  asking 

•  II,  6,  92s. 

'  Berard,  V.,  La  France  et  Guillaume  II,  p.  42. 


46  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

for  more  war  credits  in  the  Reichstag,  said,  "  What  we 
have  conquered  in  half  a  year  by  arms  we  must  defend 
by  arms  for  half  a  century."  He  adds  later  on,  "  After 
its  wars  Germany  has  caused  herself  to  be  feared  and 
to  be  esteemed,  but  she  is  not  loved."  True  enough! 
He  draws  pictures  of  the  terrible  armaments  of  France. 
Forgetting  the  Bismarck  dinner  and  the  Ems  dispatch, 
he  says,  "  What  is  borne  to  us  from  across  the  Vosges 
is  a  rabid  cry  of  revenge  for  the  reverses  which  France 
herself  has  courted."  By  a  singular  contradiction,  he 
recognizes  that  the  majority  of  Frenchmen  "  is  thor- 
oughly imbued  with  a  sense  of  the  absolute  necessity  of, 
above  all,  preserving  peace."  ^  On  another  occasion,  in 
the  same  hall  of  imperial  legislation,  discussing  socialism, 
he  evokes  needlessly  the  apparition  "  of  the  professeurs 
des  barricades  and  the  petroleuses  of  the  Commune  of 
1871."^  The  Germans  used  the  French  as  the  Spartans 
did  the  drunken  Helotes  for  the  education  of  their  chil- 
dren. The  Communists  suggested  mistaken  ideas  to 
Moltke ;  some  were  Communalists  demanding  local  gov- 
ernment, some  of  them  held  doctrines  of  communism, 
but  the  greater  number  had  nothing  to  do  with  any  new 
social   theories   whatsoever. 

The  effect  of  his  speech  before  a  conservative  German 
audience  was  telling.  As  his  examples  of  the  outcome 
of  socialism  were  taken  from  Paris  and  the  French  it  is 
needless  to  say  that  it  wounded  the  susceptibilities  of 
masses  of  the  countrymen  of  Thiers  who  were  no  friends 
of  the  destroyers  of  the  Tuileries  or  of  the  murderers 
of  Archbishop  Darboy.  In  another  instance  he  speaks 
with  an  unblushing  daring  of  the  war.     "  In  1870  there 

'  Essays,  Speeches  and  Memoirs,  vol.  II,  p.  iii. 
'^  Ibid.,  p.  77. 


AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  47 

was  as  yet  no  united  and  powerful  Germany  in  the  heart 
of  Europe,  and  the  war,  with  which  France  took  us  by 
surprise,  was  waged  principally  with  a  view  to  prevent- 
ing its  establishment."  ^ 

There  we  have  two  positively  erroneous  assertions. 
First,  France  did  not  force  a  war  upon  Prussia  and,  sec- 
ond, she  was  not  opposed  to  a  spontaneous  and  peace- 
ful unification  of  Germany.  Every  statement  made  by 
German  leaders,  and  every  argument  built  on  it,  led  to 
one  unfair  and  unfriendly  conclusion.  Bismarck  was 
even  afraid  that  French  finances  could  not  long  bear 
the  strain  of  French  military  burdens  -  and  like  his 
friend,  Moltke,  was  certain  that  war  was  forthcoming 
and  ought  to  be  anticipated.  Wilhelmstrasse  discussed 
questions  of  the  French  army  as  if  France  had  been  a 
German  protectorate.^  The  German  Ambassador  in 
Paris,  von  Arnim,  did  not  hesitate  to  criticize  the  country 
and  her  politics.*  Bismarck  accused  him  of  having 
"  facilitated,  if  not  directly  caused,  the  change  of  govern- 
ment by  thwarting  his  efforts  to  keep  M.  Thiers  in 
power."  ^ 

The  German  press  was  most  aggressive.  In  1875,  it 
reached  a  high  pitch  of  excitement  which  was  far  from 
spontaneous.  M.  Tardieu  has  summed  up  the  trend  of 
their  grievances  as  follows :  "  To  finish  once  for  all  with 
France  is  not  merely  opportune.  It  is  a  duty  Germany 
owes  to  herself  and  to  humanity.  Europe  will  never 
be  tranquil  as  long  as  a  struggle  is  possible,  and  there 
will  be  this  possibility  of  a  struggle  as  long  as  the  blunder 

^Essays,  Speeches  ancf  Memoirs,  p.  116. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  205. 

*  Broglie,  Op.  cit.,  p.  224. 
*V,  14,  19- 

'Lowe,  vol.  II,  pp.  39,  50, 


48         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

made  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfurt  remains  unrepaired. 
For  it  leaves  France  in  a  position  to  survive  and  re- 
commence the  duel.  Germany  is  troubled  by  the  con- 
sciousness of  having  only  half-crushed  her  enemy  and 
of  being  able  to  defend  herself  only  by  sleeping  with 
one  eye  open."  ^ 

It  is  well  known  that  Bismarck  had  been  for  some  time 
bent  upon  a  new  invasion  of  France.  The  old  Emperor, 
listening  to  a  speech  of  the  Prince  prepared  for  the 
opening  of  the  Reichstag  in  1874,  declared  that  that 
speech  was  a  "  menace  "  to  France.  He  insisted  that  it 
should  be  modified  in  a  pacific  sense.  He  said,  later  on, 
to  Prince  Clovis  von  Hohenlohe :  "  I  do  not  want  war 
with  France,  I  am  too  old  to  undertake  anything  like  that, 
but  I  fear  lest  Bismarck  may  lead  me  to  it  little  by 
little."  2 

"^  In  1875,  he  intended  to  attack  France  and  to  "  bleed 
her  white,"  but  was  prevented  by  Queen  Victoria,  through 
the  energetic  action  of  Lord  Derby,^  and  by  the  Czar. 
In  1887,  he  wished  again  to  provoke  her  and  had  even 
attempted  to  secure  the  neutrality  of  St.  Petersburg  in 
advance,*  but  the  Czar  was  bent  upon  a  pacific  policy. 
He  realized  all  along  that  the  great  German's  purpose 
was  to  strike  France.  By  a  strange  coincidence,  the 
two  Powers  which  were  bound  ultimately  to  be  her 
friends  stood  by  her  then.  Bismarck's  hostility  changed 
in  form,  but  remained  unabated.  As  the  French  Ambas- 
sador opposed  many  of  his  anti-Gallican  designs,  he 
ceased  to  be  persona  grata,  and  was  attacked  by  the 

"^    ^France  and  the  Alliances,  1908,  p.  124. 
'  Matter,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  380. 

*  Journal  dcs  Dcbats,  Nov.  27,  1893. 

*  Mevil,  A.,  De  la  paix  dc  Francfort  a  la  Conference  d'Al' 
gesiras,  1909,  p.  5. 


AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  49 

Bismarckian  papers.  According  to  them,  he  conspired 
against  the  Empire,  he  had  become  a  center  of  intrigues, 
he  had  endeavored  to  secure  the  favor  of  the  Emperor 
over  and  above  the  head  of  the  Chancellor,  who  wanted 
his  recall.^  In  a  letter  to  M.  Decazes,  the  Ambassador 
exclaims,  "  That  man  does  not  forgive  me  the  service 
which,  with  honor,  thank  God,  I  have  rendered  my 
country."  ^  The  Prussian  Richelieu  could  hardly  bear 
the  wise  and  judicious  policy  advocated  by  the  Ambas- 
sador and  practiced  by  France  which  foiled  his  bel- 
ligerent purpose.^ 

He  ever  finds  occasions  to  show  his  unfriendliness. 
In  1894,  as  he  received  a  deputation  of  German  teachers, 
he  speaks  of  the  teaching  of  history  in  the  German 
schools  and  at  once  proceeds  to  criticize  bitterly  the 
French  methods — that  the  Gallican  teachers  are  in- 
capable of  imparting  to  their  pupils  anything  like  im- 
partial and  objective  history — that  they  are  very  de- 
ficient in  their  knowledge  of  geography,  etc.  France 
under  the  Republic  never  had  a  blind  interpretation  of 
national  history  like  that  of  Treitschke,  nor  has  Ger- 
many any  popular  text-books  of  history  superior  to  those 
of  Gabriel  Monod  and  Lavisse,  while  the  geographical 
text-books  of  Vidal  de  la  Blache  and  Foncin — to  men- 
tion only  these — are  equal  to  the  best  elsewhere.  He  ac- 
cuses the  French  of  waging  a  systematic  war  upon 
German  securities.  It  is  true  that  French  financiers  were 
unfriendly  to  national  investments  among  the  countries 
of  the  TripUce.  They  were  unwilling  to  have  their 
savings   used   against   them   by   their  ayowed   enemies. 

*  Broglie,  Op.  cit.^  p.  259. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  266. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  293. 


^> 


50  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Right  or  wrong  in  so  doing  they  were  only  following  the 
object-lessons  of  Bismarck,  who,  when  temporarily  op- 
posed to  Russia,  did  the  very  thing  with  which  he  re- 
proached the  French.  He  repeated  ad  nauseam  that 
France  would  attack  Germany.  In  order  to  meet  this 
fictitious  danger  the  peaceful  German  taxpayer,  trusting 
his  leaders,  consents  to  pay  the  taxes,  but  hates  the  French 
whom  he  makes  responsible  for  this  burden,  and  the 
Chancellor  attains  his  twofold  purpose,  the  credits  and 
he  culture  of  antagonism  to  France. 

The  red  rag  of  the  revanche  is  constantly  held  before 
their  eyes.  At  times  his  accusations,  made  in  public  or 
made  in  print,  are  exhibited  in  posters ;  one  of  them  was 
placed  on  the  walls  of  Metz.^  When  the  Government 
publishes  alarming  news  one  may  be  certain  that  a  mili- 
tary project  is  in  the  air,  and  when  negotiations  are  going 
on  in  Paris  the  press  may  be  furious,  but  as  soon  as  the 
arrangements  are  concluded  it  is  almost  silent.  If  the 
Reichstag  refuses  to  vote  the  seven-year  army  bill,  he 
conjures  the  members  with  the  pictures  of  the  Red- 
breeches  about  to  cross  the  Vosges.-  He  speaks  of 
"  her  hatred  against  all  her  neighbors "  and  of  her 
being  "  the  most  turbulent  nation  that  exists."  He 
wanted  to  secure  his  vote.  He  knew  that  a  mighty  army 
is  not  only  efficient  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  terri- 
tory from  a  neighbor  in  time  of  war,  but  also  to  gain  con- 
cessions in  time  of  peace.  In  other  words  he  wished  to 
make  it  an  instrument  of  intimidation.  He  was  so 
provoking  that  Boulanger  owed  some  of  his  popularity 
to  the  fact  that  while  every  public  man  in  France  was 
pacific,    he    dared,    after    one    of    Bismarck's    bellicose 

Mil,  59,  237. 
'  III,  88,  210. 


AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  51 

speeches,  to  answer  him  with  energy.^  However,  as 
soon  as  Boulanger  saw  the  popular  effect  of  his  chal- 
lenge, he  put  his  musket  on  his  other  shoulder  and 
proclaimed  that  Boulangism  meant  peace.  Like  all 
demagogues  he  knew  what  the  French  people  desired 
most  and  that  he  promised  to  them.  "  The  fall  of 
Boulanger,"  said  Bebel  in  the  Reichstag,  "proves  that 
France  is  not  disposed  to  allow  herself  to  be  stirred  to 
war  and  to  go  into  it  led  by  an  adventurer." 

The  Germans  have  often  expressed  the  regret  that 
they  are  not  loved  by  their  western  neighbors,  without 
ever  imagining  that  they  themselves  may  be  at  fault, 
or  that  the  French  are  a  peaceful  people.  We  are 
not  here  speaking  of  a  group  of  individuals,  of  ir- 
responsible cliques  such  as  exist  in  every  country,  but 
of  the  men  who  were  at  the  helm  of  things.  They  were 
proper  and  correct  with  their  trans-Rhinean  peers.  On 
the  other  hand,  Bismarck  was  haughty,  arrogant.  Dur- 
ing the  palmiest  days  of  the  Drei-Kaiser-Bund,  his  atti- 
v^tude  was  exasperating.  He  practically  demanded  that 
France  should  not  help  the  Carlists  of  Spain  and  recog- 
nize the  government  of  Marshal  Serrano.^  His  stand 
toward  Belgium  in  1875  was  menacing  and  the  brave 
little  state  had  her  Bismarckian  scare. ^  He  remonstrated 
with  Italy  because  of  the  protection  which  the  Ouirinal, 
by  the  Papal  Guarantee  Law,  gave  to  the  Vatican.* 
Spain,  after  the  great  consideration  shown  her  to  draw 
her  people  into  the  alliance,  had  her  turn  when  the  con- 
troversy about  the  Caroline  Islands  arose.     For  awhile 

'  Barclay,    Sir    Thomas,    Thirty    Years    Anglo-French   Remi- 
niscences, p.  91. 

*  Lowe,  vol.  II,  p.  59. 

*  II,  9,  222. 
MI,  p.  i:i2. 


52         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

he  was  hard  and  unyielding,^  but  at  last  the  question  was 
referred  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Pope.  It  was  in  the 
same  spirit  that  he  annoyed  the  Americans  at  Samoa.'' 
In  1889,  he  showed  his  dictatorial  spirit  against  Switzer- 
land, because  she  gave  shelter  to  German  Socialists. 
With  the  support  of  Russia  and  Austria,  at  the  time,  he 
demanded  from  the  Swiss  the  suppression  of  the  right 
of  asylum  for  socialistic  fugitives  and  practically  the 
limitation  of  Swiss  sovereignty,  though  this  was  sanc- 
tioned and  guaranteed  by  Europe.^ 

f  Again,  he  annoyed  France  by  the  use  he  made  of  the 
'  acts  of  the  French  Catholic  Clergy.  It  has  ever  been 
repugnant  to  the  Catholic  Church  to  bend,  or  bow,  before 
any  political  Power,  and  at  times  it  has  been  her  glory 
to  face  the  mighty  courageously,  and,  as  in  Belgium,  to 
have  a  Cardinal  Mercier  stand  for  justice  and  humanity. 
What  was  contemptible  in  the  Iron  Chancellor  was  his 
cunning  use  of  the  rantings  of  some  French  bishops  to 
alarm  Italy,  as  if  France  intended  to  restore  the  temporal 
power  of  the  Pope,  a  step  which  no  French  Government, 
not  even  that  of  President  MacMahon,  would  have  dared 
to  take.  Bismarck  used  French  clericalism  to  fight  Ger- 
man Catholicism  at  home,  and  to  gain  his  ends  in  Italy. 
He  took  advantage  of  the  erratic  action  of  the  Clergy 
to  arouse  Italian  anger.  He  made  the  bishops  representa- 
tives of  the  people  of  France,  and  then  caused  French- 
men, many  of  whom  at  Magenta  and  Solferino  had  shed 
their  blood  for  the  independence  of  Italy — men  still  the 
best  friends  of  the  land  of  Cavour  and  Garibaldi — to 
appear  as  foes.     This  maneuver  brought  Italy  into  the 

•  III,  71,  235. 
=*  III,  9^,  477,  950. 
*III,  9^,  236. 


AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  53 

Triple  Alliance  with  its  crushing  military  burdens,  a  step 
which  many  Italians  regretted  then  and  regret  even  more 
now.  By  this  time  Russia  had  virtually  slipped  out  of 
it,  and  was  gravitating  toward  the  French  rapprochement 
which  ultimately  was  to  ripen  into  an  alliance. 

By  his  international  combinations — less  reliable  than 
he  thought — he  created  periods  of  continental  anxiety/ 
that  were  detrimental  to  Europe  and  harmful  to  France.^ 
Ever  resourceful  he  worked,  at  times,  in  two  ways  to 
attain  one  result.  Thus  he  and  a  representative  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  offered  Italy  to  take  possession  of 
Tunis.-  The  purpose  was  to  arouse  France  and  thereby 
send  Italy  toward  Berlin  and  Vienna.  Later  on  he  en- 
couraged the  French  to  take  it  and  they  did,  but  his 
gift  of  Tunis  served  the  same  purpose.  It  embittered  the 
Italians,  though,  among  them,  there  remained  those  who 
could  show  their  gratitude  to  France  for  her  past  services 
by  approving  her  protectorate  over  Tunis.  He  intended, 
according  to  M.  Tardieu,  to  use  his  new  allies  for  the 
purpose  of  irritating  and  provoking  France.^  He  adds 
later  on,  "  Italy  was  a  puppet  in  the  hands  of  Berlin."  * 
He  followed  the  same  course  in  Egypt.  At  times  he 
sided  with  France  and  encouraged  her  to  hold  her 
ground  and  at  other  times  he  urged  England  to  "  take 
Egypt."  ^  He  hoped  that  the  Land  of  the  Pharaohs  would 
prove  a  bone  of  contention  between  the  French  and  the 
English  nation.  Fie  tried  to  draw  Spain  into  his  combi- 
nations. The  German  Crown  Prince  went  to  Madrid, 
where  he  worked   for   the   German   cause.     King   Al- 

'  III,  89,  235. 
Mil,  103,  889. 

*  France  and  the  Alliances,  p.  91. 

♦  Ibid.,  p.  134. 

•  Lowe,  vol.  II,  p.  244. 


54         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

phonso  XII  returned  the  visit  in  Berlin.  William  I 
appointed  him  colonel  of  a  Prussian  regiment,  but  it  was 
stationed  at  Strasburg  in  the  conquered  country.  The 
festivities  on  that  occasion  were  such  that  a  few  days 
later  the  new  Prussian  colonel  was  greeted  in  Paris 
with  hisses  and  groans,  though,  before,  the  Parisians 
were  very  friendly  to  him.  Was  this  feast  in  Strasburg 
accidental  or  was  it  the  purpose  of  the  Chancellor  to 
exasperate  his  neighbors  again?    It  is  impossible  to  tell. 

In  1881,  Rumania  was  apparently  drawn  into  the  same 
movement.^  Inviting  M.  Bratiano  to  join  the  Triplice, 
he  said,  "  We  want  peace,  we  are  a  league  of  peace ;  and 
if  you  desire  peace,  you  may  find  support  with  us;  but 
if  war  is  your  object,  then  you  must  go  to  others."  ^  An 
alliance  was  reached,  but  the  Rumanians  demurred  and 
the  project  had  to  be  abandoned.^  King  Milan,  who 
was  practically  driven  ofif  his  throne,  and  his  reckless 
son  who  was  murdered,  disloyal  to  their  people,  also 
entered  into  the  movement,*  but  the  Servians  soon 
realized  who  their  real  friends  were.  Mr.  Lowe,  who, 
all  along,  has  characterized  the  Bismarckian  efiforts  as 
meant  to  isolate — he  might  have  said,  strike — France, 
speaks  as  follows :  "  The  German  Chancellor  .  .  .  had 
thus  gradually  imposed  his  pacific  will  on  all  European 
diplomacy,  and  gathered  the  nations  of  the  Continent 
into  a  Peace  League  to  which  it  was  discreditable,  and 
even  dangerous,  not  to  belong."  ^  The  Bismarckian  iron 
net  was  thus  woven  about  France  with  a  patience  worthy 
of  a  better  cause.     Charles  de  Mazade,  in  1883,  wrote, 

*  Lowe,  vol.  II,  p.  149. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  151. 

*  III,  109,  477. 

*  Muir,  Ramsay,  Britain's  Case  Against  Germany,  1914,  p.  141. 
•Vol.  II,  p.  155. 


AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  55 

"  France  is  at  present  surrounded  by  a  sort  of  circle 
created  with  as  much  cleverness  as  power  in  such  a  way 
as  to  compress  her."  ^  Indeed  the  Triplice  ever  pro- 
tested that  it  loved  peace,  but  it  caused  to  rest  over 
France  menaces  of  a  conflict  that  were  more  alarming 
because  of  their  indefiniteness.  Prince  von  Bismarck 
could  indeed  have  created  a  large  instrument  of  peace, 
but  that  which  he  evolved  ultimately  crumbled  because^ 
of  its  unquestionably  belligerent  purpose. 

One  of  Bismarck's  successors,  von  Biilow,  hints  that 
the  people  who  had  joined  this  great  alliance  were  drawn 
together  by  a  sense  of  "  common  dangers,"  ^  and  there 
is  the  implication  that  they  arose  from  France,  but  what 
could  she  have  done  had  she  wished,  to  Servia,  to 
Rumania,  to  Spain,  to  Italy,  to  Austria  or  to  Germany 
herself,  bristling  with  armaments?  The  new  Chancellor 
could  not  mention  the  least  evidence  of  a  French  pur- 
pose to  attack  a  single  one  of  these  peoples.  France 
needed  all  her  strength  to  cope  with  her  overwhelming/ 
home  problems.  These  "  dangers  "  were  simply  fanciful 
creations  of  a  German  political  leader  who  used  them  to 
help  or  justify  an  aggressive  course.  This  gentleman 
has  boundless  faith  in  the  Dreibund  even  when  reduced 
by  the  secession  of  Russia,  Spain,  Servia  and  Rumania. 
He  views  it  "  as  the  resumption  and  the  prolongation  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  of  bygone  days  "  ^  and  as  "  a  mighty 
fortification  dividing  the  continent  into  two."  *  "  Rarely, 
if  ever,  has  the  history  of  Europe  witnessed  so  solid  an 
alliance."  ^     In  1902,  dealing  with  the  same  subject,  he 

•  III,  60,  707. 

'  Imperial  Germany,  p.  69. 
»  V,  7.  477- 

•  Imperial  Germany,  p.  67. 

•  VI,  23,  273- 


56         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

says,  "  We  will  continue  to  maintain  Germany  so  strong 
that  our  friendship  shall  be  precious  to  each  and  that 
it  may  not  be  indifferent  to  anyone  to  incur  our  enmity."  ^ 
In  all  his  utterances  there  is  a  threat.  "  So  solid  an 
alliance,"  "  the  masterpiece  of  statecraft  "  ^  of  Bismarck, 
received  a  strong  blow,  first  by  the  Franco-Russian 
Alliance,  then  a  second  one  by  the  Franco-Italian  En- 
tente and  a  third  one  from  the  Anglo-French  Agreement. 
The  remaining  partner,  Austria,  is  the  prisoner  of  Ger- 
many, which  now  commands  at  the  Ballplatz. 

With  the  extension  and  apparent  progress  of  the 
Triplice  Bismarck  did  not  fail  to  keep  the  French 
national  nerves  unstrung.  In  1884,  someone  spoke 
to  him  of  the  possible  drawbacks  arising  from  the  fact 
that  Germany  had  no  navy.  He  replied  that  if  Germany 
had  grievances  there  should  be  no  need  of  going  so  far, 
and  that  the  gates  of  Metz  opened  into  France.^  Later 
on  came  the  Schnoebele  incident.  This  man,  an  agent 
of  the  French  Government,  had  been  made  liable  for 
some  of  his  acts.  He  was  living  in  France.  While  there, 
however,  German  officials  drew  him,  by  deceit,  into  their 
territory  and  there  arrested  him.*  Frenchmen  had  no 
sympathy  with  the  victim  of  this  police  system,  but 
resented  strongly  the  methods  employed  to  seize  him  y 
and,  not  without  misgivings,  demanded  his  release.  The 
country  was  for  a  few  days  in  a  terrible  suspense.  The 
year  was  scarcely  over,  when  along  the  frontier  of  the 
Vosges  Mountains  a  German  guard  fired  upon  French- 
men, killing  one  and  wounding  another  on  French  soil.^ 

'  V,  7,  AT7- 

*  Lowe,  II,  p.  116. 

•  HI,  64,  235. 

*  III,  81,  222.     Matter,   Op.  cit.,  vol.   Ill,  p.  551. 

•  III,  85,  950. 


AIM  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  57 

French  protestations  probably  contributed  to  the  char- 
acter of  his  next  great  speech.  On  February  8,  1888,^ 
in  the  Reichstag  he  treats  France  with  insuhing  con- 
tempt. "  One  does  not  always  wage  war  through 
hatred,"  he  said,  "  for  were  it  so,  France  ought  to  be 
ceaselessly  at  war,  not  only  with  us,  but  also  with  Eng- 
land and  Italy ;  she  hates  all  her  neighbors."  ^  These 
were  the  senile  rantings  of  a  great  man  whose  successors 
were  to  find  France  surrounded  by  "  un  cercle  d' alliances 
et  d'amities,  toufes  faites  de  coiirtoisie  et  de  cordi- 
alite."  2 

*  Matter,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  539. 

*  Pichon,  S.,  Discours,  Paris,  Feb.  24,  1907. 


V 

THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS 

When  Bismarck  resigned,  in  1890,  Frenchmen  could 
not  but  rejoice  that  their  great  enemy  had  ceased  to  be 
the  Chancellor  of  Germany,  and  also  that,  later  on,  he 
and  the  Kaiser  were  no  longer  on  friendly  terms.  They 
were  far  from  the  time  when  the  Crown  Prince,  after 
his  grandfather's  death  and  when  his  own  noble  father 
was  dying,  spoke  at  a  banquet  of  "  Germany,  with  its 
chief  killed,  its  lieutenant-colonel  deeply  wounded,  gather- 
ing round  its  standard  bearer,  Bismarck."  ^  Now  the 
Prince,  having  come  to  power  as  King  of  Prussia  and 
Emperor  of  Germany,  soon  indicated  his  purpose  of 
being  absolute.  On  March  5,  1890,  at  the  banquet  of 
the  provincial  Diet  of  Brandenburg  he  said,  "  I  will 
break  as  a  piece  of  glass  those  who  will  oppose  me." 
Soon  after  he  inscribed  on  his  portrait  Sic  volo,  sic  juheo. 
At  the  Rhinean  Diet  on  ]\Iay  4,  1891,  he  said,  "  There 
is  only  one  master  in  the  country  and  that  master  it  is  I." 
Later  on,  in  Munich,  he  inscribed  the  following  preten- 
tious sentence,  Siiprema  lex  regis  voluntas.^  These  as- 
sertions were  a  greater  expression  of  absolute  personal 
power  than  when  Louis  XIV  said,  L'Etat,  c'est  mot. 
These  were  uttered  in  France  while  Louis  XIV  was 
young,  in  an  age  of  ignorance,  but  the  Kaiser  was  speak- 

'  III,  86,  950. 

*  Le  Temps,  Nov.  17,  1891. 
58 


THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS  59 

ing  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  in  enlightened 
Germany.  What  was  worse  than  his  formulae  of  divine 
rights,  or  what  Le  Temps  called  ccsaropopism,  he  as- 
sumed the  position  of  "  standard  bearer  "  and  he  dis- 
missed Bismarck  "  like  a  lackey."  ^ 

There  followed  a  painful  period  when  the  young  Kaiser, 
who  had  displayed  a  certain  harsh  attitude  toward  his 
parents,  been  ungrateful  toward  the  Chancellor,  draping 
himself  in  the  splendor  of  his  authority,  defiantly  looked 
at  the  recluse  of  Friedrichsruh  and  practically  wished  to 
seal  his  lips.  The  latter  had  held  the  imperial  helm  for 
twenty-eight  years  and  had  not  only  made  Germany 
but  made  her  to  his  likeness.  He  had  infused  his  ideas, 
good  and  bad  alike,  into  the  life  of  the  Empire.  Humanly 
speaking  he  was  .  .  .  "  aussi  grand  qit'un  front  pent  I'ctre 
sous  le  del."  In  spite  of  his  w^rongs,  of  his  crimes, 
even,  no  one  in  the  Hohenzollera  House  had  a  right  to 
depreciate  his  work,  which,  from  many  points  of  view, 
was  great.  He  was  sensitive  in  this  direction  and  re- 
mained fearless  in  his  criticisms  of  those  who  attacked 
him.  The  warnings  which  he  received  from  Berlin 
moved  him  but  little.  When  the  Imperial  Government 
resorted  to  persecutions  such  as  its  attitude  at  the  time 
of  the  marriage  of  his  son,  he  remained  stoically  in- 
flexible. The  moment  the  Kaiser  endeavored  to  lessen 
his  fame  as  the  builder  of  the  unity  of  Germany,  and  the 
statement  was  made  that  it  was  the  work  of  Emperor 
Friedrich  III,  Bismarck  made  the  confession  which  was 
published  by  the  \^ienna  Free  Press  and  which  we  have 
reproduced.-  This  confession  ought  to  have  done  away 
with  heaps  of  German  literature,  mountain  high,  which 

*  These  are  Bismarck's  own  words. 

*  P.  21. 


6o         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

repeat  the  falsehoods  about  the  aggression  of  France  in 
1870. 

With  the  elevation  of  Wilhelm  II  to  the  supreme  im- 
perial rank  matters  changed  but  little.  Frenchmen  did 
not  modify  their  attitude,  nor  did  the  Emperor  and  his 
military  caste.  After  the  death  of  his  father  he  wrote 
to  a  friend,  "  The  way  is  the  same,  and  now,  full  speed ! 
Go  ahead !  "  ^  At  times  he  seemed  to  be  disposed  to  win 
over  the  French,  but  some  of  his  attempts  were  all  but 
happy.  The  visit  of  his  mother  to  Paris  is  a  case  in 
point.  She  had  gone  to  urge  French  artists  to  take  part 
in  an  exhibition  in  Germany.  Her  going  was  like  the 
arrival  of  the  Kaiser  in  Copenhagen,  at  the  death  of 
King  Christian  IX,  when  he  was  not  wanted  by  anyone. 
Had  German  artists  made  a  proposal  like  the  one  re- 
ferred to  above,  it  would  have  been  eminently  proper, 
but  for  the  mother  of  the  reigning  sovereign  to  do  it  was 
construed  as  an  undue  attempt  to  break  through  a  digni- 
fied moral  reserve  which  was  legitimate.  "  She  deeply 
wounded  French  feelings,"  said  Victor  Berard,  "  when 
she  visited  the  Galerie  des  glaces  of  Versailles,  where 
the  German  Empire  had  been  proclaimed,  as  well  as  the 
ruins  of  St.  Cloud."  -  Her  good  heart  ought  to  have 
saved  her  from  committing  such  a  blunder.  The  Pari- 
sians made  her  feel  this  lack  of  kindness  or  at  least  of 
tact.  The  Kaiser  was  irritated.  Like  Bismarck,  he  soon 
took  up  the  harping  at  the  "  hereditary  enemy." 

Nothing  can  help  one  better  to  understand  the  spirit  of 
the  German  Ruler  than  his  addresses  published  in  a  book, 
The  German  Emperor,^  by  Professor  Christian  Gauss 

'  III,  98,  714. 

*  La  France  ct  Guillaume  II j  p.  16. 

•  N.  Y.  1915. 


THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS  6i 

of  Princeton  University,  a  book  of  modest  pretensions 
but  of  signal  worth,  as  it  exhibits  in  their  fair  historical 
framework  some  of  the  typical  utterances  of  the  Kaiser. 
There  are  some  700  or  800  of  these  oratorical  produc- 
tions.^ These  outbursts  of  feeling — few  of  them  are 
anything  else — tell  us  that  the  army  is  dominant,  the 
army  is  the  rocher  de  bronze  upon  which  the  nation  must 
stand.  The  judgment  of  the  reader  will  recoil  at  the 
incense  burned  before  the  Hohenzollerns,  his  constant 
praise — praise  that  comes  only  from  him — for  "  my  im- 
mortal grandfather,  His  Majesty  Emperor  William  the 
Great."  ^  There  is  much  also  about  the  expansion  and 
power  of  the  German  people,  their  destiny  shaped  by  the 
law  of  the  "  Old  God,"  and  a  theology  not  far  distant 
from  that  of  Constantine,  of  Clovis  and,  at  best,  of 
Saint-Louis,  six  or  seven  centuries  ago.  One  constant 
note  is  that  of  the  danger  from  without  and  principally 
from  France.  At  first,  he  endeavored  to  react  against 
the  opinion  credited  to  him  that  he  was  militant  and 
warlike,  by  asserting  his  determination  to  keep  peace, 
but  war  and  hatred  of  France  are  in  the  Hohenzollern 
blood.  In  1889,  at  Aldershot,  in  England,  in  a  speech 
of  one  hundred  and  eleven  words,  considerably  less  than 
twice  the  length  of  the  Lord's  Prayer,  there  are  two 
references  to  Waterloo  and  one  to  Malplaquet.^  Anti- 
Gallicanism  with  him,  as  with  iMoltke  and  Bismarck,  is 
an  obsession.  He  cannot  keep  it  at  home.  It  even  be- 
comes an  article  of  exportation.    On  May  6,  1890,  plead- 

^  Tardieu,  A.,  Op.  cit.,  p.  162.  Professor  Gauss  has  given  us 
only  the  most   important  ones. 

"  Von  Arnim  addresses  William  I  as  follows  :  "  Most  illustrious, 
very  powerful  Emperor  and  King,  gracious  Emperor,  King  and 
Sovereign."    Document  from  von  Arnim' s  Trial. 

•  Gauss,  p.  so. 


62  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

ing  before  the  Reichstag  for  more  armaments,  he  lays 
stress  upon  "  the  military  organization  of  our  neighbors, 
(which)  has  been  broadened  and  perfected  to  an  unfore- 
seen degree."^  In  1891,  on  the  occasion  of  the  maneu- 
vers of  the  Fourth  Saxon  corps,  he  referred  to  Jena  and 
again  urged  the  Germans  to  prepare  against  the  "  com- 
mon enemy."  ^  In  the  latter  part  of  1892,  there  was 
another  proposal  made  by  him  for  further  armaments.^ 
No  one  needed  to  be  told  the  reason  of  it.  Not  to  speak 
of  other  acts,  on  July  4,  1893,  the  rapprochement  be- 
tween France  and  Russia  became  the  basis  of  his  plea — 
the  Germans  can  ever  find  a  rational  pretext  for  what 
they  want — for  an  increase  of  war  resources.*  Before 
his  access  to  the  supreme  honor  of  the  Empire  there  had 
been  in  Germany  celebrations  of  the  anniversaries  of  the 
war  of  1870,  during  which  there  were  the  threadbare 
accusations  against  France — accusations  that  have  been 
so  often  repeated  that  their  falsehoods  have  become  like 
infusible  crystals  in  the  national  consciousness,  as  if  they 
were  indisputable  verities.  Germany  could  not  have  been 
held  to  the  Prussian  and  Bismarckian  ideals  of  militarism 
unless  the  war  spirit  was  kept  up  to  a  white  heat  by 
misrepresentations  of  the  neighboring  state  and  culti- 
vated by  these  war  celebrations.  In  this,  confederate 
states  were  scarcely  behind  Prussia.  The  King  of 
Saxony,  at  about  this  time,  speaking  before  some  vet- 
erans, lets  his  imagination  run  loose,  and  talks  as  if  war 
were  actually  on.^ 

The   Kaiser,   however,   is   not   to   be   surpassed.     In 

'  Gauss,  p.  59. 
'  III,  /07,  713. 
»  III,  114,  234. 

*  III,  10^,  713. 

•  III,  95,  472. 


THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS  63 

September,  1894,  he  went  to  Metz  on  the  date  of  the  anni- 
versary of  the  battle  of  Sedan.  There,  standing  in  front 
of  the  bronze  statue  of  his  grandfather,  he  reviewed  his 
troops.  It  is  to  this  city,  wrested  from  France,  and 
close  to  the  country  which  the  Lorrainers  love,  that  he 
comes  with  the  Prince  of  Naples,  the  grandson  of 
Victor  Emmanuel,  for  his  theatrical  displays,  his  peace- 
ful speeches  ever  spiced  with  indirect  menaces.  He 
thus  associates  the  House  of  Savoy,  for  which  France 
had  done  so  much,  with  his  irritating  acts.  On  October 
18,  the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  he  says: 
"  This  inspiring  day  is  one  whose  memories  move  the 
world  and  which  marks  an  epoch  in  our  German  his- 
tory." ^  This  was  a  reference  to  France,  though  she  was 
not  mentioned.  At  times  his  seconds  come  in.  Von 
Caprivi,  before  the  Army  Commission,  the  previous  year, 
also  held  up  the  imaginary  specter  of  French  aggression. 
He  points  out  the  great  peril  resulting  from  the  move- 
ment of  Russia  toward  France.  He  even  saw  possible 
dangers  in  the  direction  of  peaceful  Denmark.  Ger- 
many ought  not  only  to  be  able  to  defend  herself,  he 
maintained,  but  to  take  the  offensive  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  to  protect  her  ''  brethren  from  Alsace,"  new- 
comers into  the  Empire,  who  should  not  be  abandoned 
to  the  rigors  of  the  French  armies.-  \'on  Caprivi,  speak- 
ing of  the  rigors  of  the  French  armies  against  "  the 
brethren  from  Alsace,"  gives  the  measure  of  his  sincerity. 
Rigors  of  the  French  armies  against  the  loved  Alsatians, 
that  is  splendid!  The  orators,  speaking  on  behalf  of  the 
project,  did  not  fail  to  recall  the  siege  of  Dantzig,  the 
Napoleonic  campaign  of  Eylau,  as  well  as  the  burning 

'  Gauss,  p.  83. 
Mil,  //;,  472. 


64  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

of  the  Palatinate  under  Louis  XIV.^  This  shows  the 
spirit,  the  methods  of  the  men  who,  having  no  legitimate 
wrongs  to  complain  of,  must  have  recourse  to  such 
arguments  as  those  of  von  Caprivi,  or  evoke  such  distant 
occurrences  and  distort  them  so  as  to  pose  as  victims. 
Never  do  they  refer  to  the  services  rendered  by  France 
which  weakened  the  hold  that  the  House  of  Hapsburg 
had  upon  them,  helped  German  states  oppressed  by  other 
German  states ;  nor  to  the  alliance  of  the  King  of  Prussia, 
who,  during  eight  years,  benefited,  at  the  expense  of  other 
German  states,  by  Napoleonic  conquests.  There  is  also 
perfect  silence  upon  the  fact  that  most  of  the  invasions 
of  France  proceeded  from  the  East,  and  that  Prussia 
was  foremost  in  them.  In  their  conversations  France  is 
the  great  disturber.  On  the  occasion  of  the  marriage 
of  the  Grand  Duke  of  Flesse-Darmstadt  and  the  daughter 
of  Saxe-Coburg  and  Gotha,  the  Kaiser  and  Queen  Vic- 
toria of  England  were  present  as  well  as  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Russia.  Everyone  talked  of  peace,  but  France 
was  spoken  of  as  the  only  one  to  arm,  when  her  arma- 
ments were  not  one-half  those  of  her  antagonist.^  Such 
was  the  talk  of  royalty  and  militaries,  but  the  best  in- 
formed people  must  have  been  aware  that  France  could 
not  be  so  dangerous  even  had  she  the  designs  ascribed 
to  her.  In  1895,  the  year  of  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary 
of  the  victories  of  1870,  Germany  resounded  with  uni- 
versal displays  of  mustered  patriotism  keeping  up  the 
animosity  against  the  Byzantine  and  decadent  Republic 
beyond  the  Vosges.  France,  though  not  without  re- 
minders of  her  own  victories  but  having  no  such  celebra- 
tions, was  not  infrequently  wounded  by  these  uncon- 

MII,  117,  473. 
=■  III,  123,  235- 


THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS  65 

trolled  effusions  of  a  patriotism  raised  to  a  white  heat — 
a  patriotism  that  has  two  defects,  one  rests  upon  error 
of  facts,  and  the  other  leads  astray  by  the  cumulative 
repetitions  of  the  same  fictitious  and  exaggerated 
complaints,  getting  further  and  further  away  from 
truth. 

In  1895,  as  Bismarck  reached  his  eightieth  birthday, 
the  people  of  Germany  organized  a  great  celebration. 
They  wished  to  honor  the  man  who,  in  their  eyes,  had  so 
splendidly  served  and  enlarged  the  fatherland.  They 
resorted  in  large  numbers  to  the  great  Recluse's  place 
of  exile,  Friedrichsruh.  The  Kaiser,  perhaps  conscious 
of  his  former  unkindness,  or  anxious  to  be  forgiven 
by  the  masses  for  his  injustice  towards  the  former 
"  standard  bearer  "  of  Germany,  attended  the  celebration, 
and  presented  him  with  a  sword  with  "  Alsace-Lorraine  " 
inscribed  on  it.^  The  Emperor  could  find  no  better  way 
to  honor  this  old  broken-down  servant  of  the  Empire 
than  to  bring  him  a  sword  on  which  was  an  inscription 
equally  harrowing  to  the  feelings  of  Alsatians  and  of 
Frenchmen.  He  sought  to  have  his  unkind  treatment  of 
the  old  servant  forgotten  by  referring  to  the  bloodshed 
at  Mars-la-Tour.-  This  did  not  soothe  the  wounded 
feelings  of  the  old  Dictator.  Henceforth  to  the  end  he 
fought  the  New  Order,  attacked  the  policy  of  von  Capri vi, 
maligned  some  of  the  men  who  in  the  past  had  been  his 
docile  tools,  revealed  his  dishonest  treaties  with  Austria 
and  Russia,  and  showed  the  depth  of  his  rancor  against 
those  who  deposed  him  from  what  he  had  considered  his 
omnipotent  and  eternal  seat  of  Power.  Even  then  he 
never    ceased    to    show    his    resentment    against   the 

'  III,  128,  714. 
» III,  128,  715. 


66  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

land  upon  which  he  seemed   to  have  concentrated  his 
hatred.^ 

The  Kaiser  continued  in  the  same  course.  In  1897,  as 
he  addresses  his  brother  Henry,  at  Kiel,  before  his 
departure  for  China,  he  cannot  refrain  from  reminding 
him  that  the  step  which  he  is  taking  is  a  consequence  of 
the  great  victories  of  1870  and  the  establishment  of  the 
Empire  which  followed.^  In  the  autumn  of  that  year, 
on  another  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  his 
monotonous  speech  again  recalled  the  conflict  with  the 
western  enemies  of  the  fatherland.  At  the  following 
anniversary,  he  once  more  reminds  his  hearers  of  the 
work  which  his  father  and  grandfather  accomplished  in 
building  the  German  Empire — for  him  and  for  his  sub- 
jects to  do  this  was  to  crush  France.  On  April  2'],  1903, 
while  President  Loubet  was  expressing  pacific  senti- 
ments— and  they  were  heartfelt — at  a  banquet  in  Naples, 
the  Kaiser  was  making  a  most  belligerent  speech  in 
Karlsruhe.  "  The  recollection  of  the  grand  period  when 
the  German  people  has  accomplished  its  unity,  the 
memory  of  the  battles  of  Woerth,  of  Wissembourg,  of 
Sedan,  the  remembrance  of  the  outburst  of  joy  with 
which  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden  greeted  the  first  Em- 
peror of  Germany  will  deepen  the  conviction  that  God 
will  help  us."  ^  Four  days  later  at  Mayence  and  two 
weeks  later  at  Saarbriicken,  his  orations  deserve  the 
famous  saying  of  Alphonse  Karr,  Plus  ga  change  plus 
c'est  toujours  la  mcme  chose.  The  battle  of  Leipsic, 
not  those  in  which  the  King  of  Prussia,  betraying  other 
German  states,  was  on  the  side  of  Napoleon,  stands  fore- 


'  Le  Temps,  April  10,  1896. 
'  Gauss,  p.  1 18. 
*Mevil,  p.  152. 


THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS  6y 

most.  In  1913,  it  was  to  be  celebrated  with  signal  eclat, 
as  the  centennial  of  the  great  event  which  was  also  the 
twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  his  reign.  An  accident  to  a 
Zeppelin  prevented  the  carrying  out  of  his  plans.  The 
destruction  of  this  aircraft,  entailing  the  loss  of  the 
lives  of  twenty-seven  ofificers  and  men,  hindered  him  from 
attending  the  proposed  historic  celebration.  It  is  prob- 
able that  this  distressing  casualty  saved  France  from 
being  reminded  once  more  of  what  Louis  XIV  and 
Napoleon  T,  the  French  Kaisers  of  old,  had  done.  Again 
and  again,  he  utters  what  was,  in  his  eyes,  an  incentive 
to  German  patriotism,  and  a  challenge  to  France,  as  when 
he  speaks  of  his  grandfather,  "  the  great  Emperor  Wil- 
liam." "  Let  us  not  forget  that  he  lived  through  and 
remembered  Jena  and  Tilsit,  and  that,  nevertheless,  he 
never  despaired  of  the  future  of  the  Fatherland.  From 
Tilsit  we  traveled  to  Versailles."  ^  Yes,  but  that  was 
not  the  first  time.  This  idee  fixe  of  the  Kaiser  is  so 
deeply  rooted  in  him,  that,  in  sending  a  message  of  apol- 
ogy to  Sir  Edward  Goschen  for  the  insults  to  which  the 
English  Ambassador  had  been  subjected  when  war  was 
declared,  he  could  not  avoid  making  a  reference  to 
Waterloo. 

All  along,  the  German  Government  had  been  increasing 
the  power  of  its  army  to  vast  proportions,  frightening 
the  people  into  consent  by  the  process  that  we  have 
mentioned.  Now  it  was  the  turn  of  the  navy.  Everyone 
knows  that  no  armada  was  threatening  Germany,  that 
her  great  commercial  fleet  was  plowing  the  oceans,  in 
every  direction,  with  complete  liberty  and  increasing  suc- 
cess. After  the  Franco-German  war  her  ambition  was 
in  Europe,  but  now  the  field  of  her  aspirations  is  the 
'  Gauss,  p.  230. 


68         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

world.  Then  she  justified  her  armaments  on  the  basis  of 
French  danger ;  later  on,  of  Russian  and  Danish  danger ; 
now  the  enemy  is  also  England,  "  the  great  robber-state." 
She  cultivates  hatred  of  Britons.  She  had  long  ex- 
pressed contempt  and  indifference  for  colonies.  Bis- 
marck went  so  far  as  to  oppose  colonists.  This  Dr.  Carl 
Peters  knew  by  a  painful  experience.^  About  the  time 
of  the  foundation  of  the  Empire,  Bismarck  said,  "  For 
us  in  Germany,  this  colonial  business  would  be  just  like 
the  silken  sables  in  the  noble  families  of  Poland,  who 
have  no  shirt  to  their  backs."  ^  Then  the  Germans 
wished  merely  to  develop  their  military,  their  industrial 
life  at  home,  their  commerce  abroad,  and  that  they  did 
with  a  felicity  applauded  everywhere  by  all  men  who 
admire  success.  Other  Powers  turned  their  eyes  toward 
unoccupied  fields  and  made  stupendous  sacrifices  for 
distant  territorial  expansion.  They  had  not  attained  the 
goal  reached  by  their  German  competitors  in  military, 
industrial  and  commercial  matters,  but  had  legitimately 
entered  into  possession  of  colonies.  Towards  1880  the 
attitude  of  Germany  changed.  In  1884,  the  Cameroon 
country  was  seized.  In  1885,  German  Southwest  Africa 
and  German  East  Africa  were  annexed.  The  Caro- 
line Islands  shared  the  same  fate.  Longing  for  more 
she  cast  her  eyes  upon  the  possessions  of  others. 
According  to  German  cant,  she  would  not  attack  any- 
one, she  dreamed  of  no  conquests,  of  no  increase 
of  territory,  if  we  heed  von  Billow.  However,  he  un- 
covers the  pot  aux  roses  when  he  says,  "  Between 
the  Greater  Britain  and   the  New  France  we  have  a 

'  Saunders,  George,  Builder  and  Blunderer,  p.  16. 
'  Lowe,  vol.  II,  p.  209. 


THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS  69 

right  to  a  Greater  Germany,"  ^  and  that  is  doubtless 
what  the  Kaiser  calls  "  a  place  in  the  sun."  ^  This  simply 
means  that  as  there  are  no  more  unclaimed  territories, 
Germany  is  entitled  to  those  of  others. 

In  1898,  the  Kaiser  visited  Sultan  Abdul-Hamid,  the 
cruel  murderer  of  the  Armenians  and  of  some  peoples 
of  the  Balkans.  The  imperial  visitor  kissed  him  and 
called  him  "  brother."  Indeed  "  a  kind  of  political  and 
personal  brotherhood  was  sworn  between  the  two  mon- 
archs,  and  lasted  through  the  later  horrors  of  the 
Sultan's  reign  until  he  was  deposed  by  the  revolution."  ^ 
There  is  no  need  of  saying  that  this  comedy  on  the 
part  of  the  Christian  Kaiser  was  royally  paid  for.  It 
was  then  that  were  negotiated  the  proposals  of  the 
Bagdad  railroad  and  were  secured  privileges  which  have 
developed  into  a  stupendous  mortgage  over  the  whole 
Turkish  Empire.  French  prerogatives  and  concessions 
were  arbitrarily  revoked.  British  and  French  influences 
in  Constantinople  were  reduced  to  nought.  His  visit  to 
Jerusalem  marked  a  new  departure.  He  virtually  as- 
serted a  religious  protectorate  over  the  Moslem  world 
and  announced  his  determination  to  disregard  that  which 
France  had  carried  on  for  centuries  in  connection  with 
the  Catholic  Church.  For  a  long  time  she  w^ent  beyond 
the  religious  world  and  protected  Christian  travelers  in 
the  Levant  and  the  Far  East  as  well  as  the  members 
of  the  Orthodox  Church  now  shielded  by  Russia.  She 
has  the  right,  recognized  and  defended  by  the  Holy  See, 
to  look  after  all  the  Catholic  institutions  as  well  as  after 
groups  of  Eastern  Catholics,  the  Maronites,  the  Melchites, 

•  III,  157,  234. 

'  Gauss,  p.  181. 

•  Saunders,  G.,  Builder  and  Blunderer,  p.  74. 


70         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

the  Chaldean  and  Armenian  Catholics.^  The  fact  that, 
until  recently,  she  furnished  as  many  missionaries  as 
all  the  Catholics  of  the  world  put  together,  gave  promi- 
nence to  them.  It  was  thought  that  the  national  pro- 
tectorate was  the  cause  of  the  influence  exerted,  while  it 
was  due  much  more  to  the  fact  that  France  has  ever  been 
fertile  in  men  of  genuine  apostleship.  Also  the  Govern- 
ment gave  subsidies  to  missions  when  most  of  their 
work  was  educational  and  philanthropic.  This  protec- 
torate was  approved  by  the  Pope  and  to  some  extent 
was  under  his  authority,  but  the  institution  itself  rests, 
with  most  states,  upon  international  agreements.^  This 
protective  function  doubtless  increased  French  prestige 
among  the  Orientals  and  did  much  good,  though  Free- 
Thinkers  are  generally  opposed  to  it.  They  do  not  ques- 
tion the  gains  accruing  thereby  to  general  civilization, 
but  the  whole  system  seems  to  them  an  anachronism. 

The  Kaiser  while  in  the  Holy  City  announced  not  only 
a  similar  protectorate  over  Pan-Islamism,  but  that  he  had 
rejected,  as  far  as  German  priests  were  concerned,  this 
French  Catholic  protectorate.  The  Berlin  Congress  had 
recognized  in  all  Powers  the  right  to  protect  their  own 
subjects,  but  the  same  article  states  "  that  the  rights 
acquired  by  France  are  continued,  and  that  it  is  well 
understood  that  no  breach  could  be  made  in  the  status  quo 
of  the  holy  places  "  ^  in  Jerusalem.  It  was  doubtless  the 
right  of  the  Kaiser  to  act  as  he  did,  but  it  may  be  doubted 
if  he  would  have  done  so  had  not  the  protecting  state 

'  Le  Temps,  Nov.  22,  191 2. 

'  De  Lancssan,  J.  L.,  Les  missions  et  leur  protcctorat,  Paris, 
1907,  p.  6.  In  this  work  the  author  has  treated  the  subject  with 
great  fairness  and  rare  competence  though  not  with  much  sym- 
pathy. 

'  Article  62. 


THE  KAISER'S  PROVOCATIONS  71 

been  France.  Be  that  as  it  may,  a  first  fruit  of  this  new 
pohcy,  January,  1897,  was  the  taking  of  Kiao-Chou  in 
China,  under  the  pretext  that  two  German  missionaries 
had  been  massacred  by  the  Celestials.  The  first  act  of 
this  protectorate  was  the  taking  of  Chinese  lands.  This 
new  departure,  unimportant  in  itself,  was  a  part  of  the 
unfriendly  and  aggressive  course  pursued  against  Paris 
by  his  Government.  It  did  not  stop  there.  France  was 
anxious  that  Cardinal  Rampolla,  the  liberal  Secretary 
of  State  under  Leo  XIII,  should  be  elevated  to  the  visible 
headship  of  the  Church.  This  aim  had  no  international 
bearing.  It  was  thought  by  the  Government  that  he  alone 
could  have  kept  the  French  Clergy  within  proper  bounds, 
and  he  most  probably  would  have  averted  the  separation 
of  Church  and  State  which  Pius  X  unquestionably  pre- 
cipitated.^ Austria  had  given  France  the  assurance  that 
she  would  not  raise  any  opposition  to  the  election  of  the 
Cardinal,  but  at  the  last  hour  she  sent  in  her  veto.^  This 
was  done  at  the  request  of  the  German  Government. 

The  constant  nettling  and  ruffling  of  French  feelings 
was  exasperating.  The  Kaiser's  speech  of  the  "  mailed 
fist,"  his  hypocritical  plea  for  "  a  place  in  the  sun,"  the 
clamor  for  a  greater  Germany,  the  assertion  that,  with- 
out the  German  Emperor,  no  great  decision  dare  hence- 
forth be  taken,  his  intoxication  of  power  and  his  out- 
spoken desire  of  domination  made  the  French  feel  that 
they  had  on  their  eastern  frontier  a  great  personal  source 
of  danger.  In  1900,  he  declared  that  the  troops  which 
had  gone  to  China  were  destined  to  "  show  that  the  arm 
of  the  German  Emperor  reached  to  the  farthest  ends 

'  See  Bracq,  J.  C,  France  Under  the  Republic,  1910,  pp.  290 
iand  312. 

'  Mevil,  A.,  Op.  cit.,  p.  114. 


^2         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

of  the  earth."  ^  Similarly  the  book  of  Prince  von  Biilow, 
Imperial  Germany,  which  reflects  the  national  aspirations, 
is  the  work  of  a  man  overwrought  with  the  sense  of 
German  might  and  who  can  scarcely  conceal  the  determi- 
nation to  use  it  against  someone.  "  Bismarck,"  says 
Novicow,  "  had  to  do  a  stupendous  work  to  bring  the 
Prussian  people  to  the  policy  of  violence  which  rendered 
possible  the  wars  of  1864,  1866  and  1870."  ^  Since  then 
the  German  leaders,  thoroughly  Prussianized,  have  even 
intensified  this  policy  of  "  Blood  and  Iron,"  but  they  can 
no  longer  pose  as  men  of  peace.  Books  like,  Usher,  R. 
G.,  Pan-Germanism;  Fouillee,  A.,  Psychologie  des 
peuples  enropeens;  Cramb,  J.  A.,  Germany  and  England 
or  Villard,  O.  G.,  Germany  Embattled  have  made  such  a 
comedy  impossible. 


*  Saunders,  Op.  cit.,  p.  100. 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  369. 


VI 

A  GERMAN  QUARREL  ^ 

Meanwhile,  France,  after  the  period  of  just  indigna- 
tion, and  hatred  of  her  soulless  conquerors,  witnessed  a 
most  remarkable  movement  making  for  international 
comity  which  would  have  ultimately  worked  out  a  recon- 
ciliation between  her  and  Germany  had  not  the  latter 
so  acted  as  to  deprive  it  of  its  potential  efficiency.  The 
old  idealistic  traditions  of  the  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre,  the 
teachings  of  Saint-Simonians,  the  new  education  fostered 
and  expanded  by  the  Republic,  the  scientific  movement, 
as  well  as  the  tendencies  of  philosophy,  travel  and  the 
wide  dissemination  of  intelligence,  had  profoundly  af- 
fected French  democracy.  The  movement  was  inter- 
national to  some  extent,  but  nowhere  was  it  more  earnest 
than  in  the  land  of  Voltaire  and  Hugo.  The  moral  sense 
of  the  nation  recoiled  from  the  ideals  of  militarists,  and 
from  the  thought  of  the  international  murders  that  we 
call  war.  Fashoda,  which  at  other  times  might  have  left 
a  century  of  bitter  memories,  because  the  nation  had 
reached  a  higher  conception  of  international  comity,  ulti- 
mately led  France  and  England  to  deal  with  each  other 
in  the  new  spirit  moving  men  everywhere  toward  saner 
international  relations.  The  doctrine  of  pacifism  had 
now  sunk  deeply  into  the  national  consciousness.  Social- 
ists and  Radicals,  led  by  what  the  writer  calls  a  Christian 

'  Popular  French  saying  in  speaking  of  a  quarrel  without 
cause. 

73 


74         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

humanism,  made  these  principles  central  in  their  political 
propaganda.  The  Liberals  were  equally  earnest.  The 
Government  was — and  had  to  be — the  expression  of 
national  ideals  and  feelings  and,  as  such,  was  forced  to  a 
friendlier  attitude  toward  all  Powers — even  Germany. 
Jaures,  assassinated  by  a  fanatic  of  the  old  form  of 
narrow  patriotism,  would  have  died  a  happier  man  had 
he  seen  progress  made  toward  reconciliation  with  the 
trans-Rhinean  Power. 

It  was  not  the  fear  of  Germany  but  the  growth  of  a 
more  reasonable  spirit  among  various  states  that  led  the 
French  Government  to  sign  numerous  treaties  of  arbi- 
tration. King  Edward,  ever  a  friend  of  France,  fos- 
tered better  feelings  in  his  own  country  and  paid  a  visit  to 
President  Loubet  which  was  returned  by  the  latter.  This 
was  followed  by  reciprocal  courtesies  of  the  fleets,  of 
municipalities  and  of  the  members  of  the  two  Parlia- 
ments. Baron  d'Estournelles  de  Constant,  the  great  friend 
of  peace  with  honor,  or  rather  of  peace  with  justice, 
the  man  who  had  persuaded  President  Roosevelt  to  stop 
the  boycott  against  the  court  at  The  Hague  by  referring  a 
case  to  it,  organized  a  group  of  members  of  Parliament  in 
view  of  giving  unity  and  support  to  the  peace  ideals  of  the 
nation.  Meanwhile  the  two  Governments  were  discuss- 
ing the  imperative  Anglo-French  difficulties  that  urgently 
demanded  a  solution.  Old  and  diverse  were  these  inter- 
national problems.  M.  Delcasse,  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished statesmen  that  France  has  produced,  was 
the  embodiment  of  conciliation.  He  laid  stress  upon  the 
fact  that  it  was  easier  to  solve  twenty  difficulties 
than  one,  because  in  most  problems  it  is  a  question 
of  give  and  take.  He  and  Lord  Lansdowne  started  with 
the  new  and  advanced  point  of  view  that,  in  their  at- 


A  GERMAN  QUARREL  75 

tempts  to  reach  an  understanding,  each  would  leave  to 
her  competitor  what  meant  most  to  her.  Thus,  in  New- 
foundland, the  French  Shore  was  far  more  important 
for  England  than  for  France.  In  Egypt,  freedom  of 
action  was  of  more  value  to  Great  Britain  than  to  her 
neighbor.  In  these  countries,  and  at  other  points,  France 
yielded  to  her.  Similarly,  Morocco  meant  more  for 
France  than  for  England,  and  so,  with  definite  restric- 
tions, France  secured  a  free  hand  there.  As  a  whole 
this  adjustment  was  not  only  equitable  but  mutually  con- 
siderate. When  on  April  8,  1904,  it  was  made  public,  it 
failed  to  satisfy  the  jingoes  of  both  countries,  but  peace- 
ful men  everywhere  breathed  more  freely,  and  felt  that 
a  great  step  forward  had  been  taken  by  the  two  Govern- 
ments for  their  own  peace  and  that  of  the  world.  If  the 
most  difficult  Anglo-French  contentions  could  thus  be 
settled  calmly  and  peacefully  by  the  new  diplomacy,  then 
any  international  entanglement  might  be.  A  great  moral 
victory  had  been  won  on  the  side  of  reason  and 
conscience. 

The  German  authorities  were  hostile  to  the  method  and 
to  its  results.  In  fact  they  were  skeptical  in  reference  to 
the  possibility  of  an  Anglo-French  Agreement.  Many 
of  them  would  have  been  happy  to  see  the  two  nations  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  Strait  of  Dover  cross  swords.  The 
hostility  of  the  two  countries  was  a  fundamental  postulate 
of  German  diplomacy.  The  Egyptian  stick,  that  Bis- 
marck prided  himself  to  use  sometimes  in  striking  Eng- 
land and  sometimes  in  annoying  France,  was  no  more.^ 
A  conversation  of  M.  Delcasse  with  Prince  Radolin, 
telling  him  of  the  nature  of  the  transaction,  had  failed  to 

'  Mevil,  A.,  De  la  paix  de  Francfort  a  la  Conference  d'Alge- 
siras,  p.  146. 


76         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

bring  conviction.  France  and  England  waited  seventeen 
days,  during  which  Germany  made  no  objection,  before 
signing  the  celebrated  treaty.  It  was  only  then  that  Wil- 
helmstrasse  saw  that  this  Anglo-French  Agreement  was 
a  reality.^  The  attitude  of  the  German  Government  had 
two  phases.  First,  Chancellor  von  Biilow  made  no  oppo- 
sition to  it.  On  April  12,  he  said,  and  rightly  too :  "  We 
have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  that  agreement  is  directed 
against  any  Power  whatsoever.  It  seems  to  be  an  at- 
tempt to  cause  to  disappear  a  series  of  dissents  existing 
between  France  and  England  by  a  friendly  understand- 
ing. From  the  point  of  view  of  German  interests,  we 
have  nothing  to  object."  ^  "  We  have  before  all,"  he 
states  again,  "  commercial  interests  there,  and  so  it  is  of 
much  moment  for  us  that  calm  and  order  should  pre- 
vail in  Morocco.  We  must  protect  our  mercantile 
interests  there  and  we  shall  protect  them.  We  have 
no  cause  to  fear  that  they  could  be  disregarded  by  any 
Power." 

Let  it  be  noticed  that  to  introduce  "  calm  and  order  " 
was  the  task  assumed  by  France.  Furthermore,  by  her 
position  and  experience,  she  was  better  prepared  than 
any  other  people  to  do  that  work.  When  Count 
Reventlow  criticizes  the  Anglo-French  Agreement,  from 
a  Pan-Germanistic  point  of  view,  the  Chancellor  heaps 
cutting  sarcasms  upon  him  and  defends  the  stand  which 
he  has  taken.^  Six  months  later  the  German  Secretary 
of  State  assures  the  French  representative,  M.  Bihourd, 
that  Germany  has  only  economic  interests  in  Morocco.* 

^  Mevil,  pp.  145-148. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  153. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  158. 

*  Yellow  Book,  document  192,  p.  167. 


A  GERMAN  QUARREL  yy 

On  the  29th  of  the  following  March,  the  Chancellor  has 
become  the  Jupiter  Tonans  of  German  politics.  Herr 
Bebel,  opposed  to  an  aggressive  policy,  accuses  him  of 
having  changed  his  position.  He  answers,  "  I  must  re- 
mind him  that  the  language  and  attitude  of  diplomatists 
and  politicians  are  regulated  by  circumstances."  In 
1914,  the  Great  Statesman,  speaking  of  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement  retrospectively,  says,  "  Just  at  this  time 
France  was  preparing  to  injure  us  in  Morocco."  ^  "  In 
certain  French  circles  the  original  object  was  to  ignore 
Germany."  ^  It  was  "  the  high-handed  policy  of  France 
in  Morocco  which  threatened  to  ignore  German  industrial 
and  commercial  interests  as  well  as  our  national  credit."  ^ 
Ever  thinking  more  of  Germany  than  of  the  facts  of 
the  case,  he  continues,  "  The  treaty  was  indirectly  aim- 
ing at  injuring  the  latter  country."  *  "  French  Moroccan 
policy  was  an  attempt  to  set  Germany  aside  in  an  im- 
portant decision  on  foreign  affairs,  an  attempt  to  adjust 
the  balance  of  power  in  favor  of  France."  ^  The  first 
utterances  of  the  Chancellor  were  the  calm  answer  of  a 
statesman  who,  though  disappointed  by  the  fact  that 
France  and  England  had  become  reconciled,  and  that 
France  and  Italy  had  become  friends  again,  spoke  cheer- 
fully of  the  Agreement. 

Again  the  new  relations  with  Italy  w^ere  due  largely 
to  the  broad  and  noble  spirit  of  M.  Delcasse  as  well  as 
that  of  Marquis  de  Visconti-Venosta,  who  had  recognized 
the  artificiality  and  burdensome  character  of  the  Triplice. 
The  renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  in  1902,  had  been 

*  Imperial  Germany,  p.  44. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  102. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

*  P.  95. 
»  P.  98. 


78         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

freed  from  clauses  which  were  threatening  for  France.'^ 
Sig.  Prinetti,  in  the  Itahan  Parliament,  and  M.  Delcasse, 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  asserted  that  the  unfriendly 
Bismarcko-Crispinian  elements  of  the  Treaty  had  dis- 
appeared. France,  previously  hurt  by  the  former  Italian 
ungratefulness,  could  have  said,  "  He  that  is  not  with 
me  is  against  me,"  but  now,  satisfied  with  the  Franco- 
Italian  treaty,  settling  the  Mediterranean  questions,  and 
with  the  modification  of  the  Triplice,  she  could  say,  "  He 
that  is  not  against  me  is  on  our  part."  The  speech  of 
the  Kaiser  at  Karlsruhe  showed  not  only  his  ill-feeling 
toward  the  Franco-Italian  rapprochement  but  seemed  to 
imply  that  he  did  not  admit  of  a  policy  for  other  peoples 
not  sanctioned  by  Germany.  Von  Biilow  was  aware  of 
the  cooling  of  the  Triplician  zeal  of  Italy,  but  he  did  not 
think  that  she  was  flirting  with  France.  He  referred  to 
it  in  a  witty  form :  this  was  merely  "  un  simple  tour  de 
valse." 

The  evolution  of  English  mind  and  feelings  could  not 
be  disposed  of  with  a  joke.  England,  walking  hand  in 
hand  with  France,  was  a  fact  contrary  to  all  German 
anticipations,  and,  ascribing  motives  like  their  own  to 
the  two  participants,  there  was  opened  before  them  the 
vision  of  contingencies  that  were  not  absolutely  pleasant. 
Italy's  partial  escape  from  the  Dreihund  was  bad  enough, 
and  the  change  that  had  come  over  England  was  most 
serious,  but  both,  taken  together,  justified  a  certain 
anxiety  that  the  Chancellor  would  not  admit.  Further- 
more, public  opinion,  favorable  to  a  rapid  policy  of  ex- 
pansion, was  annoyed  by  what  seemed  a  failure.  The 
resolutions  voted  on  March  20,  1904,  at  Esslingen,  by 
*  Mevil,  Op.  cit.,  p.  123. 


A  GERMAN  QUARREL  79 

the  Pan-Germanists  of  Wurtemberg/  the  address  voted 
on  May  2^,  at  Stettin,  by  the  Colonial  Society  ^  and  the 
unanimous  resolutions  of  the  Pan-Germanist  Union, 
June  3,  at  Lubeck,^  urged  the  Government  to  take  an 
aggressive  stand  in  Morocco.  The  opponents  of  the 
Chancellor  taunted  him  in  the  Reichstag  for  what 
seemed  a  diplomatic  defeat.  All  this  doubtless  contrib- 
uted to  his  right-about-face  and  his  new  pugnacious 
stand. 

The  attitude  of  mind  and  soul  which  had  led  the 
French  to  work  for  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  also 
practically  led  them  to  what  was  a  virtual  disarmament. 
Russia  had  been  defeated  in  September,  1904,  and  by 
March,  1905,  she  was  crushed  at  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese  without  any  hope  of  recovery.  England  was 
but  loosely  pledged  to  stand  by  France,  which  was  in  the 
throes  of  the  separation  of  Church  and  State.  This  was 
the  time  when,  at  the  request  of  von  Bulow,*  the  Kaiser 
went  to  Tangier  and  made  the  speech  which  was  meant 
to  exasperate  France  and  England,  and  possibly  to  bring 
on  a  fearful  war. 

The  writer  loves  the  sincerely  religious  of  all  creeds, 
and  the  earnest  worshipers  at  all  shrines,  but  he  dreads 
the  pious  effusions  of  German  political  leaders.  Bis- 
marck, notwithstanding  the  mutilation  of  the  Ems  dis- 
patch and  many  other  villainous  performances,  said, 
"  We  Germans  fear  God  and  nothing  else  in  the 
world."  ^    Von  Bulow  naturally  turns  to  religious  gush. 

'  Yellow  Book,  doc.  141,  p.  121. 
'  Ibid.,  doc.  162,  p.  136. 

*  Ibid.,  doc.  166,  p.  138. 

*  V,  26,  269;  von  Billow,  Op.  cit.,  p.  98;  Tardieu,  A.,  France 
and  the  Alliances,  p.  24. 

Mil,  103,  885. 


8o         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

He  speaks  of  the  "  happy  dispensation  of  Providence  "  * 
and  of  what  "  Providence  has  granted  us."  ^  In  a  speech 
at  Bremen,  on  March  22,  1905,  the  Kaiser  urged  his 
hearers  "  to  hold  fast  to  the  conviction  that  our  God 
would  never  have  taken  such  pains  with  our  German 
Fatherland  and  its  people,  if  he  had  not  been  preparing 
us  for  something  greater."  Then,  with  characteristic 
German  contradiction  of  pride  and  humility,  he  adds, 
"  We  are  the  salt  of  the  earth,  but  we  must  also  be 
worthy  to  be  so."  ^  Nine  days  later,  the  Kaiser  reached 
Tangier,  in  great  pomp,  to  perform  the  task  laid  upon 
him  by  his  Chancellor.  There  are  evidences  that  he  hesi- 
tated long,  and  that  even  after  he  had  reached  Tangier 
he  dreaded  the  fatal  words  that  might  bring  about  the 
irretrievable.  At  last  he  made  his  speech.  "  1  am 
pleased,"  he  said,  "  to  make  the  acquaintance  of  the 
pioneers  of  Germany  to  Morocco  and  to  be  able  to  tell 
them  that  they  have  done  their  duty. 

"  Germany  has  great  commercial  interests  here.  I 
shall  advance  and  protect  our  commerce,  which  shows  a 
satisfying  increase,  and  for  that  reason  shall  insist  upon 
equal  rights  with  all  Powers,  which  is  only  possible 
through  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  and  the  independ- 
ence of  the  country.  For  Germany  both  of  these  must 
be  unquestioned,  and  I  am,  therefore,  ready  to  intervene 
for  them  at  all  times. 

"  I  hope  that  my  visit  to  Tangier  declares  this 
plainly  and  emphatically  and  that  it  will  call  forth  the 
conviction  that  what  Germany  undertakes  in  Morocco 

^  Op.  cit.,  p.  12. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  297. 
•  Gauss,  p.  239. 


A  GERMAN  QUARREL  8i 

will  be  negotiated  exclusively  with  the  sovereign  Sul- 
tan." ^ 

In  all,  the  Kaiser  was  two  hours  in  Morocco,^  but, 
had  nothing  else  happened,  his  speech  would  have  put 
back  the  potential  reconciliation  of  France  and  Germany 
for  half  a  century.  The  speech  was  interpreted  every- 
where as  a  menace  both  to  France  and  to  England.^ 
What  made  his  statements  unpardonable  is  that  he  did 
not  frankly  state  the  deep  underlying  motive  of  his 
course,  and  that  what  he  said  was  largely  untrue.  The 
"  great  commercial  interests  "  of  Germany  amounted  to 
9,500,000  of  francs  a  year  on  the  basis  of  the  returns 
of  the  four  preceding  years.  France  and  Algeria  had  a 
trade  of  33,000,000  and  England  31,000,000.*  Professor 
Gauss  neatly  stated  the  case  when  he  said  that  German 
"  trade  there  did  not  amount  to  as  much  as  that  of  an 
ordinary  department  store  or  to  that  of  a  fairly  successful 
merchant."  ° 

At  first  the  Germans  claimed  to  have  none  but  ex- 
clusively economic  interests  in  that  country,  but  if  that 
had  been  true' the  Tangier  Speech  was  the  greatest  pos- 
sible blunder.  "  The  German  Government,"  says  Novi- 
cow,  "  has  caused  a  stagnation  of  affairs  which  has  made 
its  subjects  lose  ten  times  more  money  than  the  trade 
with  Morocco  would  have  brought  them  in  a  century."  ^ 
The  twaddle  about  the  "  sovereign  Sultan  "  does  not  bear 
examination.  As  to  the  absolute  disregard  of  Germany 
in  the  Anglo-French  Settlement,  it  is  true  that  the  Quai 

'  Gauss,  p.  242. 
'  v.,  2(5,  946. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  9SO. 

*  Tardieu,  La  Conference  d'Algesiras,  p.  499. 

•  Op.  cit.,  p.  241. 

•  Op.  cit.,  p.  228. 


82         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

d'Orsay  had  made  no  formal  notification  to  Germany, 
but  M.  Delcasse,  with  perfect  correctness  of  manner 
and  frankness,  had  communicated  the  substance  of  the 
Agreement  to  Prince  RadoHn,  the  German  Ambassador 
in  Paris,  a  fortnight  before  it  was  signed.^  In  the  French 
Yellow  Book  one  is  obhged  to  recognize  that  the  great 
Prime-minister  had  not  forwarded  an  official  communica- 
tion of  the  document  to  the  German  Ambassador,  though 
he  had  made  an  informal  one."  It  is  certain  that  Wil- 
helmstrasse  knew  all  about  it.  Berlin  waited  a  whole 
year,  made  no  remonstrances,  friendly  or  otherwise, 
showed  not  even  those  cant  courtesies  upon  which  states 
and  individuals  are  so  punctilious  in  the  case  of  strained 
relations.  In  June,  1905,  "  the  Germans,"  says  M. 
Tardieu,  "  knew  that  M.  Rouvier  was  willing  to  do  more 
than  pay  the  price  of  their  good- will  in  Morocco."  ^  If 
Germany's  intentions  were  peaceful  why  did  she  not 
speak?  Why  did  she  not  ask  explanations?  Why  did 
she  choose  the  moment  when  Russia  was  overpowered 
by  Japan,  and  when  France  was  torn  asunder  by  what 
looked  like  a  possible  revolution,  to  spring  forth  like  one 
in  ambush  for  a  chance?  Were  there  in  the  act  of 
France  any  valid  reasons  for  a  people  bent  upon  peace 
to  abandon  diplomatic  action,  and  to  resort  to  a  theatrical, 
discourteous  threat  like  that  of  Tangier?  None,  none 
whatsoever.  The  Tangier  Speech  was  une  querelle 
d'Allemand.  Professor  Gauss  puts  this  conclusion  into  a 
neat  English  form :  "  Germany  was  evidently  picking  a 
quarrel  with  France."  * 

'  v.,  27,  948. 

*  Doc.  142,  p.  122. 

*  France  and  the  Alliances,  p.  187. 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  240. 


VII 

FRANCE,  GERMANY  AND  MOROCCO 

Almost  all  the  German  references  to  French  colonies, 
since  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  have  been  greatly 
misleading.  The  colonial  expansion  of  France  has  been 
determined  both  by  her  history  and  by  her  environments. 
For  over  three  centuries,  she  has  done  colonial  work 
more  and  more  appreciated  by  all.  The  countries  which 
have  come  under  her  sway  during  the  last  eighty  years 
have,  in  part  at  least,  been  forced  upon  her,  and  that  is 
particularly  true  of  North  Africa.  She  purged  the  Medi- 
terranean Sea  of  Algerian  pirates  who  seized  her  vessels, 
as  well  as  those  of  other  countries,  and  even  descended 
upon  her  coast,  carrying  ofif  men  and  women  as  slaves  to 
Algiers.  The  first  action  of  France  was  no  more  of  a 
conquering  nature  than  that  of  Commodore  Decatur  at 
Tripoli.  However,  she  felt  compelled  to  push  her  action 
further.  The  Algerian  conquest  was  long,  ever  to  be 
renewed,  and  when  it  was  considered  ended  it  had  to  be 
begun  again.  She,  at  times,  contemplated  giving  up  the 
task.  In  the  last  days  of  the  Orleanists,  P.  Christian 
published  his  Afrique  franQoise,  in  which  he  eloquently 
protested  against  such  a  fatal  consummation.  Today 
Algeria  is  one  of  the  finest  colonies  of  the  world.  This 
led,  perhaps  not  by  straight  roads  but  led,  to  the  pro- 
tectorate over  Tunis.  The  depredations  of  its  inhabitants 
upon  the  Algerian  frontier  and  the  movements  which  led 

83 


84         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Austria  to  Bosnia,  England  to  Cyprus,  doubtless  con- 
tributed to  accelerate  this  action. 

The  expansion  of  the  North  African  and  of  the  West 
African  colonies  in  their  hinterland  brought  about  the 
creation  of  a  colonial  dominion  extending  from  the  Medi- 
terranean to  the  Congo.  Not  to  speak  of  her  other 
colonial  possessions,  some  of  which  date  from  the  seven- 
teenth century,  France  has,  there  at  her  very  door,  an 
extensive  colonial  empire,^  though  some  of  these  terri- 
tories seem  to  have  but  a  trifling  value.  This  shows  the 
unreliable  character  of  the  statements  of  learned 
Germans,  American  university  professors,  when  they 
tabulated  colonial  reports  and  said  that  since  1870  she 
had  increased  her  colonies  by  so  many  square  miles  and 
Germany  by  only  so  many.  What  is  the  value  of 
thousands  of  square  miles  of  Saharan  sands?  Nations, 
like  individuals,  have  their  course  determined  by  their 
aptitudes  and  uses  of  opportunities.  Germany  chose 
military,  industrial  and  commercial  power,  and  when  she 
has  attained  a  goal  far  in  advance  of  others  in  these 
domains  she  comes  and  asks  those  who  have  toiled  in 
other  directions  to  give  up  the  fruits  of  their  efforts. 
She  asks  it  in  a  brutal  way,  as  by  the  Tangier  Speech. 
Again,  nations  may  have  an  especial  policy  like  that  of 
England  of  old  in  Newfoundland,  where  her  fisheries 
were  reserved  for  English  fishermen  from  home,  and 
thereby  increasing  the  number  of  her  seamen,  and 
through  that  developing  the  greatest  navy  that  the  world 
has  ever  seen.  However,  when  Britain  no  longer  found 
it  profitable  to  follow  her  former  course  she  could  not 
ask   the   French,   in    Newfoundland,   except  by    special 

'  See  Bracq,  J.  C,  The  Colonial  Expansion  of  France,  National 
Geographic  Magazine,  vol.  XI,  no.  6,  June,  1900. 


FRANCE,  GERMANY  AND  MOROCCO       85 

agreement,  as  was  done,  to  surrender  prerogatives  shaped 
by  the  first  pohcy.  Similarly,  Germany  was  signally  in- 
different to  colonies  for  a  long  time,  and  now  she  is 
bitter  because  she  has  not  done  what  others  did. 

Unquestionably,  Morocco  looked  to  her  like  a  desirable 
field  for  a  colony  and  to  the  French  it  seemed,  at  first, 
like  a  most  enviable  morsel  to  be  added  to  the  French 
colonial  empire.  There  were,  however,  such  dangers 
associated  with  it  that  the  most  thoughtful  Frenchmen 
were  averse  to  such  an  acquisition.  On  other  grounds, 
Socialists  and  Radicals  clamored  against  the  idea  of 
having  either  a  protectorate  over  it,  or  of  proceeding  to 
its  annexation.  Its  general  condition  was  forlorn. 
Anarchy  reigned  supreme.  In  the  eyes  of  all,  govern- 
ment meant  violence  and  plunder.  The  Sultan  had  lost 
almost  all  his  power.  To  reconquer  it  for  him,  or  to 
win  it  for  France,  looked  like  a  gigantic  task.  Generally, 
Frenchmen  were  opposed  to  any  form  of  action  which 
would  lead  even  to  a  partial  control.  They  found  a  great 
danger  in  the  very  extension  of  this  French  Mediter- 
ranean colonial  Power.  North  Africa  is  peopled  by  a 
very  capable  militant  population  ever  ready  to  resort  to 
arms.  Formerly,  these  North  Africans,  divided  among 
themselves,  were  in  a  continual  state  of  civil  war,  and 
security  to  the  outside  world  came  from  their  intense 
particularism.  With  French  rule,  they  have,  willy-nilly, 
lived  under  the  pax  Gallicana  and  some  of  their  sons 
have  acquired  considerable  French  culture  through  the 
lycecs  and  the  Medersas  for  the  Islamic  Clergy.  These 
natives,  formerly  at  variance  with  each  other,  have,  in 
later  times,  shown  signs  of  a  growing  common  moral  and 
religious  consciousness.  There  is  among  the  most  intel- 
ligent a  sense  of  oneness  which  has  never  existed  before. 


86         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Their  belligerent  spirit,  which  has  been  weakened  by  the 
new  life  introduced  by  France,  is  frequently  reawakened 
by  appeals  from  Mohammedan  communities  outside  or 
by  local  fanatics,  A  secret  Moslem  society,  the  Maghre- 
binian  Union,  with  headquarters  at  Alexandria,  has  long 
worked  to  unite  the  Pan-Islamic  forces  in  North  Africa 
under  the  auspices  of  Germany.^ 

The  annexation  of  Morocco  would  have  accentuated 
the  evil.  Before  long,  according  to  an  eminent  authority, 
M.  Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu,  there  would  be  14,000,000 
Arabs  and  Kabyls  against,  at  most,  1,150,000  to  1,200,000 
Europeans,  and  thirty  Moslems  for  one  Frenchman.^ 
This  increase  might  imperil  French  colonies.  Further- 
more, Jaures  and  his  followers  made  the  most  violent 
opposition  to  the  taking  of  Morocco  in  any  way  whatso- 
ever.^ There  was  no  national  desire  to  possess  that 
territory,  but  when  it  became  evident  that  the  Germans 
were  aiming  at  a  foothold  there,  the  sense  of  a  greater 
danger  loomed  up.  The  aggressive  spirit  of  the  Ger- 
mans, so  dangerous  in  Europe,  would  be  even  more  so 
in  Africa.  The  French  army  in  Algeria,  and  Tunisia, 
would  have  to  be  increased,  and  the  chances  of  German- 
French  friction  would  be  multiplied.  To  quote  the  words 
of  Sir  Thomas  Barclay,  a  man  very  friendly  to  Germany, 
writing  before  the  present  war,  "  Beyond  the  latent  feel- 
ing about  the  lost  provinces,  there  was  at  the  time  no 
hostility  on  the  part  of  Frenchmen  to  Germany."  *  Look- 
ing at  the  matter  calmly — for  the  population  of  France 
exhibited  a  great  deal  of  self-control  at  this  time — it  was 

*  Le  Temps,  Nov.  2,  1912. 
'  V,  43,  22. 

*  V,  43,  709- 

*  Thirty  Years  Anglo-French  Reminiscences,  p.  267., 


FRANCE,  GERMANY  AND  MOROCCO      87 

better  to  take  chances  with  the  Arabs  and  the  Kabyls  than 
with  the  men  who  were  clamoring  for  the  "  Greater  Ger- 
many," and  complained  that  their  territories  were  insuf- 
ficient for  all  their  needs;  as  if  all  progressive  nations  did 
not  depend  upon  other  countries  to  supply  some  of  the 
increased  wants  created  by  our  civilization. 

England  was  compelled  to  take  the  same  attitude  as 
France,  and  for  many  similar  reasons.  She  had  more 
than  four  times  greater  economic  interests  there  ^  than 
the  Germans.  She  had  and  could  have  kept  her  ascend- 
ency over  the  Sultan.  Englishmen  had  done  much  for 
the  introduction  of  Western  civilization  in  that  country. 
There  was  also  the  question  of  Gibraltar.  England  could 
hardly  have  countenanced  the  establishment  of  the  hel- 
meted  men  on  the  opposite  shore.  As  someone  has  said, 
"  Morocco  was  mortgaged  with  the  question  of  the 
Strait "  ^  guarded  by  the  impregnable  English  fortress. 
Spain,  somewhat  cramped  between  two  strong  neighbors, 
did  not  wish  to  see  the  advent  of  a  third  one,  Germany. 
An  entente  with  the  Castilian  Government  was  recorded 
on  October  6,  1904.  Italy  had  already  approved  the 
Anglo-French  Agreement  as  a  compensation  for  a  free 
hand  in  Tripoli.  The  unanimity  of  these  Powers  grew 
out  of  the  fact  that  this  was  the  culminating  point  of  a 
great  historic  status,  during  which  the  nations  had  made 
great  sacrifices  and  through  which  the  world  had  been 
greatly  benefited.  They  were  all  at  one  about  the  es- 
sential work  to  be  done  in  Morocco,  to  put  an  end  to  an 
impossible  life  there  and  to  open  the  land  to  all.  These 
Powers  recognized  that  France,  on  account  of  her  posi- 
tion and  experience,  was  better  equipped  and  better  quali- 

'  Tardieu,  La  Conference  d'Algesiras,  p.  499. 
'  Menil,  Op.  cit.,  p.  137. 


88         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

fied  than  any  other  Power  for  this  work.  Again  Germany 
had  in  former  years  showed  a  singular  indifference  to 
the  land  of  the  Sultan.  In  1880,  Bismarck,  in  a  report 
to  the  Kaiser,  said  that  Germany  should  encourage 
France  to  go  to  Morocco.^  When  the  Count  de  Saint- 
Vallier  went  to  see  him  about  the  protectorate  over 
Tunis,  he  expressed  the  hope  that  France  would  also 
annex  Morocco.  "  We  can  but  rejoice  at  that,"  ^  said 
he.  The  land  of  the  Kaiser,  as  we  have  seen,  had  but 
scanty  interests  there,  created  by  the  recent  emissaries 
sent  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  future  action  of  her 
Weltpolitik. 

We  have  already  said  that  Morocco  was  not  really  a 
country  with  a  regular  government.  There  were  only 
sections  of  the  territories  that  accepted  fully  the  authority 
of  the  Sultan,  who  at  times  seemed  more  like  a  mediaeval 
baron  robber  than  like  a  modern  ruler.  His  sway  was 
at  best  nominal  over  the  greater  part  of  the  land.  His 
subordinates  did  what  they  had  seen  their  Prince  prac- 
tice and  that  in  cruel  ways.  Absence  of  government  and 
lawlessness  reigned  supreme.  Neither  the  property  nor 
the  persons  of  the  natives,  nor  the  belongings  nor  the 
persons  of  foreigners  were  in  security.  No  one  has 
summed  up  the  situation  better  than  M.  Andre  Tardieu 
when  he  says,  "  For  the  last  ten  centuries  it  has  been  the 
lot  of  Moroccan  vSultans  to  have  continually  to  conquer 
their  subjects,  and  the  special  occupation  of  the  subjects 
has  been  that  of  disobeying  their  sovereigns.  To  tell  the 
truth,  the  notion  of  sovereignty  does  not  exist.  Where 
there  is  no  hierarchy,  it  is  impossible  that  there  should 
be  any  moral  notion  attaching  to  revolt.     Morocco  is  a 

'  VI,  6,  718. 

"*  Matter,  Ibid.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  512. 


FRANCE,  GERMANY  AND  MOROCCO       89 

country  of  feudal  and  theocratic  anarchy;  and  the  dis- 
turbances that  have  occurred  there  in  recent  times  are 
merely  a  fresh  manifestation  of  tendencies  that  have 
long  existed.  It  is  Europe  alone  which,  first  through 
mental  assimilation,  and  subsequently  through  political 
interests,  has  created  the  unity  of  Morocco.  In  such 
unity  there  has  never  been  either  reality  or  totality. 
What  does  exist  is  a  Moorish  empire  with  which  other 
Powers  treat ;  but  inside  the  empire  one  finds  merely 
tribes  who,  in  battles  or  else  in  incessant  negotiations, 
seek  their  personal  profit  only."  ^  To  carry  out  his  ag- 
gressive purpose,  the  Kaiser  maintained  this  fiction  of  a 
government  as  if  it  had  been  real. 

The  Yellow  Book  published  in  December,  1905,  is  an  elo- 
quent defense  of  the  friendly  attitude  of  France  toward 
Morocco.  A  long  list  of  grievances,  plunders,  murders 
speaks  well  for  the  patience  of  the  stronger  Power.^  To 
remedy  this,  France  did  not  assail  the  Sultan,  but  en- 
deavored to  help  him.  On  that  long  frontier  of  nearly  a 
thousand  miles,  after  so  many  incursions  of  Moroccan 
tribes  and  marauders  into  Algeria,  she  could  have  found 
many  pretexts  for  invasion.  She  had  by  the  treaty  of 
1845  the  "  right  of  pursuit  "  whereby  she  could  track 
Moroccan  intruders  into  the  country.  She  had  made 
several  punitive  expeditions  into  the  Sultan's  territories,' 
but  as  a  whole  she  acted  as  a  friend  ready  to  help  him  to 
solve  his  own  difficulties.  Several  treaties  show  a  mutual 
understanding  between  the  two  Governments.  The 
amicable  disposition  of  France  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 

'  France  and  the  Alliances,  p.  108. 

*  See  documents  i,  3,  4,  25,  44,  46,  47,  48,  54,  67,  68,  79,  80,  83, 
84,  114,  115,  118,  125,  128,  136,  144,  148,  221,  225,  240,  264. 
•Tardieu,  Op.  cit.,  p.  115. 


90         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

several  times  she  allowed  the  Sultan's  troops  to  cross 
her  territory  on  the  way  to  restore  order  ^  or  Moroccan 
subjects  pursued  by  enemies  to  find  refuge  in  Algeria.^ 
She  rendered  many  other  services. 

The  French  policy  of  peaceful  penetration  was  already 
being  carried  out  at  the  beginning  of  this  century.  Some 
French  ofificers  were  endeavoring  to  put  some  order  in 
the  Sherifian  army  at  Fez.  French  customs  ofificers  were 
organizing  the  fiscal  service  in  the  various  parts.  The 
chief  of  police  of  Tangier  was  a  Frenchman,  his  two 
helpers  were  Algerian  Moslems  but  appointed  by  the 
Sultan.  He  was  to  decide  upon  who  would  be  their 
successors.  This  work  was  done  quietly  without  hurt  or 
shock;  it  was  to  be  an  evolution  and  not  a  revolution.^ 
The  Anglo-French  Agreement  was  really  the  continua- 
tion of  this  which  was  already  opposed  at  Fez  by 
German  agents.  The  Sultan  had  borrowed  some 
money  from  French  banks  for  important  public  works. 
French  officials  had  displayed  much  energy  for  the  re- 
lease of  the  American  subject,  Perdicaris,  captured  by 
the  brigand  Raisuli.  The  most  imperative  and  reason- 
able reforms  contemplated  by  the  Agreement  had  re- 
ceived at  least  a  partial  application.  The  French  aim, 
according  to  M.  Tardieu,  was  directed  by  three  guiding 
principles,  "  Morocco's  integrity,  the  Sultan's  authority, 
commercial  liberty."  ^  As  M.  Delcasse  said,  "  Far  from 
lessening  the  Sultan's  authority  we  were  particularly 
anxious  to  enhance  his  prestige."  "  We  are  endeavor- 
ing to  give  the  country   (Morocco)    security  to  assure 

'  Yellow  Book,  docs.  26,  29,  69,  86,  92,  95,  97,  188. 
"  Ibid.,  docs.  59,  69,  124,  193,  201,  218,  250,  354. 
'  Le  Temps,  Aug.  17,  1904. 
*  Op,  cit.,  p.  120. 


FRANCE,  GERMANY  AND  MOROCCO       91 

ours,"  hoping  that  it  "  would  know  our  presence  by  the 
benefits  that  would  accompany  it.  France  seeks  her 
advantages  only  in  the  harmony  of  interests  and  for  the 
benefit  of  all."  ^  M.  Delcasse  has  all  along  endeavored  to 
introduce  a  real  idealism  into  international  relations.  No 
French  statesman,  more  than  he,  has  shown  the  danger 
from  a  narrow  patriotism  and  a  national  selfishness.  No 
one  ever  was  more  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  conquest  and 
domination  according  to  the  Bismarckian  method.  M. 
Delcasse  has  been  at  one  with  modern  sociologists  who 
have  proclaimed  the  evil  of  national  greed  and  the 
beneficence  of  general  good-will.  In  dealing  with  inter- 
national problems,  he  always  saw  the  reasonableness  of 
conflicting  claims.  In  the  spirit  of  conciliation  he  pro- 
ceeded to  just  concessions.  A  Hay  or  a  Root,  only  even 
gentler,  he  wished  to  have  French  action  permeated  with 
a  lofty  form  of  humanitarianism  good  for  the  Moroccans 
as  well  as  for  the  world  at  large.  The  Tangier  Speech 
put  an  end  to  all  this. 

On  its  own  side,  the  German  Government  sent  at  once 
Count  von  Tattenbach  to  Fez  to  work  upon  the  feelings 
of  the  Sultan."  Agents  in  different  parts  of  the  country 
tended  to  keep  up  national  anarchy.^  As  a  matter  of 
fact  Germany  has  generally  been  indifferent  to  the 
wrongs  endured  by  small  and  backward  nations.  She 
did  not  side  with  the  Greeks,  the  Bulgarians,  the  Servians 
or  with  any  of  the  peoples  so  outrageously  treated  by 
the  Turks.  She  has  ever  been  against  the  oppressed, 
hand  in  hand  with  the  massacrers.  She  never  took  an 
important  part  in  opposing  indescribable  wrongs  in  the 

*  Mevil,  A.,  Op.  cit.,  p.  174. 

*  V,  27,  236,  474. 

*  Ibid.,  480. 


92  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Congo,  or  in  the  Turkish  possessions,  as  the  United 
States,  England  and  France  have  done.  Philanthropic 
considerations  of  the  well-being  of  the  natives  in  Morocco 
never  entered  the  mind  of  the  Germans.  Their  repre- 
sentatives posed  as  the  defenders  of  Islamism.  In  his 
address  in  Damascus  the  Kaiser  spoke  as  the  protector 
of  the  Moslems.  "  May  the  Sultan,"  ^  he  said,  "  and  may 
the  300,000,000  of  Mohammedans  throughout  the  world 
who  reverence  him  as  their  Caliph,  be  assured  that  at  all 
times  the  German  Emperor  will  be  their  friend."  ^  He 
has  been  popularly  presented  to  the  Turks  as  "  Hadji 
Mohammed  Guillioun."  ^  It  was  therefore  easy  for  Count 
von  Tattenbach,  imitating  his  chief,  to  get  close  to  the 
Sultan  of  Morocco,  to  convince  him  that  his  country  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  French,  that  the  German  Turcophiles 
were  his  friends — he  sadly  learned  the  contrary  later  on 
— ^and  that  they  would  be  the  deliverers  of  his  empire. 
He  worked  with  him,  and  finally  succeeded  in  convinc- 
ing him  of  the  importance  of  a  European  conference  to 
settle  North  African  matters.^ 

Meanwhile  the  German  Government  was  seeking  in 
Paris  to  undermine  and  overthrow  the  great  minister 
who  had  made  friends  for  France,  and  had  introduced  a 
new  spirit  into  international  relations.  All  kinds  of 
falsehoods  were  circulated  to  show  that  France  at  Fez 
had  claimed  to  act  by  virtue  of  a  mandate  from  Europe 
— that  she  was  about  to  send  an  ultimatum  to  the  Sultan 
demanding  that  he  should  accept  French  terms, — that 
M.   Delcasse   had   tried   to    form  combinations   against 

*  Abdul  Hamid. 
'^  Gauss,  p.  129. 

*  Le  Temps,  Jan.  19,  1915. 

*  V,  2/,  951. 


FRANCE,  GERMANY  AND  MOROCCO       93 

Germany,  that  he  had  done  his  work  with  England  in  an 
underhanded  way — charges  which  do  not  bear  exami- 
nation. There  were  threats  softened  by  the  suggestions 
that  if  M.  Delcasse  were  thrown  overboard,  Germany 
would  be  more  conciliatory.  There  were  even  hints  of 
war.  Dernburgs  were  sent  to  Paris  to  conciliate  the 
Radicals  and  to  have  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
removed.  The  official  diplomacy  of  Prince  Radolin  was 
supplemented  by  an  officious  one  headed  by  Prince 
Henckel  von  Donnersmark,  who  worked  in  every  way  to 
win  his  point.^  The  pacifists  headed  by  M.  Rouvier, 
thinking  that  Germany  was  in  earnest,  sacrificed  the 
great  minister.^  European  opinion  interpreted  this  act 
as  a  victory  of  von  Bulow.  The  great  English  dailies 
expressed  their  regrets,  and  the  Daily  Chronicle  had  a 
heading,  "  A  Victory  of  the  Kaiser."  As  soon  as  the 
latter  received  the  news  of  M.  Delcasse's  downfall  he 
drove  in  great  haste  to  the  residence  of  the  aggressive 
Chancellor,  and  announced  to  him  his  elevation  to  the 
rank  of  Prince.^ 

Before  this  there  were  two  possible  courses  open  to 
the  French  Government.  One  was,  with  the  help  of 
England,  help  that  had  been  offered,  to  resist  Germany. 
This  was  the  Delcasse  policy  which  was  rejected.  The 
other  was  to  yield  as  much  as  possible  to  Wilhelmstrasse, 
showing  a  spirit  of  peace  at  any  price.  This  was  the 
course  taken  by  M.  Rouvier.  France  in  her  concessions 
went  to  the  borderland  of  cowardice,  but  that  did  not 
modify  the  attitude  of  Prince  von  Biilow.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  Morocco  was  a  mere  pretext.    What  astonished 

*  Mevil,  Op.  cit.,  p.  273. 

*  Ihid.,  Chap.  V. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  301. 


94         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

the  yielders  was  that  the  Chancellor,  having  won  his 
point  in  the  matter  of  the  great  Minister,  was  more  than 
ever  pressing  the  Moroccan  question,  and  demanding  a 
conference.  Five  days  after  the  resignation  of  M. 
Delcasse,  Prince  von  Radolin  had  an  interview  with  M. 
Rouvier  urging  the  question  and  concluding  with  these 
threatening  words,  "  You  must  know  that  we  stand 
behind  Morocco."  ^ 

Von  Biilow,  appealing  to  various  countries,  had  but 
little  encouragement.  The  Government  in  Washington, 
after  looking  into  the  matter,  asserted  its  disinterested- 
ness in  the  question.  President  Roosevelt  and  Secretary 
Taft  gauged  at  once  the  true  purpose  of  von  Biilow.^ 
Had  the  advice  of  M.  Delcasse  been  followed  a  con- 
ference would  have  been  impossible.  The  Powers  at 
large,  while  perhaps  not  absolutely  satisfied  with  every 
part  of  the  Agreement,  approved  it.  The  Quai  d'Orsay 
could  not  accept  at  once  the  idea  of  a  conference.  Its 
inquiries  from  the  defenders  of  the  proposal  as  to  the 
specific  aims  and  methods  and  the  particular  questions  to 
be  discussed  were  met  by  a  cold  mutism  and  a  suggestion 
that  France  should  inquire  at  Fez.  This  way  of  doing 
was  in  perfect  keeping  with  the  previous  action  of  Prince 
von  Biilow  and  in  fact  it  was  a  new  manner  of  waging 
war.  Before  the  Algeciras  Conference,  he  had  another 
thrust  at  France,  made  another  menacing  speech  in  the 
Reichstag,  and  asked  more  money  for  armaments  upon 
land  and  sea.^  The  substance  of  the  speech  was  a  repeti- 
tion of  that  of  the  Kaiser  at  Tangier.  After  all  this,  the 
Kaiser,  his  Chancellor  and  the  German  provocators  had 
yet  the  monumental  boldness  to  pose  as  friends  of  peace. 

*  Yellow  Book,  document  269,  p.  232. 
'  Mevil,  p.  230. 

'  V,  30,  954. 


VIII 

FROM  THE  ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE  TO  THE 
DELIVERANCE  OF  FEZ 

M.  RouviER  had  thought  that  Germany  would  yield 
after  the  resignation  of  M.  Delcasse,  but  she  did  not. 
On  the  contrary  she  became  more  exacting,  and  finally 
France  accepted  the  principle  of  a  conference  which  in 
reality  was  nothing  but  a  German  intervention.  This 
conference  convened  at  Algeciras  on  January  i6,  1906. 
The  delegates  of  von  Biilow  had  explicit  instructions  to 
leave  to  France  only  the  frontier,  to  give  Spain  the 
Mediterranean  coasts,  to  secure  for  Berlin  or  for  Ger- 
man allies  or  for  some  neutral  Power  the  police  of  the 
ocean. ^  For  officers,  they  had  Austria  propose  repre- 
sentatives of  neutral  Powers  that  could  easily  be  in- 
fluenced, such  as  Switzerland  or  Holland.^  With  the 
beginning  of  the  session  the  language  of  the  German 
Government  was  hard,  imperious  and  menacing.  Ger- 
many wanted  to  dictate  what  should  be  done.  She  tried 
hard  to  faire  la  pliiie  et  le  beau  temps.  She  rejected  with 
haughtiness  ofifers  of  arbitration  made  by  Italy,  Russia, 
America  and  Austria.^  Before  the  Conference  the  Ger- 
mans endeavored  to  place  their  claims  upon  the  basis 
of  the  Conference  of  Madrid  in  1880,  but  German  jurists 
were  the  first  to  discover  that  the   Conference  which 

'  Berard,  Op.  cit.,  p.  212. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  213. 

'  Tardieu,  Op.  cit.,  p.  202. 

95 


96  THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

dealt  then  with  a  special  issue  had  no  bearing  upon  the 
present  difficulty. 

A  striking  change  in  the  attitude  of  Germany  is  that 
from  the  first  she  attempted  to  internationalize  a  problem 
which  really  concerned  three  Powers,  and  this  was  done 
by  the  most  nationalistic  nation  of  Europe.  Novicow 
has  shown  that  "  since  1871,  the  Germans  have  not, 
with  the  exception  of  the  postal-union,  taken  a  single 
step  for  the  organization  of  Europe."  ^  All  at  once,  in 
Algeciras,  they  were  seized  with  zeal  for  the  interests 
of  all.  They  began  to  talk  of  equal  treatment  as  if 
France  had  had  no  more  rights  in  the  land  of  Abd-el- 
Aziz  than  Belgium,  Holland  and  Sweden.  Did  not 
England,  with  her  peculiar  position  at  Gibraltar,  the  key 
to  the  avenue  of  her  Eastern  Empire,  have  more  claims 
than  Germany  in  deciding  what  should  be  done  with  the 
bankrupt  and  collapsed  Moroccan  state  ?  Was  not  Spain, 
with  her  establishments  on  the  coast  of  the  country,  more 
concerned  than  the  United  States?  Was  the  combined 
work  of  France,  England  and  Spain  of  no  moment  and 
were  the  services  which  they  had  rendered  to  civilization 
to  give  them  no  special  recognition?  Was  Germany,  so 
long  indifferent  to  colonies  and  never  having  done  any- 
thing on  behalf  of  the  Moroccans,  entitled  to  the  same 
treatment  as  France,  who  had  so  long  been  annoyed  by 
her  Moslem  neighbors,  and  who,  by  treaty,  enjoyed  in 
Morocco  all  the  prerogatives  of  England  as  well  as  her 
own? 

After    much    useless    opposition    the    agents    of    von 

Billow  were  forced  by  the  spirit  of  the  Conference  to 

admit  France's  special  rights.     Italy,  England,  Russia, 

the    United    States,     Spain,    Portugal,     Belgium    and 

'  Op.  cit.,  p.  243. 


THE  ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE  97 

Holland,  were  thoroughly  won  over  to  the  side 
of  Rouvier's  representatives,  while  Morocco  and 
Austria  were  with  Germany.^  This  last  statement  must 
be  modified.  M.  Tardieu  says  that  "  although  devoted 
to  Germany,  she  (Austria)  could  not  go  against  plain 
evidence,  and  had  exercised  a  conciliatory  action,  which 
now  and  again  inclined  distinctly  in  favor  of  France."  ^ 
Morocco  was  representing  mere  nominality  and  nullity 
as  a  state.  In  spite  of  all,  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers  were  under  the  impression  that  French  claims 
were  as  fair  as  they  were  moderate.^  Germany  was  at 
times  inconsistent.  She  recognized  some  special  rights 
to  her  antagonist  in  Morocco  and  at  the  same  time 
wished  to  secure  the  internationalization  of  everything. 
She  wanted  to  have  a  "  general  inspector  "  chosen  from 
the  diplomatic  corps  of  Tangier  to  look  after  Moroccan 
matters  and  at  the  same  time  stood  for  the  independence 
of  the  Sultan.*  Finally  the  Conference  voted  that  France 
and  Spain  should  be  intrusted  with  the  work  of  pacifica- 
tion and  organization. 

Most  of  the  Powers  realized  that  behind  German 
action  there  was  a  bold,  aggressive  and  pugnacious  pur- 
pose, and  so  they  decided  on  behalf  of  the  two  Powers 
who  had  really  the  greatest  interests  at  stake  there. 
Germany  gained  no  prestige,  but,  rather,  emerged  crest- 
fallen. Her  press  was  full  of  severe  denunciations. 
There  was  as  usual  the  stereotyped  complaint  that  Ger- 
many could  not  have  her  "  place  in  the  sun."  There  was 
intense    bitterness    against    Russia,^    while    Italy    was 

'  V,  J-',  77. 

'  Op.  cit.,  p.  203. 

•  V,  3^,  717. 

*  V,  3^,  718. 

•  V,  32, 957. 


98         THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

greatly  censured.^  What  was  more  painful  for  Ger- 
many than  the  fiasco  of  Algeciras  was  that  she  be- 
gan to  have  misgivings  about  the  Triplice.  Italy  was 
in  favor  of  an  aUiance  of  peace,  while  Germany,  by 
her  methods  and  action,  was  for  a  Triplice  of 
war. 

The  great  German  nation  began  to  feel,  what  she  had 
so  long  imposed  vipon  France,  a  sense  of  isolation  that 
was  positively  depressing.  Von  Biilow,  who  kept  up  a 
brave  countenance,  was  obliged  to  recognize  in  a  speech 
in  the  Reichstag  a  certain  entente  cordiale  of  the  Western 
Powers  unsympathetic  to  Germany  and  on  that  account 
dangerous.^  A  similar  movement,  inaugurated  by  Bis- 
marck, the  purpose  of  which  was  to  isolate  France, 
was  praised  by  Prince  von  Biilow,  but  this  one  which 
menaced  no  one  was  characterized  by  him  as  follows : 
"  A  policy  which  would  have  for  its  purpose  to  create 
a  ring  of  Powers  to  isolate  and  paralyze  us  would  be  a 
very  dangerous  policy.  The  foundation  of  such  a  ring 
is  not  possible  unless  there  is  exerted  a  certain  pression ; 
a  pression  creates  a  counter-pression ;  pression  and 
counter-pression  may  easily  produce  explosions."  ^  The 
Entente  was  the  child  of  the  Dreihund,  of  the  Triplice, 
and  above  all  of  the  violent  and  aggressive  course  of 
Prince  von  Biilow.  In  his  mind,  the  German  coalitions 
were  legitimate,  but  a  coalition  of  the  other  Powers  was 
wrong.  For  him  the  only  international  morals  must  be 
German  ethics.  What  is  right  for  Deutschland  is 
wrong  for  some  other  country.  Instead  of  recogniz- 
ing  that   the   cause    of    this   international    friction   was 

^  V,  33,  218. 
'  V,  36,  7^7- 
*  Quoted  from  Berard,  Op.  cit.,  p.  243. 


THE  ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE  99 

himself,  he  concluded  with  the  great  expression  of 
Prussian  faith  in  force,  "  Let  us  keep  our  sword 
sharp."  1 

The  task  intrusted  to  France  was  specially  difficult, 
as  her  government  was  censured  alike  by  Jaures  and  his 
supporters  as  well  as  by  the  Germans.  She  was  doomed 
to  be  blamed  either  for  overdoing  or  for  failing  to  do. 
One  fact,  however,  which  we  must  notice  is  that  the 
privileges  granted  to  France  by  the  Powers  at  Algeciras 
were  not  essentially  different  from  the  previous  ones 
assumed  after  the  Agreement.  If  we  examine  the  in- 
structions given  by  M.  Delcasse  to  M.  Saint-Rene  Tail- 
landier  when  he  went  to  Fez  to  announce  to  the  Sultan 
the  great  historic  Anglo-French  understanding,  and  if 
we  look  at  the  Franco-Spanish  Agreement  of  the  same 
year,  both  contain  a  pledge  to  respect  "  the  integrity  of 
the  Moroccan  Empire  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sul- 
tan." 2  The  mission  of  pacifying  Morocco  was  rendered 
harder  by  the  Germans,  who  had  excited  the  natives — 
they  who  needed  so  little  incentive  to  rise  against  any- 
one— against  the  French.  The  German  war-machine  to 
create  public  opinion  in  their  favor,  or  against  their 
antagonists,  the  machine  that  sent  Dernburg  to  the  United 
States,  Baron  von  Schenk  to  Athens,  Prince  von  Biilow 
to  Italy,  that  has  secured  members  of  the  German  Em- 
bassy to  help  Dr.  Dumba  to  disorganize  American  in- 
dustries, that  has  sent  emissaries  to  India,  to  Egypt,  to 
Tripoli,  Tunis,  Algiers,  and  especially  to  the  colonies  of 
France  and  Great  Britain,^  was  at  work  and  carried 
on  efforts  to  make  the  French  task  impossible. 

'  V,  36,  718. 

*  Tardieu,  A.,  Op.  cit.,  p.  102. 

*  Le  Temps  J  March  7,  27,  and  July  3,  191 5. 


loo        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

The  natives  were  furious  against  these  Frenchmen 
whose  aims  were  represented  to  them  in  sinister  colors. 
At  all  points  in  the  Sultan's  country,  they  were  annoyed, 
insulted,  ill-treated  and  several  lost  their  lives.  Dr. 
Mauchamp,  who  practiced  medicine,  was  assassinated  by 
Moslem  fanatics.^  At  Casablanca,  on  the  west  coast, 
Frenchmen  were  outrageously  treated,  and  their  work — 
they  were  building  a  breakwater — was  destroyed  so  that 
French  soldiers  were  landed  to  protect  Europeans  and 
the  French  consulate.  As  these  mariners  came  in  sight 
of  the  city  gates,  though  there  was  a  pre-arrangement 
with  the  authorities,  Moroccan  soldiers  began  to  fire 
upon  them,  and  a  reckless  mass  of  native  fighters,  from 
the  country,  came  in  not  only  to  attack  the  French,  but 
also  to  give  vent  to  their  deepest  instinct,  plunder.  The 
French  defended  themselves  and  then  protected  the  city.^ 
They  did  what  the  Americans  were  compelled  to  do  in 
Vera  Cruz,  but  did  not  do  what  the  Germans  have  done 
in  Louvain.^ 

This  incident,  common  enough  in  the  history  of  colonies 
and  protectorates — the  French  could  not  honorably  have 
acted  otherwise — at  once  aroused  the  German  military 
element  and  the  German  press.^  Did  they  ever  imagine 
that  in  such  a  country  and  with  such  a  people,  the  French 
could  do  their  work  and  not  meet  "  bloody  points  with 
bloody  points  "  ?  Again  France  and  Spain  were  intrusted 
with  restoring  order,  but  Germany  kept  on  interfering. 
Thus  when  the  two  brothers,  Abd-el-Aziz,  who  was  in 
power,  and  Moulai-Hafid,  who  was  a  pretender,  were 

'  V,  38,  709. 
*  V,  39,  947. 

'  Supposing  that  the  Belgians  attacked  them,  which   is  most 
improbable. 
'  V,  41.  235- 


THE  ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE.'  ;,; if  ioj: 

fighting,  Germany  received  the  delegates  of  the  latter.^ 
Again,  when  the  former  was  defeated  Germany  sent  her 
Consul,  Herr  Vassel,  to  Fez  to  work  upon  the  new  Sul- 
tan's mind.  At  the  same  time  she  sent  a  note  to  the 
Powers  urging  them  to  recognize  Moulai-Hafid.  She 
acted  as  if  there  had  been  no  Conference  at  all.  She  had 
given  Abd-el-Aziz  the  greatest  assurances  of  friendship, 
proclaimed  his  independence  urbi  et  orhi,  asserted  in 
the  Tangier  Speech  that  he  was  the  only  ruler  that  she 
would  recognize,  persuaded  him  to  resist  France,  but 
now  when  fortune  betrayed  the  hapless  ruler,  Germany 
not  only  dropped  him  but  she  urged  other  nations  to 
support  his  brother. 

This  resembles  the  treatment  of  President  Kruger. 
When,  in  1884,  a  Boer  delegation,  anti-English  in  char- 
acter, was  received  in  Berlin,  it  was  entertained  with 
lavish  hospitality  at  the  Emperor's  expense.  Kriiger 
"  sat  at  the  Emperor's  table  next  to  Bismarck,  and  talked 
about  the  glorious  future  of  the  Dutch  and  German  races 
in  South  Africa." "  On  January  6,  1896,  the  Kaiser 
telegraphed  to  him,  "  I  beg  to  express  to  you  my  sincere 
congratulations  that,  without  help  from  foreign  Powers, 
you  have  succeeded  with  your  own  people  and  by  your 
own  strength  in  driving  out  the  armed  bands  which 
attempted  to  disturb  the  peace  of  your  country  and  in 
re-establishing  order  and  in  defending  the  independence 
of  your  people  from  attacks  from  outside."  When,  later 
on,  at  the  hour  of  great  bitterness  and  sorrow,  the  van- 
quished President  of  the  South  African  Republic  wished 
to  see  him,  Wilhelm  II  declined.  He  has  related  in  the 
Daily  Telegraph  interview  how  he  made  plans  for  the 

'  V,  45,  474- 

*  Lowe,  vol.  II,  p.  235. 


sq-?.       THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

defeat  of  the  Boers.  These  plans  were  sent  to  London, 
It  was  in  following  them  that  Lord  Roberts  achieved 
victory.^ 

Similarly  the  poor  Sultan  was  thus  betrayed  by  those 
who  had  pledged  themselves  to  stand  by  him,  and  who 
now  attempted  to  help  his  brother  against  him.  France 
was  indifferent  as  to  who  the  Sultan  was  in  the  first 
place,  but  she  was  loyal  to  him  until  it  was  demon- 
strated that  the  Moroccans  had  transferred  their 
allegiance  to  his  brother.  Even  then  Paris  insisted 
that  the  defeated  ruler  should  have  his  life  spared, 
and  be  treated  with  kindness  and  becoming  dignity.^ 
She  even  provided  him  with  means  to  lead  a  decent 
existence. 

Berlin  kept  up  its  policy  of  irritation.  In  1908,  the 
Kaiser,  in  his  interview  with  a  reporter  of  the  Daily 
Telegraph,  stirred  up  his  own  people  by  references  to  the 
Boer  war  and  by  his  moral  color-blindness  in  his  boast 
of  what  he  had  done  for  England;  but  he  managed  to 
say  things  about  France  that  would  damage  her  in 
British  eyes — things  which,  according  to  Mevil,  were 
most  erroneous.^  During  the  year  his  Government  re- 
curred to  the  Moroccan  Question.  After  the  decision 
of  the  Conference,  Germany  again  objected  that  one 
Power  should  have  a  more  favored  position  in  the  Moor- 
ish Empire  than  any  other.*  She  really  tried  again  to 
take  Morocco  out  of  French  and  Spanish  hands.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Conference,  all  Powers  were  to  be  upon  the 
same  economic  basis,  but  not  upon  the  same  basis  of 

*  Gauss,  p.  272. 
'  V,  47,  A7^. 

*  Op.  cit.,  chap.  I. 

*  V,  47,  712. 


THE  ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE  103 

influence.  The  Chancellor  asked  for  more.  In  Novem- 
ber of  the  same  year  an  incident  occurred  that  intensified 
the  bitterness  of  feeUng  created  by  the  action  of  Berhn. 
The  French  were  at  Casablanca,  having  restored  order 
in  the  city  and  in  the  Chaoui'a.  The  occupied  country 
was  under  martial  law.  As  is  shown  further  on,  the 
Germans  had  long  been  hostile  to  the  Foreign  Legion, 
a  French  corps  of  foreign  volunteers.  Now  it  happened  ^ 
that  six  of  these  men,  in  order  to  desert  their  regiment, 
had  placed  themselves  under  the  protection  of  the  Ger- 
man Vice-consul.  On  September  25,  1908,  when  he  at- 
tempted to  smuggle  them  on  board  of  a  German  steamer, 
the  men  were  recognized  by  the  French  authorities,  who 
endeavored  to  arrest  them.  There  was  a  serious  scuffle 
of  both  parties.  The  German  Vice-Consul  raised  his 
cane  to  strike  a  French  officer,  and  the  officer,  in  the 
legitimate  performance  of  his  functions,  took  up  his 
revolver.  At  the  time  when  Vera  Cruz  was  under 
martial  law,  let  us  suppose  that  the  German  Consul  of 
that  city  had  tried  to  help  American  soldiers  to  desert 
from  the  American  army,  and  had  attempted  to  smuggle 
them  on  board  of  a  German  steamer,  what  would 
Americans  have  thought  of  such  acts?  Would  not  the 
consular  immunities  have  appeared  slight  as  compared 
with  the  wrong  of  helping  to  disorganize  the  American 
army?  So  it  was  at  Casablanca.  The  deserters,  what- 
ever their  nationality,  were  French  soldiers.  They  had 
become  so  by  a  free  regular  engagement.  Of  their  own 
free  will  they  had  entered  the  French  army.  What  made 
the   matter  more   delicate,   the   deserters   were    not   all 

'  L' Illustration  says  that  there  was  in  Casablanca  "  a  real 
agency  of  desertion  "  under  the  protection  of  the  German  Con- 
sul.   Nov.  28,  1908,  p.  355. 


104        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Germans.  There  were  an  Austrian,  a  Swiss  and  a  non- 
German  Pole.  One  of  them  was  a  French  subject  recently 
naturalized  German.  In  reality  there  were  only  two 
Germans.  Another  report  speaks  of  three  Ger- 
mans.^ 

The  trans-Rhinean  press  and  Government  took  up  a 
very  menacing  attitude.  It  demanded  the  immediate 
release  of  the  men  as  well  as  an  apology.  It  was  inti- 
mated that  in  the  case  of  refusal  Prince  Radolin,  the 
German  Ambassador,  would  be  immediately  recalled. 
The  Quai  d'Orsay  asked  that,  as  several  contradictory 
principles  were  involved  in  the  question,  the  whole 
matter  be  referred  to  The  Hague  Court,  with  the  under- 
standing that  if  France  was  blamed  she  would  apologize 
and  vice  versa.  This  was  finally  accepted.  The  award  of 
the  Court,  which  was  favorable  to  France,  deeply 
wounded  her  opponents  beyond  the  Rhine.  The  rela- 
tions of  the  two  countries  were  far  from  improved 
thereby. 

The  persistent  aggressive  ill-will  of  Germany  against 
France  continued  with  the  exception  of  a  period  of 
nearly  two  years  during  which  Berlin  would  have  been 
happy  to  array  her  against  England.  There  came  a  time 
when  it  was  realized  that  all  the  initiatives  of  Berlin 
had  been  checked  and  its  hostile  combinations  against 
France  had  largely  failed.  Prince  von  Biilow  put  on  a 
brave  countenance,  but  he  was  painfully  reminded  by 
his  opponents  in  the  Reichstag  that  his  maladroit  and 
hostile  moves  had  been  far  from  improving  Germany's 
international  situation,  and  that  the  opposite  was  true. 
The  alliance  of  France  with  Russia  had  been  strength- 
ened. Among  important  treaties  signed  there  was  one 
^  Oppenheim,  L.  F.  L,,  International  Law,  1912,  p.  503. 


THE  ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE  105 

of  arbitration  between  Paris  and  Tokio,  June  13,  1907. 
On  August  31  an  agreement,  most  earnestly  seconded 
by  France,  was  made  between  England  and  Russia.^ 
The  hostility  of  these  two  Powers  had  hitherto  been 
considered  as  a  permanent  statical  force  in  European 
affairs. 

Nothing  at  present  proves  that  the  Germans  were 
concerned  in  the  unfortunate  occurrence  between  Ad- 
miral Roszdestvensky's  fleet  and  British  fishermen  off 
the  Dogger  Bank,  but  it  is  strange  that  the  rumors  that 
led  to  it  emanated  from  Germany.^  France  not  only 
helped  the  pacific  settlement  of  this  deplorable  incident, 
but  contributed  to  an  understanding  between  London 
and  St.  Petersburg. 

A  fact  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  two  nations 
dwelling  on  either  side  of  the  Pyrenees  was  the  marriage 
of  the  King  of  Spain  with  an  English  princess.  The 
Entente  with  England  greatly  facilitated  that  with  Spain. 
It  was  not  pleasant  for  Wilhelmstrasse  to  hear,  in  1907, 
of  the  treaty  between  Japan  and  Russia,  a  treaty  complet- 
ing that  of  1905  and  sealing  the  reconciliation  of  the 
two  peoples.  This  not  only  freed  the  land  of  the 
Romanofs  from  any  anxiety  in  the  East,  but,  during  the 
present  war,  Japan  has  proven  an  inexhaustible  source 
of  supplies.  Wilhelm  II  had  doubtless  hoped  great 
things  from  the  Russo-Japanese  rivalry,  but  at  this  point 
his  hopes  were  baffled.^ 

All  along,  the  restless  and  aggressive  spirit  of  Ger- 
many forced  upon  the  Entente  Powers  the  conviction  of 
a  common  danger,  and  that,  sooner  or  later,  one  or  all 

•  V,  5^.  84. 

'  Saunders,  G.,  Op.  cit.,  p.  104. 

"Ibid. 


io6        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

of  them  would  be  attacked.  This  consciousness  strength- 
ened the  Entente  itself.  The  Germans  on  the  other 
hand  had  the  feeling  that  they  were  encompassed  by 
unsympathetic  nations.  They  made  others  responsible 
for  a  situation  which  they  themselves  had  created. 

In  1909,  an  agreement  indicating  good-will  on  both 
sides  was  signed  in  which  Germany  pledged  herself  no 
longer  to  oppose  France  in  Morocco.  The  two  Govern- 
ments and  their  representatives  had  not  found  practical 
formulae  for  carrying  out  the  understanding,  but  that  was 
no  proof  that  it  could  not  be  done.  Early  in  191 1,  while 
French  officers  were  doing  a  work  agreed  upon  between 
Paris  and  Fez  for  the  training  of  the  Moroccan  army  so 
as  to  render  her  capable  of  establishing  order  in  the 
country,  a  small  colony  of  Europeans  had  been  gathered 
at  the  capital.  Suddenly  it  was  learned  that  masses  of 
natives  from  several  points  threatened  the  lives  of  all 
Europeans  in  this  city  as  well  as  those  of  the  authorities. 
To  allow  fanatics  to  massacre  these  peoples  would  have 
been  a  crime.  It  would  have  given  the  lawless  hordes  a 
free  hand  in  one  of  the  few  spots  of  the  country  where 
there  was  yet  what,  with  charity,  we  may  call  Govern- 
ment. Something  had  to  be  done.  As  soon  as  prepara- 
tions were  made  to  relieve  the  Europeans  in  Fez  the 
official  German  newspapers  began  their  menaces.^  The 
troops  started  for  their  work  of  deliverance  and  reached 
the  city  when  it  was  no  longer  tenable.  Both  Europeans 
and  loyal  Moroccans  had  fallen,  cut  off  from  their  base 
of  supply  and  from  the  possibility  of  national  relief. 
French  troops  did  not  enter  the  city,  but  remained  out- 
side to  do  their  work  of  pacification.  Again  it  must  be 
reasserted  that  France  did  not  wish  to  go  to  Fez.  It 
'  VI,  3,  476. 


THE  ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE  lo^ 

is  a  characteristic  of  such  enterprises  that  they  compel, 
by  unexpected  accidents,  nations  to  do  what  was  abso- 
lutely contrary  to  their  desires  at  the  outset.  This  is 
what  the  Radicals  and  Socialists  of  the  French  Parliament 
had  feared  all  along. 


IX 

THE  AGADIR   PROVOCATION 

Germans  have  peculiar  ways  of  their  own.  They 
often  dispense  with  diplomatic  courtesies  which,  in  time 
of  strained  relations,  make  the  continuance  of  interna- 
tional life  possible.  They  who  are  so  sensitive  have  done 
things  which,  with  people  of  a  similar  spirit,  would  have 
meant  war  at  once.  The  sudden  sending  of  the  Panther 
to  Agadir  on  the  coast  of  Morocco  early  in  July,  191 1, 
was  a  most  warlike  challenge.  The  Government  in  Ber- 
lin informed  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
of  the  fact  after  the  vessel  had  been  sent.  There  was 
no  disturbance  on  the  coast,^  so  that  this  was  without 
excuse.  It  was  the  repetition  of  the  Tangier  Comedy. 
What  France  and  England  in  answer  to  this  ought  to 
have  done  would  have  been  to  send  their  own  men-of- 
war  and  have  done  everything  which  the  German  ag- 
gressors did,  but  such  a  course  would  have  been  fraught 
with  momentous  possibilities.  It  was  said  that  this  move 
on  the  part  of  Wilhelmstrasse  was  intended  to  please 
Pan-Germanists,  and  that  the  Government  at  their  sug- 
gestion had  already  chosen  Agadir  as  a  future  German 
port.  This  step  was  considered  by  many  of  them  as  a 
virtual  seizure  of  that  part  of  the  disputed  Moorish 
Empire.  Other  apologists  of  Germany  said  that  the 
Panther  incident  was  a  means  of  compelling  the  French 
to  negotiate,  but  the  Quai  d'Orsay  had  been  ready  at  all 

»  ^  Le  Temps,  July  3,  191 1. 

108 


THE  AGADIR  PROVOCATION  109 

times  so  to  do.  M.  Jules  Cambon,  whom  many  will  re- 
member for  his  splendid  services  in  Washington,  had 
long  endeavored  to  discuss  the  question,  and,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  he  had  actually  had  conferences  on  the  subject 
with  von  Kinderlen-Waechter,^  so  that  this  explanation 
is  inadequate.  The  Agadir  coup  was  the  obvious  dis- 
regard of  the  Cambon  Agreement  of  1909  and  an  un- 
friendly challenge  to  the  Entente.  By  this  agreement 
Germany  had  pledged  herself  not  to  interfere  "  with  the 
consolidation  of  order  and  peace  in  the  Sherifian  Em- 
pire "  ^  towards  which  France  was  working.  According 
to  this,  had  the  Germans  had  any  special  interest  to  de- 
fend in  Agadir  they  ought  to  have  referred  the  task  to 
France.  It  was  understood  that  if  difficulties  arose  the 
two  Powers  would  consider  them  and  settle  them  in  the 
spirit  of  mutual  concession,  nay,  in  the  spirit  that  had 
made  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  of  1904  a  possibility. 
The  most  elementary  international  courtesy  demanded 
that  Germany  should  have  announced  her  intentions  and 
have  acted,  in  keeping  with  the  Cambon  Agreement,  for 
the  carrying  out  of  the  decisions  of  Algeciras. 

There  were  Germans  who  justified  the  Agadir  coup 
by  the  fact  that  there  were  French  soldiers  at  Fez.^ 
Agadir  in  their  eyes  was  the  counterpart  of  Fez.  These 
vindicators  of  this  unfriendly  course  seem  to  have  for- 
gotten that  when  the  Cambon  Agreement  was  signed, 
in  1909,  there  were  French  troops  at  Oudjda,  and  that 
thousands  of  French  soldiers  held  the  Chaouia.  This 
was  not  an  unusual  fact.  Furthermore,  General  Moinier 
went  to  Fez  to  save  human  lives  and  France  had  prom- 

'  VI.  4,  472. 

*  Accord  dii  8  fevrier  1909. 

•  See  p.  331- 


no        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

ised  to  withdraw  these  Fez  men  as  soon  as  possible.  She 
intended  to  do  there  what  she  had  performed  in  Syria 
in  1860.^  Even  then  this  attempt  to  whitewash  the  op- 
probrium of  Agadir  ignored  the  fact  that  the  Sultan  of 
Morocco  was  sovereign.  Germany  had  been  loud  in  her 
assertions  of  his  independence.  Now  this  sultan,  exer- 
cising the  fullness  of  his  rights,  called  France  to  his  aid 
and  she  went,  saving  thereby  the  lives  of  the  authori- 
ties as  well  as  those  of  Europeans  doomed  to  be  crushed 
by  a  Moroccan  Boxer  Movement.  She  was  ready  to  re- 
call her  forces  from  there,  but  had  it  been  otherwise,  so 
long  as  the  Sultan  and  the  Makhzen  ^  approved  the  Ger- 
mans could  not  find  in  that  situation  any  excuse  for  the 
Agadir  coup.  It  was  a  violent  reopening  of  the  Moroccan 
Question  which  confirmed  absolutely  in  the  French  heart 
the  sense  of  the  aggressive  intentions  of  the  Teutons. 

In  the  eyes  of  Europe,  at  large,  it  was  unmistakably 
an  act  of  provocation  from  a  Power  that  deemed  itself 
capable  of  whipping  the  whole  world.  For  Russia  it 
seemed  a  casus  foederis.  England,  though  less  out- 
spoken, was  deeply  alive  to  the  great  European  danger. 
France  was  willing  to  talk,  to  negotiate  and  to  com- 
promise for  the  sake  of  peace.  Her  statesmen,  calm  and 
resolute,  were  the  very  opposite  of  the  de  Gramonts  and 
the  Emile  OUiviers  of  the  last  days  of  the  Second  Em- 
pire. They  were  even  then  reasonably  conciliatory.  The 
two  Governments  took  up  the  whole  Moroccan  Question. 
By  this  time  Germany  had  given  up  all  talk  of  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  Sultan,  the  integrity  and  independence  of 
Morocco  and  the  internationalization  of  the  Question. 
She  had  ceased  to  pose  as  the  defender  of  the  rights  of 

*  Le  Temps,  July  3,  191 1. 

*  Practically  the  ministers  of  the  Sultan. 


THE  AGADIR  PROVOCATION  in 

all.  Now  it  was  merely  a  matter  of  bartering  for  her 
own  advantage.  The  Cambon  Agreement  was  forgotten, 
the  decisions  of  Algeciras  were  set  at  naught.  Her 
former  contentions  had  practically  been  set  aside,  now 
she  was  after  a  bargain.  France  ought  to  have  refused 
to  consider  the  proposals  and  to  have  appealed  to  a  new 
conference.  She  could  have  shown  the  unreasonable 
demands  of  Berlin  and  made  the  Powers  the  judges  of 
her  use  of  the  trust  placed  in  her  hands  in  1906.  Von 
Kinderlen  asked,  at  first,  one  half  of  the  French  Congo 
next  to  the  ocean  ^  as  well  as  the  right  of  pre-emption 
which  France  had  over  the  Belgian  Congo  in  order  to 
cease  all  opposition  to  France  in  the  land  of  the  Sultan. 
Everyone  acquainted  with  Morocco  knew  that  the  pre- 
requisite of  all  reforms  was  peace  in  the  country  and 
that  peace,  according  to  the  decisions  of  Algeciras  and 
the  Cambon  Agreement,  was  to  be  established  by  France. 
It  was  impossible  to  open  the  economic  life  of  Morocco 
to  European  trade  until  a  political  order  of  some  kind 
was  established ;  but  as  soon  as  France  tried  to  face  the 
imperative  issues  in  that  direction  Germany  intervened. 
Again,  in  order  to  have  the  French  bring  about  the 
pacification  from  which  the  whole  world  would  benefit, 
she  asked  the  compensations  stated  above.  INIoreover, 
what  right  had  she,  in  that  respect,  that  did  not  belong  to 
other  Powers?  Why  should  not  the  United  States  or 
Sweden  have  made  similar  claims?  It  is  true  that 
France  was  having  a  virtual  extension  of  territory,  but 
did  Germany  say  a  single  word  when  England  annexed 
the  Transvaal  in  1902,  or  when  Japan  took  Corea?  Did 
she  protest  against  the  British  protectorate  over  Egypt 
by  virtue  of  this  selfsame  Anglo-French  Agreement? 
'  V,  4,  716. 


112   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Did  she  offer  any  objection  when  Spain  really  took  pos- 
session of  the  northern  coast  of  Morocco  from  Ceuta  to 
Melilla?  No.  No.  No.  The  reason  for  her  action 
was  her  national  aggressive  spirit  against  the  "  hereditary 
enemy  "  and  her  burning  desire  for  new  territories.  Her 
hard  harsh  attitude  can  only  be  explained  on  the  ground 
that  she  expected  that  the  British  would  abandon  France 
to  her  own  fate.     She  was  sorely  disappointed. 

England  saw  clearly  where  the  Franco-German  wrang- 
ling would  lead.  The  British  press  sounded  a  strikingly 
united  warning  to  the  Goths.  On  July  4,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  had  a  conference  with  Count  Wolff  Metternich  in 
which  he  did  not  conceal  his  displeasure  over  the  Agadir 
provocation.  The  British  political  leaders  uttered  no 
uncertain  sound.^  On  July  6,  Asquith  called  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Parliament  to  the  seriousness  of  the  German 
pretensions  in  Morocco.^  On  July  21,  Lloyd  George 
gave  the  threatening  Teutons  to  understand  that  their 
course  was  shocking  the  deepest  sense  of  fair-play  of  the 
Britons.  Balfour  spoke  for  the  Unionists  in  the  same 
strain.  Ramsay  Macdonald  voiced  the  feelings  of  the 
labor-party — all  were  most  outspoken,  and  gave  Ger- 
many to  understand  what  the  course  of  England  would 
be.  There  was  a  united  front  against  the  aggressiveness 
of  Berlin.  The  Germans,  who  had  thought  the  British 
hopelessly  divided  upon  everything,  found  them  intensely 
of  one  mind  upon  this  issue.  The  helmet  men  who  had 
so  long  delighted  in  showing  their  swords,  their  German 
swords,  as  a  menace  resented  like  exhibitions  on  the  part 
of  others.  The  furor  of  Pan-Germanists  was  great. 
In  1908,  they  had  used  with  Russia  the  bluff  of  force 

'  VI,  4,  949. 

'VI,  4,  953. 


THE  AGADIR  PROVOCATION  113 

successfully  on  the  occasion  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia ; 
they  attempted  a  similar  arrogant  act  with  Morocco,  and 
wished  to  dictate  their  will,  as  law.  The  French  with- 
stood their  opponent,  and  the  British  Lion  gave  an  un- 
mistakable growl  which  practically  meant,  "  Hands  off 
from  France !  "  The  Kaiser  and  his  subjects  understood. 
They  realized  that  they  must  give  up  all  territorial  ambi- 
tion in  the  Sherifian  Empire. 

In  that  interesting  book,  Imperial  Germany,  a  book  to 
which  the  writer  has  so  frequently  referred,  Prince  von 
Billow  makes  a  most  eloquent  plea  pro  domo  sua,  and 
that  with  no  excessive  modesty.  He  offers  a  brilliant 
defense  of  his  administration,  not  as  an  historian,  but  as 
a  Prussian  politician.  No  book,  not  even  Bernhardi's 
The  Next  War,  gives  such  an  insight  into  the  psychologi- 
cal and  ethical  conceptions  of  Prussians.  We  say  Prus- 
sians, because  we  repudiate  the  idea  that  all  Germans 
are  Bernhardians  and  Biilowans.  He  recalls  the  state- 
ment made  by  someone  that  after  M.  Delcasse's  over- 
throw, which  brought  to  the  imperial  chancellor  princely 
honors,  Germany  ought  to  have  come  to  an  understand- 
ing. "  It  is  a  question,"  he  replied,  "  whether  France 
was  at  all  inclined  to  pay  an  acceptable  price."  ^  There 
lies  the  explanation  of  the  rattling  of  the  German  saber 
in  Tangier,  at  Algeciras  and  at  Agadir. 

Von  Kinderlen  asked  one-half  of  the  French  Congo 
and  French  reversionary  rights  over  the  Congo  Free 
State.  These  rights,  to  which,  in  case  that  country 
should  pass  into  other  hands  than  those  of  the  Belgians, 
France  would  have  a  first  claim,  Germany  coveted.  For 
a  long  time  Pan-Germanists  had  spoken  of  Belgium  as 
an  essential  part  of  Germany.     In  addition  to  one-half 

'  P.  100. 


114   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

of  the  French  Congo,  Wilhelmstrasse  wished  to  secure 
these  potential  claims  of  France  in  the  heart  of  Africa. 
In  the  case  that  brave  little  state  were  annexed,  having 
secured  the  French  reversionary  rights,  the  Congo  Free 
State  would  become  a  German  possession,  while  the 
conquest  of  Belgium  would  not  entail  the  transfer  of 
these  colonies.  Unquestionably  the  Teutons  had  already 
some  plans  to  seize  that  country,  and  were  stretching 
their  hands  forward  so  as  to  have  at  the  same  time  the 
Congolese  possessions.  This  was  not  all.  "  The  open 
door  "  was  promised  again.  They  wanted  much  more. 
Before  Algeciras  and  even  after  they  worked  to  reserve 
all  concessions  exclusively  for  the  Sultan,  but  now,  they 
wanted  to  have  from  the  French  some  of  these  conces- 
sions, such  as  railroads  built  by  Germans  and  operated 
by  Germans — not  to  speak  of  other  privileges  among 
which  was  that  of  having  proteges — natives  enjoying 
German  citizenship,  protection  and  exemption  from  fiscal 
burdens. 

France  was  willing  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  the  Al- 
geciras Conference,  liberally  interpreted,  that  is,  bearing 
in  mind  the  contingencies  arising  in  different  parts  of  the 
country  and  meeting  them  squarely.  She  was  willing  to 
open  the  country  to  civilization.  She  was  ready  to  help 
the  natives  to  do  the  work  for  themselves,  and  to  evolve 
toward  a  modern  state,  if  a  Mohammedan  community  has 
ever  attained  such  an  end.  She  was  willing  to  do  the 
work  which  would  increase  the  possibilities  of  German 
trade  in  Morocco  as  she  had  done  in  Algeria  and  Tunisia, 
where  things  "  Made  in  Germany  "  had  a  great  sale. 
She  hesitated  long  to  dispose  of  territories  that  had  been 
won  by  her  noble  explorers  and  kept  by  men  who,  as  a 
whole,  have  done  heroic  service.     Her  rights  of  pre- 


THE  AGADIR  PROVOCATION  115 

emption  to  the  Congo  Free  State  were  for  her  intangible. 
Furthermore,  the  German  claims  were  ever  followed  by 
new  requests  from  Germany. 

At  last  the  threats  of  British  leaders  seriously  modified 
the  attitude  of  Berlin,  though  matters  had  become  so 
serious  that  a  financial  panic  ensued.^  The  Germans  be- 
came more  conciliatory  and  at  last  the  two  Governments 
came  to  an  understanding.^  The  delay  in  reaching  this 
goal  weighed  heavily  upon  Europe.  To  put  an  end  to 
German  claims,  France  reluctantly  established  a  pro- 
tectorate over  Morocco,  but  this  involved  the  sacrifice 
of  over  100,000  square  miles  of  the  Congo  colony.  This 
settlement  was  not  the  result  of  fear.  The  great  barome- 
ter of  French  feelings,  the  Bourse,  had  scarcely  any  ups 
or  downs.  It  was  not,  either,  an  act  imposed  by  the  sense 
of  the  justice  of  German  claims,  but  by  French  love  of 
peace.  The  Germans  secured  territories  in  which  they 
had  never  performed  any  service,  had  never  spent  a 
dollar  or  lost  a  man.^  A  fact  which  shows  their  quarrel- 
some spirit  is  that  hardly  had  the  treaty  been  signed 
when  they  claimed  islands  in  the  Congo  River,  though 
the  text  carefully  stipulated  "  jusqu'a  la  rive."  *^ 

This  treaty  excited  the  most  bitter  dissatisfaction  of 
Pan-Germanists.  They  naturally  blamed  everyone  but 
themselves,  though  Chauvinists  are  the  same  the  world 
over.  When  it  was  presented  in  the  Reichstag  it  ex- 
cited the  hilarity  of  Socialists  as  well  as  of  numerous 
malcontents,  among  whom  the  Crown  Prince  was  con- 
spicuous.    The   Minister  of   Colonies,   von   Lindequist, 

•  VI.  5,  475. 

'  VI,  5,  710. 
•VI,  5,  471. 

*  VI,  6,  239. 


ii6        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

was  so  disappointed  that  he  resigned.^  The  impression 
left  by  these  proceedings  was  painful  for  their  admirers 
abroad.  Public  opinion  in  Russia  and  in  Great  Britain 
had  crystallized  into  a  profound  conviction  that  Germany 
courted  war.  In  France,  the  Tangier  Speech  and  the 
long  silence  that  followed,  the  German  tactics  for  the 
overthrow  of  M.  Delcasse,  the  maneuvers  at  the  Al- 
geciras  Conference,  the  Agadir  incident  bold  and  bad, 
the  surrender  of  a  large  part  of  the  territories  acquired 
mostly  by  the  heroic  labors  of  Savorgnan  de  Brazza,  the 
brutal  ways  of  dealing  with  a  land  in  which  the  suaviter 
in  modo  ever  takes  precedence  over  the  fortiter  in  re 
struck  deeper  than  the  Teutons  thought  or  perhaps 
meant.  Shortly  after  this,  however,  the  Kaiser  posed 
as  a  pacifist  when  he  said,  "  We  have  given  a  new  proof 
of  our  willingness  to  settle  international  points  of  dispute 
amicably  wherever  this  can  be  done  in  accordance  with 
the  dignity  and  the  interests  of  Germany,  through  the  con- 
clusion of  our  agreement  with  France."^  How  clever! 
The  great  miracle  of  our  day  is  that  there  are  still  people 
who  believe  what  the  Kriegsherr  of  Germany  says. 

From  this  time  on  to  the  present  war,  Germany  armed 
even  more  than  in  the  past.  In  three  years,  three  laws 
for  the  increase  of  armaments  and  men  were  passed. 
Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  repeated  the  old  Prussian 
Comedy  before  the  Reichstag.  He  made  the  statement 
that  he  had  discovered  beyond  the  Vosges  "  a  revival  of 
Chauvinism."  ^  Indeed  there  was  something'  new  in 
France,  a  new  consciousness  of  danger  uniting  parties 
and  creeds,  leading  men  to  reject  pacifistic  tenets  at  the 

'  VI,  6,  472. 
*  Gauss,  p.  306. 
•VI,  7^,948. 


THE  AGADIR  PROVOCATION  117 

sight  of  the  German  danger.  There  was  indeed  a  new 
spirit  awakened  by  the  long  German  provocation.  Inci- 
dents of  an  irritating  nature  deepened  these  feelings. 
In  May,  1913,  the  descent  at  Luneville  of  a  Zeppelin 
with  a  party  of  German  officers  who,  before  coming  there, 
had  flown  over  many  of  the  fortified  cities  along  the 
frontier  did  not  seem  accidental.  These  men  asserted 
that,  owing  to  a  fog,  they  had  lost  their  way.  That  may 
have  been  true,  the  Government  accepted  it  as  such,  but 
it  is  not  unreasonable  to  doubt  it.  The  Nancy  incident, 
when  a  few  Frenchmen  annoyed  some  Germans  on  a 
Sunday  evening — a  rare  occurrence  in  view  of  the  situa- 
tion— made  the  German  press  furious,  though  absolutely 
silent  concerning  the  Luneville  Affair.  The  French 
authorities  punished  the  prefect  of  Nancy,  and  the  con- 
temptible policeman  who  had  failed  to  do  his  duty  in  pro- 
tecting the  young  insulted  German  underwent  a  severe 
penalty.  The  new  German  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
denounced  violently  this  insignificant  brawl,  which  re- 
sembled all  such  quarrels  that  take  place  constantly  on 
the  frontier  of  all  civilized  peoples,  and  viewed  it  as  a 
manifestation  of  "  French  Chauvinism,"  repeating  the 
very  terms  which  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  had  used  a  few 
days  before.  The  French  Government  took  efficient 
measures  so  that  nothing  should  be  done  in  France  which 
would  irritate  the  Germans.  This  applied  to  theaters,  to 
comic  papers  and  to  military  life.  At  an  earlier  date  a 
French  general  who  had  spoken  freely  about  Germany 
was  punished  by  being  sent  from  Eastern  France  to 
Algeria.^ 

Among  other  provocations  of  the  Germans  during  this 
period,   they   carried    on   a   campaign   of   unpardonable 
'  V,  46,  239. 


ii8   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

slanders  against  the  Foreign  Legion  to  which  reference 
has  already  been  made.  It  is  a  body  of  foreign  volunteers 
who  have  generally  served  in  the  colonies  and  especially 
in  North  Africa.  All  that  is  asked  from  them  is  good 
service,  good  behavior  and  no  question  is  raised  in  ref- 
erence to  their  antecedents  or  to  their  nationality.  As 
many  of  the  men  have  a  past  which  it  is  better  to  forget, 
the  rules  of  this  corps  are  severer  than  in  others,  but 
not  inhumane.  If  it  is  discovered  that  a  man  enlists 
before  he  is  of  age,  he  is  dismissed  at  once.  The  same 
thing  is  true  with  what  pertains  to  their  health.  A  great 
sense  of  fairness  tempers  the  severity  of  their  life  with 
justice  and  humaneness.  What  kindled  this  German 
antipathy  is  that  a  large  number  of  Alsatians  joined  the 
Legion.  In  spite  of  great  exertions  in  Germany  and  in 
Alsace  against  this  military  institution,  more  Alsatians 
entered  the  Foreign  Legion  in  1912  than  in  any  single 
year  since  1870.^  Misrepresentations  availed  nothing. 
The  people  in  whose  army  there  has  been  such  cruel 
treatment  of  soldiers  that  when  Red  Rosa  called  for 
witnesses  to  defend  her  statements  1,100  came  forth 
— the  people  that  made  no  protest  against  the  massacres 
of  Armenians  by  Kurds,  or  those  of  the  Balkan  popula- 
tions by  the  Turks,  were  seized  with  a  most  holy  zeal 
for  the  poor  victims  of  this  organization.  In  April,  191 3, 
there  was  a  play  in  Berlin  against  the  Foreign  Legion 
patronized  by  representatives  of  the  army  and  navy,  to 
arouse  popular  feelings.  Some  Germans  who  had  taken 
service  in  this  corps  came  forward  to  protest  against 
these  slanders.  The  alleged  statements  that  France  had 
recruiting  agents  in  Germany  were  baseless.  These  men 
could  never  be  found  and  what  was  a  most  perfect  refuta- 
^  Gauss,  p.  100. 


THE  AGADIR  PROVOCATION  119 

tion  was  that  France  had  more  volunteers  for  the  Legion 
than  she  needed.  Herr  Zimmermann,  a  state  official 
who  had  thoroughly  looked  up  the  matter,  said  that  every 
time  that  the  German  administration  had  made  inquiries, 
the  conclusions  had  always  been  that  these  assertions 
were  groundless.^  It  is  easy  to  see  the  purpose  of  this 
campaign  in  which,  by  the  side  of  the  irritating  challenges 
of  Germany,  there  was  a  pin-prick  policy  calculated  to 
exasperate  France. 

'  VI.  21,  475. 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION 

A  GREAT  source  of  irritation  to  France  was  Alsace. 
The  Treaty  of  Frankfurt  has,  ever  since  1871,  cast  its 
fatal  shadows  upon  central  Europe.  The  country  taken 
by  the  might  of  the  conquerors  has  remained  in  the 
German  organism  like  an  infusible  substance  which  their 
mighty  genius  cannot  assimilate.  The  survival  of  na- 
tional loyalty  is  sometimes  extraordinary.  "If  an  igno- 
rant nation  like  Bulgaria,"  says  Novicow,  "  did  not 
abandon  her  national  aspirations  after  five  centuries  it 
is  easy  to  see  what  those  of  the  Alsatians  will  be."  ^  It 
is  not  only  the  Poles,  the  Schleswigians,  the  Holsteinians 
but  also  the  Hanoverians,  the  Nassovians,  the  Hessians 
and  the  Frank  furtians  that  were  incorporated  in  spite  of 
themselves  into  Prussia.  Many  there  were,  and  there  are 
still,  in  the  Empire  who  hate  Prussian  domination. 
Alsatians  likewise  hated  the  Prussian  character  and  the 
Prussian  method  of  holding  men  as  if  they  were  pos- 
sessions. Nothing  is  more  pathetic  than  the  noble  stand 
of  the  deputies  of  the  annexed  provinces  at  Bordeaux 
and  their  eloquent  protestations.  "  Before  any  delibera-" 
tion  of  the  National  Assembly,  we,  Alsatians  and  Lor- 
rainers,  gathered  together  in  Bordeaux,  wish  to  pro- 
test vehemently  against  even  the  very  idea  of  a  cession 
whatsoever  of  the  least  part  of  our  territory,  we  are 

'  Op.  cit.,  p.  355. 
120 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION  121 

French  and  we  want  to  remain  French.  .  .  , "  ^  Eleven 
days  later,  another  protestation,  "  Abandoned  in  spite  of 
all  justice  and  by  a  hateful  abuse  of  force  to  foreign 
domination  we  have  a  last  duty  to  perform.  We  declare 
again  null  and  void  a  pact  which  disposes  of  us  without 
our  consent. 

"  The  vindication  of  our  rights  remains  forever  open 
to  all  and  to  each  in  the  form  and  in  the  measure  which 
our  conscience  shall  dictate  to  us."  -  In  ten  years  100,000 
Alsatians — chiefly  young  people — left  the  country,^  a 
few  of  the  rest  were  won  by  favors,  but  the  greater 
number  became  more  and  more  unreconcilable.  The 
efforts  to  win  them  have  been  colossal  failures.  This 
was  particularly  visible  at  the  polls.  At  the  elections  in 
1881,  the  German  candidates  had  13,000  votes,  the  Cleri- 
cals 20,000,  but  the  protestators  had  133,000.  In  1887, 
18,000  were  given  to  the  Germans  while  the  protestators 
elected  all  their  candidates  and  had  630,000  votes.^  The 
Prussian  mind  cannot  understand  that  force,  brutal 
force,  is  a  poor  instrument  of  conquest.  "  It  is  the 
Prussian  Government,"  says  again  Novicow,  "  which  by 
its  oppressive  laws  prevents  Posen  from  being  Ger- 
manized." °    The  same  thing  might  be  said  of  Alsace. 

France  has  rapidly  drawn  to  her  new  peoples.  This 
an  English  writer  has  luminously  set  forth  in  an  admir- 
able passage  which  we  quote.  "  This  power  of  attracting 
loyalty  from  neighbouring  conquered  states  is  one  of 
which  France  may  fairly  boast,  for  she  is  almost  alone 
in  Europe  in  its  possession.     The  Germans  cannot  con- 

'  Feb.  18,  1871. 

^  Florent-Matter,  L' Alsace-Lorraine  de  nos  jours,  1908,  p.  84. 

*  Matter,  P.,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  489. 

*  Florent-IMatter,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  87,  90. 
'  Op.  cit.,  p.  131. 


122        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

ciliate  the  Poles  even  as  much  as  the  Russians  can,  and 
have  been  resisted  by  the  Magyars  for  centuries,  with 
ultimate  success.  They  are  hated  by  the  Bohemians,  and 
have  never  succeeded  in  making  themselves  endurable  to 
any  section  of  the  population  of  Italy.  The  Russians 
cannot  absorb  the  Poles,  and  are  not  liked  by  the  Finns ; 
while  the  Spaniards  have  never  been  able  fully  to  digest 
the  Basques,  and  could  not  keep  the  Portuguese  after 
sixty  years  of  union,  and  this  though  Lisbon  is  the  natural 
capital  of  the  entire  Peninsula.  The  Danes  never  re- 
moved the  deep  distaste  felt  for  them  by  the  Holsteiners, 
while  the  Norwegians  to  this  day,  after  seventy-three 
years  of  alliance,  regard  the  Swedes,  their  own  Norse 
kinsfolk,  with  the  deepest  suspicion  and  dislike.  Our 
own  failure  in  Ireland  is  at  this  moment  the  governing 
factor  in  English  politics;  and  though  Scotland  is  more 
than  friendly,  the  fusion  of  the  two  Kingdoms,  such  as 
France  has  always  insisted  on  in  all  absorbed  States, 
would  be  next  to  an  impossible  revolution.  France  only 
has  secured  a  loyalty  at  once  complete  and  obedient,  and 
the  fact  is  the  more  remarkable  because  France  has  the 
power  of  exciting  bitter  national  enmities.  If  all  her 
neighbours  regarded  her  with  liking  or  even  with  toler- 
ance, there  would  be  nothing  wonderful  in  the  success  of 
her  annexations.  ...  It  is  when  annexation  is  com- 
plete, and  bitterness  should  grow  rancorous,  that  in  all 
white  subjects  of  France  it  begins  to  die  away.  .  .  . 
Government  by  France  after  annexation  is  always 
honorific.  It  is  insolent  during  an  occupation,  but 
absorption  once  decreed,  logic  secures  that  there  shall 
be  no  inequality,  that  laws  shall  be  the  same,  that  votes 
shall  be  equal  in  force,  that  even  the  mob  of  Paris  shall 
respect  the  new  citizens  of  France,  the  fresh  children  of 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION  123 

the  Republic.  That  attitude  is  carried  straight  through 
in  the  smallest  as  in  the  highest  detail,  so  that  a  Savoyard 
who  succeeded  as  Deputy  or  Senator  would  have  just 
as  good  a  chance  of  the  Presidential  chair  as  if  he  were 
a  Parisian,  as  he  would  also,  if  successful  in  a  little  way, 
have  just  the  same  chance  of  gaining  permission  to  open 
a  tobacco  shop ;  and  it  removes  much,  if  not  all,  the 
bitterness  of  conquests.  No  Frenchman  is  looked  down 
on  in  France,  the  status  of  Frenchmen  being,  for  any 
one  who  accepts  it,  a  kind  of  civil  consecration.  .  .  . 
France  can,  in  a  very  special  degree,  assimilate  absorbed 
peoples,  and  this  is  one  of  her  greatest  political  re- 
sources, and  one  of  which  she  has  the  greatest  reason 
to  be  proud."  ^ 

The  peoples  in  France,  drawn  within  the  national 
orbit,  have  been  assimilated  and  nationalized  through 
kind  and  generous  treatment.  The  authorities  never 
dreamed  of  robbing  these  populations  of  their  essential 
liberties,  such  as  that  of  language,  for  instance.  The 
inhabitants  of  Provence,  still  using  their  vernacular  with 
the  French,  have  become  almost  bilingual.  Some  of 
them,  though  loyal  to  the  old  Langue  d'oc,  have  become 
incomparable  prose  writers  in  French  like  Daudet  and 
Aicard,  not  to  mention  others.  The  Basques  still  use 
their  very  ancient  tongue.  The  Bretons  enjoy  the 
language  and  the  poetry  of  the  French  Welsh,  and  in 
the  northernmost  part  of  French  Flanders  the  people 
hammer  away  at  their  Germanic  Flemish,  while  the 
French  language  penetrates  slowly,  very  slowly  but 
surely,  among  all.  A  broad-minded  Government  would 
have  favored  a  bilingual  culture  which  is  so  potent  in 
the  life  of  a  nation,  but  in  Alsace  French  was  ostracized 
'  The  SpectatoTj  Sept.  10,  1892,  p.  343. 


124        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

everywhere.  Some  local  newspapers  have  had  a  perma- 
nent ironical  heading.  "  French  Inscriptions  Hunting."  ^ 
It  was  prohibited  in  all  postal  documents  for  Alsace  and 
Lorraine.  It  was  interdicted  upon  all  public  signs.  A 
hairdresser  was  prevented  from  having  his  sign,  Coiffeur, 
he  had  to  put  Friseur.  Milliners  could  no  longer  have 
the  sign,  Modiste,  which  was  replaced  by  Modistin. 
Restaurant  had  to  be  transformed  into  Restauration. 
The  Cafe  du  Griffon  was  obliged  to  drop  the  du  and 
became  Cafe  Griffon  and  Cafe  italien  was  compelled  to 
have  its  adjective  begin  with  a  capital  because  it  gave 
the  name  a  German  appearance.  Cafe  imperial  was  inter- 
dicted by  the  police,  it  was  too  French.  A  restaurant 
posted  its  bill  of  fare,  the  Menu  du  jour,  which  had  the 
advantage  of  being  artistic.  It  was  tabooed.  Cigarettes 
frangaises  en  vente  ici,  posted  upon  a  cigar  store  in 
Savern,  had  the  same  fate.^  The  police  of  Strasburg 
allowed  eight  French  plays  a  year,  each  one  approved  by 
the  chief  of  police.  This  privilege  was  revoked.^  The 
singing  of  the  Marseillaise  was  prohibited  even  in  the 
city  of  Strasburg  where  it  was  composed.  The  tricolor 
bows,  which  young  Alsatian  women  wore  on  their  hair, 
were  violently  snatched  by  the  police. 

The  Eden-Theater  of  Strasburg  wishing  to  play 
La  Vivandicre,  an  operetta  representing  the  life  of  the 
French  Revolution,  the  police  objected  to  the  French 
flag  in  it.  After  awhile  a  compromise  was  reached  and 
the  Dutch  flag  was  used  instead.*  There  was  also  the 
disbanding  of  all  kinds  of  societies  with  French  sympa- 

'  Florent-Matter,  Op.  cit.,  p.  i88. 

"^  Op.  cit.,  pp.  188-192;  Lcs  Annates,  March  7,  1915. 

'  Ibid.,  May  30,  191 5. 

"  Florent-Matter,  Op.  cit.,  p.  235. 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION  125 

thies,  such  as  choral  unions,  literary  circles,  dramatic 
associations,  botanical  and  zoological  societies  and  even 
those  harmless  organizations,  societies  of  mutual  help.^ 
The  Club  of  Alsatian  and  Lorrainer  Students  was  closed.^ 

The  teaching  of  French  was  suppressed  in  the^schools, 
its  use  in  the  courts,  and  everywhere  the  language  was 
pursued  with  a  relentless  spirit.  The  names  of  citizens 
in  public  records  had  to  be  Germanized;  Guillaume  be- 
came Wilhelm,  Jean  was  written  as  Johann  and  Albert 
assumed  the  form  of  Albrecht.^  Even  the  inscriptions 
upon  the  clothes  or  the  caps  of  employees  and  porters 
in  private  establishments  had  to  be  in  German.  This  did 
not  accomplish  its  purpose.  In  1895,  I59'532  Alsatians 
reported  that  their  mother  tongue  was  French;  in  1900, 
it  had  become  198,173.  Several  newspapers,  either 
published  in  German  or  in  two  languages,  during  the 
Second  Empire  have  now  become  French.* 

The  Alsatians  were  made  to  feel  that  everything  which 
they  cherished  was  to  be  eradicated  from  their  hearts, 
and  above  all  their  great  national  hope.  No  wonder  that 
they  did  not  love  their  conquerors.  Already  in  1871, 
Busch  speaks  of  "  the  inexplicable  attachment  of  the 
Alsatians  for  France ;  of  their  voluntary  Helotism,  and 
their  infatuation  which  prevents  their  seeing  and  feeling 
that  a  Gaul  regards  them  only  as  Frenchmen  of  the 
second  class,  and  treats  them  in  many  respects  accord- 
ingly." °  As  far  as  common,  uneducated  Frenchmen  were 
concerned,  there  may  be  a  little  truth  in  Busch's  state- 
ment in  reference  to  Alsatians,  but  the  elite  of  France 

'  III,  96,  692. 

'  IJ Illustration,  June  24,  191  r. 

'  Florent-Matter,  Op.  cit.,  p.   191. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  195. 

°  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  p.  130. 


126        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

had  the  greatest  admiration  for  them.  They  were  given 
important  positions  in  the  educational,  the  scientific  and 
the  historical  world.  They  have  had  such  popular 
literary  men  as  About,  Erckmann-Chatrian  and  eminent 
artists.  Some  of  them  have  succeeded  in  every  high 
domain  that  demands  intelligence  and  character.  This 
is  particularly  true  of  the  army.  Five  years  ago  Jules 
Claretie  made  the  following  statement :  "  At  the  present 
hour  there  are  76  generals  of  divisions  or  of  brigades 
coming  from  Alsace-Lorraine  whose  names  stand  on  the 
books  of  the  French  army."  ^  The  fact  which  is  evident 
from  Busch's  statement  is  the  attachment  of  the  Alsatians 
to  France.  That  "  inexplicable  attachment "  already 
existed  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century.  In 
1709,  a  Prussian  Minister,  Schmettau,  wrote  to  Prince 
Eugene  and  to  the  Duke  of  Marlborough,  "  It  is  evident 
that  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace  are  more  French  than  the 
Parisians,  and  that  the  King  of  France  is  so  sure  of  their 
affection  in  his  service  and  for  his  glory  that  he  has 
ordered  them  to  provide  themselves  with  rifles,  pistols, 
halberds,  swords,  powder  and  lead  every  time  that  he 
hears  that  the  Germans  intend  to  cross  the  Rhine,  and 
that  they  rush  in  masses  toward  the  bank  of  the  river 
to  prevent  or  at  least  to  dispute  the  passage  to  the  Ger- 
man nation,  at  the  evident  peril  of  their  own  lives,  as  if 
they  were  going  to  a  triumph."  ^ 

Miss  Ruth  Putnam  has  pointed  out  the  inconsistency 
of  a  German  historian  who  speaks  of  Alsace  brought 
"  back  to  the  newly  founded  German  Empire.  That  a 
newly  founded  institution  could  receive  back  territory  it 

*  Quarante  ans  aprcs,  p.  194. 

*  Quoted    from    Matter,    P.,   Bismarck   et  son   temps,  vol.  III. 
p.  227. 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION  127 

was  too  young  to  have  lost,  sounds  a  trifle  illogical."  ^ 
Yes,  it  is  more  than  illogical,  the  statements  of  German 
writers  do  not  correspond  to  reality.  "  There  never 
was,"  says  Dr.  Matter,  "  any  Reichsland  under  the  name 
of  Elsass-Lothringen :  that  geographical  expression  has 
existed  only  since  1871 ;  up  to  their  assimilation  by  France 
the  territories  of  this  region  were  partitioned  and  varied. 
Belfort  and  the  Sundgau,  objects  of  contention  by 
princes  in  the  course  of  centuries,  were  united  to  France 
in  1648 ;  Mulhausen,  a  Swiss  city,  gave  herself  freely  in 
1798;  Colmar  and  the  cities  about  were  in  reality  annexed 
in  1673;  Strasburg  became  French  in  1681 ;  Metz  entered 
into  its  new  fatherland  with  Toul  and  Verdun  in  1552. 
Until  the  time  of  their  annexation,  these  territories  were 
distinct,  rival,  and  such  a  city  as  Saint-Marie  aux  Mines 
was  divided  by  a  frontier  which  made  two  hostile  parts 
of  its  population.  It  was  the  work  of  France  to  ag- 
glomerate these  divers  parts,  to  assimilate  them  into  one 
same  nation,  and  to  breathe  into  them  the  same  patriot- 
ism :  there  were  no  longer  Alsatians  or  Lorrainers, 
peoples  of  the  plains  or  of  the  mountains,  but  French- 
men." ^  Their  treatment  by  the  Germans,  so  different 
from  that  of  their  fathers,  closed  their  hearts  to  their 
conquerors.  Their  open,  frank  nature  did  not  conceal 
the  fact.  At  the  time  of  the  discussion  of  the  septen- 
nate  of  Bismarck,  some  one  of  his  supporters  said  that 
if  the  bill  was  not  passed  the  enemy  would  invade  the 
Reichsland.  An  Alsatian  member  of  the  Reichstag 
sprang  up  and  exclaimed,  "  The  enemy  has  been  among 
us  for  more  than  sixteen  years."  ^ 

"^Alsace  and  Lorraine,  1915,  p.  177. 

^  Matter,  P.,  Bismarck  ct  son  temps,  vol.  Ill,  p.  227. 

»  III,  88,  210. 


128   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

One  of  the  harshest  measures  was  the  closing  of  the 
Alsatian  frontier  to  those  who  had  made  their  option 
for  France.  Again  and  again,  when  aged  parents  were 
passing  away,  asking  to  see  once  more  their  loved  sons, 
the  latter  were  held  at  the  frontier  by  a  stern  order  re- 
quiring the  imperative  passport,  and  not  infrequently  if 
the  required  permit  came  at  all  it  would  be  after  the 
old  father  or  mother  would  be  under  the  sod.^  In  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfurt  there  is  a  clause  stating  that  sub- 
jects born  in  the  ceded  territories  are  free  to  keep  their 
property  there.  The  right  to  own  property  ought  to 
include  the  right  to  visit  it,  and  to  use  it,  but  such  was 
not  the  interpretation  of  German  officials.^  One  of  the 
outcomes  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  is  that  as  soon 
as  it  had  become  a  reality  the  hard  regime  of  passports 
was  ended.^ 

There  were  periods  of  calm  as  there  were  spasms  of 
violence.  The  furious  treatment  of  the  caricaturists, 
Zislin  and  Hansi,  who  had  sketched  so  skillfully  the 
foibles  and  ridicules  of  the  conquerors,  excited  protests 
everywhere.  What  the  authorities  called  treason,  and 
wished  to  punish  like  treason,  should  have  called  forth  tlie 
heartiest  laughter  of  healthy  men.  Who  were  ever  more 
often  exposed  to  the  sarcasms  of  satirists  in  every  part 
of  the  world,  and  deservedly  so,  than  the  French  ?  They 
have  never  thought  of  bringing  the  clever  artists  before 
the  courts  and  condemning  them  to  a  long  imprison- 
ment because  they  had  exaggerated  in  a  very  clever  way 
French  weaknesses.  Hansi  was  referred  to  the  Court 
of  Leipsic.     He  was  charged  to  have,  in  My  Village, 

'  III,  20,  475. 

Mil,  96,  682. 

^Journal  des  Debats,  Oct.  6,  1915. 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION  129 

excited  the  Alsatians  against  the  German  regime  and 
prosecuted  for  high  treason.^  Then  comes  the  Savern 
incident  ^  which  called  forth  the  horror  of  men  with  a 
large  heart  in  every  country.  To  assail  men  as  Col.  von 
Reutter  and  Lieutenant  Forstner  did,  "  sabring  and 
persecuting  the  civilians,  who  were  driven  almost  to 
revolt  by  the  overbearing  arrogance  of  ,the  military,^ 
carries  one  back  to  the  regime  of  the  brutal  violence  of 
olden  times.  Yet  these  men  were  exonerated  by  their 
military  judges.*  At  an  earlier  period  Marshal  von 
Manteuffel  did  not  see  the  sad  irony  contained  in  his 
statement,  when  he  spoke  of  the  Alsatians  as  "  the  re- 
conquered brethren."  ^  "  The  reconquered  brethren  " 
subjected  to  this  regime ! 

The  spirit  of  the  victors  in  Alsace  in  dealing  with  the 
vanquished  is  shown  by  a  few  facts  taken  at  random.  One 
of  their  most  ungenerous  and  tactless  acts  was  the  erec- 
tion of  the  statue  of  William  I  upon  the  finest  square  of 
Strasburg.  The  Alsatians  were  thereby  challenged  in 
their  sentiments  toward  the  Hohenzollerns.  Kindness 
of  heart  would  have  prevented  such  a  step.  When  Herr 
Herzog,  Director  of  Affairs  for  the  Reichsland,  visited 
Mulhausen,  someone  asked  him  to  be  considerate  for  the 
people.  He  answered,  "  The  wishes  of  the  people  are 
absolutely  indifferent  to  me."  "  One  recalls  the  Prus- 
sians crossing  Hanover,  and  Manteuffel's  telegram  to 
Bismarck  asking  how  the  Hanoverians  should  be  treated, 
"  As  friends  if  one  can,  if  not  in  a  deadly  way  "  was  the 

•  L' Illustration,  May  23,  1914. 
'in.  18,  954. 

'  Villard,  Oswald  Garrison,  Germany  Embattled,  1915,  p.  55. 

*  VI,   19,  479. 

'  Larousse,  Grand  dictionnaire,  vol.  XVII,  p.  206. 
» III,  88,  205. 


I30   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

reply. ^  Giving  instructions  to  the  chiefs  of  adminis- 
tration in  Schleswig-Holstein,  he  advises  them  to 
deal  severely  with  those  undisciplined  peoples  after  the 
principle,  "  If  thou  canst  not  be  loved  thou  must  be 
feared."  ^  In  parts  of  Germany  conquered  by  Prussia, 
King  William  met  a  cool  reception.  He  reproached  his 
Minister  for  it.  Bismarck  answered,  "  We  have  no 
time  to  make  ourselves  loved."  ^  "  In  annexing  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  his  primary  object,"  he  said,  "  was  not  to  make 
the  inhabitants  happy  and  contented,  but  to  secure  Ger- 
many against  future  aggression."  *  "  Alsace  must  for- 
ever be  and  remain  the  glacis  of  the  Empire."  ^  Apart 
from  the  heartlessness  contained  in  these  statements,  they 
were  rendered  much  more  hateful  by  revealing  the  stiff, 
hard  and  harsh  ways  of  the  conquerors.  The  French 
treatment  was  different.  When,  at  various  times,  most 
of  the  sections  of  Alsace-Lorraine  came  under  the  French 
flag,  they  were  won  over  by  considerateness.  An  Alsa- 
tian member  of  the  Reichstag  eloquently  voiced  the  recol- 
lection of  French  rule  in  his  appeal  for  a  fairer  treat- 
ment of  his  people,  "  Make,"  he  said,  "  for  the  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers  a  home  in  which  they  will  be  at  ease  and 
can  forget  a  happy  past.  The  German  Empire  could  only 
gain  by  following  the  example  of  France.  You  possess 
the  language,  you  have  force,  but  there  is  something 
that  is  not  in  you,  it  is  generosity.  What  we  ask  is  not 
generosity  but  equity."  ^ 

"  V,  14,  753. 
'  V,  21,  245. 

*  HI,  T3,  541. 

*  Lowe,  Op.  cit.,  vol.  II,  p.  382. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  390. 

*  VI,  I,  957. 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION  131 

The  regime  of  German  harshness,  alike  in  every  one 
of  the  conquered  territories,  equally  severe  with  the 
Danes,  the  Poles  and  the  Alsatians,  did  but  little  to  ad- 
vance the  conquerors'  cause.  One  is  astonished  to  hear 
the  Kaiser  say,  in  a  speech  at  Strasburg,  July  30,  1908, 
"  The  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  have  given  me  such  an 
expression  of  their  love  and  loyalty."  In  this  he  must 
have  mistaken  German  emigrants  for  genuine  Alsatians. 
Unquestionably,  German  leaders  believe  in  this  policy 
when  dealing  with  the  vanquished  who  remain  refractory 
to  German  expectations.  Prince  von  Billow  would  say 
of  Alsace  what  he  has  uttered  about  Poland,  "  This  policy 
must  ultimately  reconcile  our  Polish  fellow-countrymen 
to  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  the  Prussian  State  and 
to  the  German  Empire."  ^  The  Prince  might  have  added 
that  virtual  expulsion  and  real  expropriation  of  Poles 
from  the  home  and  land  of  their  fathers,  will,  if  con- 
tinued, be  more  efficient,  but  the  terrible  mistake  of 
Prince  von  Biilow  and  of  Germans  at  large  is  that  in 
their  opinion  the  Poles  and  the  Alsatians  belong,  that 
they  are  the  property  of  German  states  and  that  behind 
this  conception  there  is  the  German  first  principle  that 
"  Might  makes  Right."  That  which  Germany  cannot 
forgive  the  Alsatians,  any  more  than  the  Poles  or  the 
Danes,  is  the  survival  of  their  national  hopes.  They  do 
not  forget  the  iniquity  which  has  denationalized  them, 
and  they  continue  to  appeal  to  the  immanent  justice  which 
dominates  history. 

The  question  of  Alsace  remains  to  be  settled.  Ger- 
man misrepresentations  of  the  question  have  been  signal 
provocations  west  of  the  Rhine.  Prince  von  Biilow  says, 
"  France  moves  in  a  circle  round  the  thought  of  x\lsace- 
*  Op.  cit.,  p.  309. 


132        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Lorraine."  ^  Anyone  acquainted  with  the  variety  and 
richness  of  French  thought  during  the  last  forty  years 
will  smile  at  the  statement  that  France  has  been  hypno- 
tized by  such  an  idea,  however  noble.  Again,  "  France 
will  not  look  upon  her  great  colonial  empire  as  a  suffi- 
cient compensation  for  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine."  ^ 
It  is  not  land,  but  justice  to  a  people  that  France  wishes. 
The  German  Emperor  is  reported  to  have  said  to  some- 
one, referring  to  the  Alsatian  Question,  "  It  is  impossible 
that  all  the  progress  of  the  civilized  nations  should  depend 
upon  knowing  if  1,800,000  individuals  shall  be  Ger- 
man or  French."  ^  The  question  is  not  whether  or  no 
"  1,800,000  individuals  shall  be  German  or  French,"  but 
whether  or  no  they  can  be  what  they  choose ;  whether 
they  can  have  political  freedom  or  no.  Prof.  Miinster- 
berg  speaks  as  if  France  had  no  other  feelings  than  those 
of  revenge,  and  again  and  again  repeats  his  calumnies  * 
as  if  Alsace  were  an  all-absorbing  question,  and  the  only 
possible  solution  of  which  would  be  war  upon  Germany. 
Yes,  for  over  twoscore  years  France  has  thought  and  has 
thought  much  of  Alsace.  There  were  French  militants 
— not  a  large  number — who  would  have  been  willing  to 
attack  Germany  to  redress  the  Alsace  wrong,  but  the 
nation  at  large  was  not.  "  Here  is  the  fact,"  says 
Novicow.  "  Since  1871  France  has  performed  no  act 
showing  that  she  wished  to  take  back  the  lost  provinces 
by  arms.  There  have  been  many  German  bluffs  since 
1871,  there  has  not  been  a  single  French  one."  ^  The 
spirit  of  revanche 'has  existed  if  that  meant  the  vindica- 

'  Op.  cit.,  p.  no. 
'^  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

*  Novicow,  Op.  cit.,  p.  6. 

*  America  and  the  War,  pp.  43,  76,  95,  139,  etc. 
"  Op.  cit.,  p.  199. 


THE  ALSATIAN  QUESTION  133 

tion  of  Alsace,  "  but,"  says  the  same  author,  "  if  the 
Germans  think  that  it  has  been  heroic  for  them  to  main- 
tain their  claims  during  223  years,  it  would  be  the  op- 
posite for  Frenchmen  to  do  the  same  for  44  years."  ^ 

Everywhere  the  spirit  of  revanche  had  died  out,  when 
it  was  revived  by  the  aggressive  course  of  Germany  in 
Morocco,  by  the  ill-treatment  of  Alsatians  and  by  the 
colossal  armaments  beyond  the  Rhine.  The  thought  of 
revanche  had  so  subsided  that,  in  1904,  Francis  de  Pres- 
sense  challenged  the  conservatives  in  Parliament,  daring 
them  to  put  upon  their  program  a  war  for  the  recovery 
of  Alsace.^  In  1909,  Le  Temps,  examining  French  text- 
books used  in  the  schools,  draws  the  following  conclusion, 
"  France  has  lost  the  hope  and  even  the  desire  of  re- 
venge." ^  The  great  Parisian  paper  was  right,  the 
pacifistic  movement  had  largely  swept  away  the  revanche 
aspect  of  the  Alsatian  Question,  and  this  would  have 
continued  had  it  not  been  for  the  late  indignities  to 
which  France  has  been  subjected  by  Germany. 

The  mass  of  Frenchmen  would  not  have  dreamed  of 
attacking  Germany — they  had  too  keen  a  sense  of  the  im- 
morality and  irrationality  of  war — but  they  hoped  that, 
with  the  international  readjustments  which  the  Teutons 
would  force  upon  the  world,  thp  lost  provinces  would 
recover,  as  they  may  do,  their  freedom.  On  the  other 
hand  the  Germans  are  only  too  ready  to  see  but  one 
solution  for  questions  of  this  kind,  and  that  is  war. 
They  tried  to  settle  the  question  of  Alsace  that  way  in 
1870,  and  since  then  they  have  ascribed  like  motives  to 
the  French.     Some  of  the  most  civilized  nations  point 

^  Novicow,  p.  192. 
*  V,  19,  916. 
'  V,  54,  477. 


134   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

with  pride  to  other  solutions  of  international  issues  either 
by  arbitration  or  by  conciliation.  There  have  been  more 
than  75  cases  in  which  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  have  deemed  such  solutions  the  only  ones  be- 
coming highly  civilized  states.  The  arbitration  of  the 
Alabama  Case  between  the  two  countries  was  a  higher 
index  of  civilization  than  the  great  scientific  institutions 
which  are  the  boast  of  Teutonic  peoples.  It  is  because 
of  the  signal  German  difficulty  of  rising  to  such  a  fair 
judicial  point  of  view  that  they  cannot  reconcile  French 
feelings  for  Alsace  with  a  French  love  of  peace.  Even 
when  they  recognize  the  nobleness  of  the  French  attitude 
they  seldom  fail  to  give  a  suggestion  which  is  far  from 
flattering  for  their  opponents.  Prince  von  Biilow,  speak- 
ing of  England  and  France,  says,  "  The  mainspring  of 
English  policy  toward  us  is  national  egoism;  that  of 
French  policy  is  national  idealism.  He  who  follows  his 
interest  will,  however,  mostly  remain  calmer  than  he 
who  pursues  an  idea."  ^  Let  us  overlook  the  "  national 
egoism  "  of  England,  and  perhaps  also  the  suggestion 
of  the  absence  of  national  selfishness  among  Germans, 
but  after  the  irritation  in  reference  to  Alsace,  the  Tangier 
Speech,  Agadir  and  other  provocations,  France  was 
calmer  than  her  Teutonic  opponent.  It  must  be  added 
that  all  along  the  sufiferings  and  trials  of  the  Alsatians 
were  sympathetically  those  of  Frenchmen  ever  ready  to 
listen  to  "  L'Hernelle  plainte  des  vaincus,"  ^  that  is,  to 
protest  against  the  unrighteous  decisions  of  war. 

^Imperial  Germany,  p.  109. 
2  Jules  Ferry. 


XI 

GERMAN    MILITARISM 

One  fact  which  makes  Frenchmen  indignant  is  the 
naive  way  in  which  German  apologists  endeavor  to  de- 
ceive the  pubUc,  acting  and  talking  as  if  the  thought 
of  war  was  not  an  obsession  of  the  national  mind.  Von 
Billow  asserts  that  the  German  Empire  "  is  and  must 
remain  a  military  state."  ^  Prussia  has  risen  to  the 
supreme  leadership  among  other  states  by  war.  The 
French  historian,  Lavisse,  who  has  written  with  so  much 
competence  and  impartiality  upon  Prussia,  truly  says, 
with  a  point  of  irony,  "  The  Hohenzollern  is  someone 
who  ever  wishes  to  have  more  money  to  pay  more  sol- 
diers. He  has  the  habit  of  acquiring  new  territories; 
this  habit  is  so  old  and  so  strong  that  he  cannot  give  it 
up.  Today,  he  dreams  of  governing  the  world."  -  That 
the  Hohenzollern  has  been  a  territory,  and  largely  a 
German  territory,  grabber  is  not  an  invention  of  Teuto- 
phobists.  Bismarck  relates  how  he  spoke  to  his  royal 
master.  "  I  pointed  out  to  the  King,  for  instance,  that 
all  his  predecessors,  with  the  exception  of  his  late 
brother,  had  added  to  their  territories,  and  asked  him 
whether  he  wished  to  follow  that  brother's  example."  ^ 
Thanks  to  Bismarck,  he  did  not. 

'  Op.  cit,  p.  338. 
'  Le  Temps,  Feb.  15,  1915. 

*  Busch,  M.,  Bismarck.  Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History, 
vol.  II,  p.  172. 

135 


136   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

With  the  Prussians  war  purpose  and  territorial  ex- 
tension go  hand  in  hand.  The  highest  distinctions  of 
the  Empire  are  for  mihtaries.  The  Kriegherr,  the  War- 
Lord,  is  the  supreme  soldier  and  thereby  the  supreme 
magistrate.  "  God's  will  placed  him  at  the  head  of  the 
army."  Wherever  his  sons  are,  and  at  whatever  age, 
they  appear  in  their  military  dress.  At  great  national 
functions  the  army  officers  come  before  the  representa- 
tives of  the  nation.  At  the  opening  of  the  imperial 
House  of  Parliament,  its  members  were  not  the  hosts; 
on  the  contrary,  there  was  a  rope  stretched  separating 
them  from  the  dignitaries  of  the  Court,  and  from  the 
representatives  of  the  army.  Everywhere  the  man  with 
a  helmet  comes  before  the  philosopher  and  thfe  scientist. 
The  commonest  lieutenant  assumes  a  certain  superiority 
over  the  rector  of  a  university.  The  scholar  subordinates 
his  work  to,  and  harmonizes  his  conclusions  with,  the 
aims  and  purposes  of  the  military  clique.  The  historian, 
betraying  his  mission  of  telling  the  objective  truth,  ever 
celebrates  the  perfections  of  his  race  and  its  military 
attainments.  Even  the  clergymen  have  lost  all  inde- 
pendence in  their  international  judgments.  The  Reichs- 
tag is  ten  times  more  military  and  more  responsive  to 
military  appeals  than  any  other  parliamentary  institu- 
tion in  Europe.  The  late  Professor  J.  A.  Cramb  speaks 
of  "  the  annual  appearance  of  very  nearly  seven  hundred 
books  dealing  with  war  as  a  science,"  while  in  England 
there  is  published  barely  a  score  of  books  on  the  same 
subject.^  The  German  army,  the  military  organization,  is 
the  central  axis  of  national  efforts,  the  greatest  instru- 
ment of  the  will  to  power,  and  preparation  to  fight  the 
supreme  end  of  the  nation's  life.    For  Bismarck  the  army 

*  Germany  and  England,  p.  71. 


GERMAN  MILITARISM  137 

was  "  Prussia's  life-nerve."  ^  For  Treitschke,  it  was 
"  the  expression  of  a  nation's  will  to  life  and  must  ad- 
vance with  that  life."  "  A  nation's  military  efficiency  is 
the  exact  co-efficient  of  a  nation's  idealism,"  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  says,  "  The  vital  strength  of  a  nation  is  only 
the  measure  of  that  nation's  armaments."  ^ 

For  the  Germans  at  large  war  itself  has  been  spiritual- 
ized, made  divine  and  paramount,  and  for  some  of  them  a 
state  of  things  resting  upon  peace  would  be  immoral. 
The  doctrine  of  evolution  of  Darwin  explaining  zoologi- 
cal relations  has  been  extended  to  nations  who  develop 
through  the  natural  selection  of  war  which  brings  about 
the  survival  of  the  fittest,  the  German,  "  the  most  perfect 
creation  that  history  has  produced  up  to  now."  ^  That 
German  wants  to  be  the  strongest  and  that  for  him  means 
the  greatest.  He  has  thrown  himself  without  restraint 
into  a  mad  industrialism  and  mercantilism  which  have 
dwarfed  his  spiritual  life.  He  is  not  so  foolish  as  to 
dream  of  liberty,  equality  and  fraternity  for  all.  He 
does  not  try  to  harmonize  his  patriotism  with  humanity, 
as  the  French  have  done.  He  has  but  little  interest  in 
mankind.  Germany  is  the  exclusive  center  of  his  pre- 
occupations, Deutschland  iiber  Alles.  It  is  true  that 
German  Socialists  have  platonically  reproved  all  wars, 
and  held  to  the  principle  that  peoples  have  a  right  to  dis- 
pose of  themselves,  but  they  voted  for  the  increase  of 
armaments,  and  when  the  war  came,  they  acted  like  the 
other  Germans.  To  the  prevalence  of  these  ethics  must 
be  ascribed   the   relative   failure  of   pacificism   in   that 

*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  81. 

'  Cramb,  J.  A.,  Germany  and  England,  p.  51. 

•  Letter  of  Dr.  Adolf  Lassen. 


138        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

country,  and  its  attitude  toward  the  judicial  settlement  of 
international  difficulties. 

Dr.  Andrew  D.  White,  ever  an  admirer  of  Germany, 
has  shown  us,  in  a  masterly  way,  her  attitude  at  the 
first  Hague  Conference.  He  speaks  as  follows  of  the 
chief  of  the  German  delegation :  "  Count  von  Munster 
insisted  that  arbitration  must  be  injurious  to  Germany; 
that  Germany  is  prepared  for  war  as  no  other  country  is 
or  can  be ;  that  she  can  mobilize  her  army  in  ten  days ; 
and  that  neither  France,  Russia,  nor  any  other  power 
can  do  this.  Arbitration,  he  said,  would  simply  give 
rival  Powers  time  to  put  themselves  in  readiness,  and 
would  therefore  be  a  great  disadvantage  to  Germany."  ^ 
Again,  "  He  was  out  of  humor  with  all  the  proceedings 
of  the  conference.  He  is  more  than  ever  opposed  to 
arbitration.^  .  .  .  He  came  out,  as  he  did  the  day 
before  in  his  talk  with  me,  utterly  against  arbitration, 
declaring  it  '  humbug.'  "  ^  At  the  closing  of  the  Con- 
ference, after  speeches  by  M.  de  Staal  and  others,  Count 
von  Munster,  as  the  presiding  delegate  from  Germany, 
had  to  make  a  closing  address.  "  It  must  have  been  pain 
and  grief  to  him,"  says  again  the  renowned  American 
educator,  "  for  he  was  obliged  to  speak  respectfully,  in 
the  first  place,  of  the  Conference,  which  for  some  weeks 
he  had  affected  to  despise;  and  secondly,  of  arbitration 
and  the  other  measures  proposed,  which,  at  least  during 
all  the  first  part  of  the  Conference,  he  had  denounced  as 
a  trick  and  a  humbug."  *    Another  member  of  the  Ger- 

^  Autobiography,  N.  Y.  1905,  vol.  II,  p.  265. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  296. 
'Ibid.,  p.  297. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  346. 


GERMAN  MILITARISM  139 

man  delegation,  Professor  Baron  von  Stengel  of  Munich, 
was  especially  known  for  a  book  which  he  had  written 
against  arbitration.^  With  them  was  Colonel  Schwartz- 
hoff,  a  man  strongly  "  prejudiced  against  the  Conference." 
Herr  Zom  von  Bulach,  another  German  delegate,  main- 
tained that  an  international  tribunal  is  incompatible  with 
the  sovereignty  of  a  monarch.  These  delegates  accord- 
ing to  Novicow  blocked  every  attempt  to  solve  inter- 
national difficulties  by  judiciary  processes.^  So  much 
for  the  attitude  of  the  German  delegation  at  The  Hague 
in  1899. 

The  American  diplomatist,  already  quoted,  throws 
further  light  upon  the  position  of  the  German  authorities 
at  this  time.  "  It  now  appears,"  he  says  again,  "  that  the 
German  Emperor  is  determined  to  oppose  the  whole 
scheme  of  arbitration."  ^  "  There  are  also  signs  that  the 
German  Emperor  is  influencing  the  minds  of  his  allies 
— the  sovereigns  of  Austria,  Italy,  Turkey,  and  Roumania 
— leading  them  to  oppose  it."  *  "  There  is  no  longer  any 
doubt  that  the  German  Emperor  is  opposing  arbitration, 
and,  indeed,  the  whole  work  of  the  Conference."  .  .  . 
"  I  had  learned  from  a  high  official,  before  I  left  Berlin, 
that  the  Emperor  considered  arbitration  as  derogatory 
to  his  sovereignty."  °  At  times,  on  account  of  Teuton 
opposition,  the  American  delegates  seem  discouraged,  but 
they  go  on.  "  Those  of  us  who  are  faithful  to  arbitra- 
tion plans,"  says  the  chief  of  the  American  delegation, 
"  will  go  on  and  do  the  best  we  can ;  but  there  is  no 
telling  what  stumbling-blocks   Germany  and  her  allies 

^  Ibid.,  p.  259. 
'  Op.  cit.,  p.  77. 
'  Op.  cit.,  p.  293. 

*  J  bid.,  p.  294. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  29i8. 


I40   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

may  put  in  our  way."  ^  The  American  Ambassador 
makes  earnest  appeals  to  Count  von  Miinster,  as  if  he 
were  more  concerned  for  German  moral  interests  than 
for  those  of  his  own  countrymen,  but  he  was  struggling 
for  a  great  ethical  issue,  and  his  conspicuous  services 
will  be  remembered.  He  wrote  a  most  impressive  letter 
to  von  Billow  in  view  of  modifying  the  stand  of  the 
German  Government.  At  last  he  went  so  far  as  to  send 
Judge  Frederick  Holls  to  Berlin,  as  a  special  delegate, 
imploring  the  Germans  to  cease  their  hostility  to  arbitra- 
tion and  assuring  them  that,  unless  they  yielded,  the 
Emperor  would  be  the  most  hated  man  in  the  world.^ 
He  did  not  fail  to  act  in  other  directions.  He  urged 
Baroness  von  Suttener  "  to  write  with  all  her  might  to 
influence  public  prints  in  Austria,  Italy  and  Germany  in 
behalf  of  arbitration."  ^  At  last  the  Emperor  relented 
and  ceased  his  opposition,  but  the  attitude  of  Germany 
at  this  time  leaves  room  for  no  uncertainty.  She  showed 
there  how  fundamentally  hostile  she  is  to  the  rational 
and  equitable  settlement  of  international  difficulties,  and 
how,  in  her  mind,  the  sword  is  almost  the  sole  ultima 
ratio. 

We  are  told  repeatedly  that  the  Kaiser  is  a  man  of 
peace.  Hardly  a  defender  of  Germany  has  failed  to 
mention  the  quarter  of  a  century  of  peace  during  his 
reign,  but  as  Mohere  puts  it,  Le  temps  ne  fait  rien  a 
I'affaire.  If  it  takes  two  to  marry,  it  takes  two  to  fight. 
Indeed  the  Ruler  of  Germany  has  said,  "  It  is  incom- 
patible with  my  Christian  faith  and  with  the  duties  which, 
as  Emperor,  I  have  assumed  toward  the  people  need- 

*  Ibid.,  p.  299. 

"  Ibid.,  pp.  299,  302,  311. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  309. 


GERMAN  MILITARISM  141 

lessly  to  bring  upon  Germany  the  sorrows  of  war,  even 
of  a  victorious  one."  ^  Notwithstanding  that,  his  utter- 
ances are  those  of  a  man  hypnotized  by  the  army  and 
ever  rolling  the  word,  sword,  upon  his  tongue  like  a 
sweet  morsel.  When  he  wishes  to  honor  Bismarck, 
who  was  on  the  border  of  the  grave,  he  presents  him  with 
"  the  noblest  weapon  of  the  Germans."  His  military 
metaphor  of  "  the  sharpened  sword "  recurs  as  by  a 
fixed  idea.  "  We  Germans,"  he  says  in  1909,  "  are  a 
people  who  rejoice  in  weapons  and  who  lightly  and  joy- 
fully wear  our  uniforms,  because  we  know  that  it  pre- 
serves peace  for  us."  ^ 

On  July  31,  1914,  speaking  of  the  AlHes,  he  says, 
"  they  are  forcing  the  sword  into  my  hand,"  and  on 
August  I,  "  We  hope  and  pray  that  our  good  German 
sword  will  come  out  of  the  struggle  victorious."  The 
threats  of  "  the  mailed  fist,"  the  demand  that  his  soldiers 
shall  use  their  "  weapons  in  such  a  way  that  for  1,000 
years  no  Chinese  shall  dare  to  look  upon  a  German 
askance,"  and  the  supreme  behest  to  his  men  that  they 
"  give  no  pardon  "  and  take  "  no  prisoner  "  are  not  the 
ways  of  speaking  of  a  man  of  peace.  To  this  "  mailed 
fist "  speech  Prince  Henry  replied,  "  One  thing  alone 
draws  me  on.  It  is  to  publish  in  foreign  lands  to  every- 
one who  will  listen  and  also  to  those  who  will  not  listen 
the  gospel  of  your  Majesty's  hallowed  person.  This 
gospel  I  mean  to  have  inscribed  upon  my  banner,  and  I 
will  inscribe  it  wherever  I  go.  ...  I  call  upon  those 
who  are  so  fortunate  as  to  be  my  comrades  in  this 
voyage  to  keep  this  day  in  their  recollections,  to  imprint 
the  person  of  the  Emperor  upon  their  minds,  and  to  send 

'  Gauss,  p.  45. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  278. 


142        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

forth  into  the  world  afar  the  cry :  '  Our  most  illustrious, 
our  most  high  and  mighty,  our  beloved  Kaiser,  King  and 
Lord  for  ever  and  ever !  Hurrah !  Hurrah !  Hur- 
rah ! '"  1  What  a  valuable  document  of  mental  pathol- 
ogy! The  categories  of  the  Kaiser's  mind  deny  at  every 
step  his  pretensions  in  this  direction.  His  telegram  to 
President  Kriiger  and  his  speech  at  Tangier  do  not  sug- 
gest the  spirit  of  "  peace  on  earth,  good-will  toward  men." 
At  the  time  of  the  Morocco  Affair  he  was  bold,  pushing, 
conscious  of  being  backed  by  the  mightiest  army  on  earth, 
resolved  to  use  it. 

Militarism  and  thirst  for  power  are  two  dominant 
characteristics  of  German  activity.  Every  human  dis- 
covery and  every  form  of  progress  is  at  once  mortgaged 
for  war  purpose.  "  The  constant  increase  of  German 
armaments  by  land  and  sea,"  says  Professor  Muir,  "  has 
turned  all  Europe  into  an  armed  camp."  ^  Dr.  David 
Starr  Jordan  speaks  of  Germany  which  had  acquired  "  a 
monstrous  and  menacing  military  equipment  before 
breaking  the  world's  peace."  Never  has  the  world  seen 
such  an  amazing  amount  of  war  provisions,  the  Spandau 
Treasury,  the  Kiel  Canal,  deepened  and  enlarged  for  war 
purposes,  the  numerous  strategic  railroads  that  make  it 
so  easy,  in  time  of  conflict,  to  transport  ammunitions  and 
soldiers  from  one  frontier  to  another.^  There  were  also 
great  exertions  to  prepare  foodstuffs.  From  191 1  on, 
the  Germans  bought  large  quantities  of  meats  even  in 
France  which  they  gathered  in  their  cold  storage.*    There 

'  Saunders,  G.,  Op.  cit.,  p.  88. 

*  Britain's  Case  Against  Germany,  p.  132. 

°  Prof.  E.  Doumergue  of  Montauban  speaks  of  eleven  lines  of 
strategic  railroads  transporting  troops  to  the  front.  Foi  et  Vie, 
May   16,   1915. 

*  Houlaigue,  L.,  Le  Temps,  Nov.  15,  1914. 


GERMAN  MILITARISM  143 

is  an  almost  encyclopedic  world  of  war  preparations  from 
the  control  of  the  press,  the  spying  system,  the  organized 
agitation  in  hostile  and  neutral  countries  to  stupendous 
strategic  activities,  secret  to  an  extent  that  would  be 
impossible  in  any  other  country.  Had  Germany  made 
the  same  efforts  for  peace  the  so-called  Utopias  of  paci- 
fists would  have  become  world-wide  realities ! 

After  1870,  the  imperial  rule  imposed  military  service 
upon  all,  while  France  adopted  that  measure,  with  in- 
numerable exceptions,  only  later.  The  German  tendency 
to  larger  armaments  increased  with  time.  Every  inter- 
national event  was  turned  into  a  pretext  for  increased 
war  appropriations.  In  191 1,  1912  and  1913,  legislative 
acts  continued  this  unreasonable  accumulation  of  means 
of  human  destruction,  though  when  the  last  law  was 
passed  the  Chancellor  said  that  no  one  threatened  his 
country.  Nevertheless,  the  army  at  one  vote  and  by  a 
war  levy  of  $250,000,000  was  increased  by  200,000  units 
and  presented,  in  1913,  an  aggregate  of  850,000  men 
in  time  of  peace,  while  France,  with  a  very  much  smaller 
army,  had  to  discount  the  men  of  various  services,  and 
60,000  men  immobilized  in  North  Africa.  Germany's 
figures  represent  fighters,  the  different  services  were 
provided  with  men  to  be  added  to  the  effective  fighting 
numbers.  According  to  various  French  authorities  the 
relative  strength  of  German  and  French  contingents 
was  something  like  three  to  two  or  at  least  four  to 
three.^  If  we  are  to  accept  the  statements  of  Le  Temps, 
Germany  increased  her  war  expenses  22y  per  cent,  from 
1883  to  1913,  that  is  in  thirty  years,  and  France  only 
70  per  cent. 

The  German  hallucination,  or  perhaps  mere  pretext, 

'  VI,   14,  211. 


144   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

of  the  French  revenge  has  caused  them  not  only  to  see 
enemies  in  the  West,  but  the  Russo-French  alliance  led 
them  to  see  them  in  the  East  also,  and  the  same  spirit 
has  revealed  to  them  foes  on  the  sea.  The  creation  of 
one  of  the  most  powerful  navies  of  the  world  cannot  be 
put  upon  the  score  of  French  aggression,  or  that  a 
foreign  fleet  menaced  its  merchantmen.  The  colossal 
growth  of  her  navy  cannot  be  explained  on  the  basis  of 
love  of  peace.  The  imperial  naval  formulae,  "  The 
trident  ought  to  be  in  our  fist,"  "  Bitterly  we  need  a 
powerful  German  fleet,"  "  Nothing  can  now  be  done  in 
the  world  without  Germany  and  the  German  Emperor," 
were  the  outbursts  of  an  unsated  ambition  and  of  an 
aggressive  purpose.  We  know  that  Germany  showed  a 
conspicuous  unfriendliness  to  the  work  of  The  Hague 
and  also  that  she  refused  to  accept  every  proposal — 
there  were  many — of  England  for  the  limitation  of  naval 
increase.^  We  know  that  during  the  Greek-Turkish 
war  in  1897,  when  the  Powers  were  doing  their  utmost 
to  limit  the  conflict,  Germany  lent  her  officers  and  fur- 
nished implements  of  war  to  the  Turks.  We  know  that 
in  1912,  when  Russia,  France  and  England  made  noble 
attempts  to  prevent  and  stop  the  Balkan  war,  Germany 
showed  a  signal  indifference,  and  her  officers  took  a 
very  important  place  in  the  Turkish  army,  while  the 
great  Powers  of  Europe  remained  neutral.  We  know 
that  she  stood  by  Austria — perhaps  pushed  her  in  1908, 
and  supported  her  in  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  Germany  encouraged  her,  or  at  least 
backed  her,  in  the  present  war.  In  viewing  the  facts 
that  we  have  pointed  out  and  many  others  besides,  there 
loomed  before  Frenchmen  the  sense  of  a  great  potential 
^  Muir,  Ramsay,  Britain's  Case  Against  Germany,  p.  16. 


GERMAN  MILITARISM  145 

and  unavoidable  danger.  The  disingenuous  utterances 
of  the  Kaiser  irritated  them  still  further.  In  the  Reichs- 
tag on  August  14,  1914,  he  said,  "  Too  often  have  our 
attempts  to  come  to  friendlier  relations  with  the  French 
Republic  failed  because  of  her  old  resentments."  ^  Yes, 
the  "  attempts  to  come  to  friendlier  relations  "  in  French- 
men's eyes  were  the  alliances  to  isolate  them,  the  Bis- 
marck designs  to  fight  them  again,  his  misrepresen- 
tations and  those  of  the  Kaiser,  colossal  menacing 
armaments,  the  Morocco  challenges,  Agadir,  and  the 
harrowing  treatment  of  the  Alsatians. 

There  is  a  German  psychological  trait,  almost  exas- 
perating for  the  French,  which  throws  considerable  light 
upon  their  provoking  acts.  This  was  brought  out  many 
years  ago  by  A.  Fouillee,  in  his  Esquisse  psychologique 
des  peuples  europcens,^  and  has  been  put  in  striking 
relief — Horresco  referens — in  a  conversation  of  Chan- 
cellor von  Billow  with  Sir  Thomas  Barclay.  "  We  Ger- 
mans," he  said,  "  at  least  the  Gehildeter  Stand  (the 
educated  middle  class),  have  history  on  the  brain.  It  is 
an  intellectual  disease  which  makes  Germans  see  cur- 
rent events  out  of  focus.  Far-off  happenings  stand  out 
in  their  mind  as  large  as  the  nearer  ones.  We  see  them 
without  the  sense  of  perspective  that  fixes  their  true 
value.  The  professor  and  his  pupils  are  as  indignant  at 
wrongs  inflicted  on  Germany  a  century  or  even  cen- 
turies ago  as  they  are  at  what  happens  today,  and 
publicists  seriously  write  historical  books  to  show  up  the 
evil  ways  of  their  neighbors,  as  if  they  might  be  prece- 
dent  for  action   today."  ^     This  is   very   true,   so   true 

'  Gauss,  p.  326. 

'  P-  256. 

•  Thirty  Years  Anglo-French  Reminiscences,  p.  270. 


146   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

that  the  Chancellor,  having  become  a  Prince,  is  uncon- 
sciously to  give  us  many  proofs  of  it.  In  his  book, 
Imperial  Germany,  he  says,  "  We  wish  to  prevent  the 
return  of  such  times  as  those  of  Louis  XIV  and  of 
Napoleon  I  and  for  our  greater  security  have  therefore 
strengthened  our  frontiers  against  France."  ^  Speaking 
of  the  treatment  of  the  Poles,  whom  the  Germans  with 
great  cruelty  have  endeavored  to  drive  away  from  their 
ancestral  homes,  he  says,  "  In  the  seventh  century  we 
Germans  abandoned  all  lands  east  of  the  Elbe."  ^  "  West 
Prussia  was  regarded  not  as  a  newly  acquired  land, 
but  as  German  land  that  had  been  recovered  and  rightly 
so."  ^  Notice,  lands  abandoned  "  in  the  seventh  cen- 
tury," the  Germans  endeavor  now  to  recover  by  methods 
unworthy  of  a  civilized  people.  Decidedly  they  have 
good  memories.  During  the  Franco-Prussian  war  and 
after  Sedan,  M.  Thiers  met  Ranke  in  Vienna.  He  asked 
the  Prussian  historian,  "  Now  that  you  have  Napoleon,* 
against  whom  are  you  fighting?"  "Against  whom?" 
answered  Ranke,  "  Against  Louis  XIV."  ^  Von  Moltke, 
in  the  Reichstag,  evokes  the  specter  of  Napoleon  and  his 
generals  as  if  they  were  about  to  cross  the  Rhine.®  He 
speaks  of  the  milliard  squeezed  by  Bonaparte  and  the 
robbery  of  the  Hamburg  bank  by  a  French  General  as 
if  they  were  a  matter  of  yesterday.'  One  would  think 
from  these  German  ways  of  viewing  things  that  Turenne 

'  P.  87. 
'  P.  297. 

•  P.  302. 

*  In  a  manifesto  one  German  General  had  said:    "We  do  not 
fight  the  French  but  Napoleon." 

'  Le  Temps,  March  31,  1915. 

"Essays,  Speeches  and  Memoirs,  vol.  II,  p.  112. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  138. 


GERMAN  MILITARISM  147 

and  Villars  are  with  General  Joffre,  that  the  Palatinate, 
not  Louvain,  not  Dinant,  not  Ypres,  not  Reims,  not 
Arras,  not  Senlis,  is  still  burning — that  President  Poin- 
care,  the  first  servant  of  France,  is  still  Louis  XIV,  the 
former  War-Lord,  the  Kaiser  of  France — and  that 
French  soldiers,  the  earnest  sons  of  French  democracy 
— not  the  hirelings  and  mercenaries  of  Louis  XIV — are 
ready  to  renew  the  awful  tragedies  of  attacking  Germany 
"  thirty  times  in  two  hundred  years,"  as  the  humane  von 
Tirpitz  who  torpedoed  the  Lusitania  puts  it.^  These 
men  who  seek  in  history  only  pretexts  for  their  aggres- 
sive purpose  never  say  that  many  of  the  wars  were 
undertaken  for  the  protection  and  liberation  of  German 
peoples,  and  never  have  anything  to  say  about  their  own 
invasions  of  the  land  west  of  them.^ 

They  do  not  refer  to  the  unpardonable  invasion  of 
France  by  Prussia  and  Austria,  in  1792,  to  defeat  the 
men  who  were  endeavoring  to  free  their  country  from 
the  despotism  of  the  Ancien  regime.  Both  were  de- 
feated at  Valmy  by  French  soldiers  fighting  for  the 
first  time  under  the  inspiring  strains  of  the  Marseillaise. 
Prussia  and  Austria  were  fighting,  not  only  against  those 
who  stood  for  the  rights  of  France,  but  for  those  of 
man.  Two  years  later  they  joined  the  whole  of  Europe 
against  France.  After  having  been  for  nearly  eight 
years  the  allies  of  Napoleon,  and  having  secured  through 
this  compact  all  possible  benefits,  they  turned  against 
their   ally,   invaded   France   after   Waterloo,   and   once 

*  New  York  Sun,  Dec.  22,  1915. 

*  We  commend  particularly  on  this  subject  an  essay  of  that 
able  and  courageous  member  of  the  French  Parliament,  Joseph 
Reinach,  De  I'iniluence  historique  de  la  France  sur  I'Allemagne, 
in  his  Histoire  et  litterature,  1889. 


148   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

more  in  1870  when  they  worked  out  the  scheme  of 
conquest  of  Bismarck.  In  their  statement  of  grievances, 
they  never  formulate  them  objectively  or  stand  defi- 
nitely by  an  issue.  Finally,  they  do  France  a  great  in- 
justice not  only  by  the  misstatement  of  their  case,  but 
by  overlooking  the  generous,  broad,  human  and  humani- 
tarian evolution  of  the  last  century.  One  feels  that 
behind  German  acts  and  German  historiography  there 
is  a  strong,  unreasoning,  hostile  passion  against  France. 
The  writer  does  not  maintain  that  the  latter  has  always 
been  as  amiable  as  she  might  have  been.  Amicability 
is  less  a  right  than  a  favor.  France  has  had  a  correct 
attitude,  at  times  frigidly  correct,  but  correct  even  when 
Germany  was  exasperating. 

The  subjects  of  the  Kaiser  do  not  seem  to  be  aware 
of  the  fact  that  uncultured  foreigners  know  something 
of  the  work  of  the  Naval  League,  of  the  German  Colonial 
Society,  of  the  Pan-Germanistic  Association  as  well  as 
other  organizations  which  may  differ  in  character,  but 
have  the  common  purpose  of  territorial  expansion  and  of 
ethnological  accretions  at  any  cost.  In  broad  daylight, 
publicly,  some  of  these  organizations  have  advocated  the 
annexation  of  Belgium  and  of  large  parts  of  France. 
Almost  all  demanded  dominant  positions  in  the  North 
Sea,  all  the  land  along  the  Meuse,  the  Scheldt,  and  the 
Rhine,  the  mining  basin  of  Belgium  for  coal  and  that 
of  Lorraine  for  iron.  Such  pretensions  among  French- 
men, in  reference  to  other  countries,  would  have  met 
with  popular  reproof.  In  the  country  in  which  a  large 
party  had  for  its  motto  at  a  time  when  the  matter  was 
discussed,  "  Tonkin  for  the  Tonkinese !  "  and  when  re- 
cently the  same  party  in  Parliament  fought  with  the 
rallying  cry  of  "  Morocco  for  the  Moroccans ! "  the  aims 


GERMAN  MILITARISM  149 

of  Pan-Germanists  seemed  to  belong  to  another  age. 
In  fact  they  were  in  keeping  with  those  of  jurists,  of 
economists,  of  sociologists  and  philosophers  pointed  out 
by  M.  Fouillee,  men  among  whom  there  is  a  perfect 
worship  of  brute  force,  the  ethical  justification  of  na- 
tional aggressiveness  and  a  complete  acceptance  of  the 
doctrine  that  might  makes  right. 


XII 

GERMANY    AND    RUSSIA 

The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  was  peculiarly  annoy- 
ing to  the  Germans  and  the  characterization  of  their 
Eastern  neighbors  was  greatly  resented  in  France.  The 
Kaiser  is  said  to  have  spoken  of  them  as  "  Asiatic  Bar- 
barians." In  the  recent  apologetic  literature  of  German 
origin,  one  meets  constantly  expressions  like  the  follow- 
ing, "  barbaric  Pan-Slavism,"  "  the  Cossacks  ready  to 
crush  the  culture  of  Germany,"  "  the  uncultured  hordes 
of  the  East,"  "  the  onrush  of  barbaric  masses "  who 
have  "  the  force  of  blind  barbarity " ;  in  the  present 
war,  the  Germans  defend  "  the  cause  of  civilization  as 
opposed  to  Muscovite  barbarism."  Dr.  Andrew  D. 
White  has  done  justice  to  the  often  quoted  epigram, 
"  Scratch  a  Russian  and  you  will  find  a  Tartar,"  which 
is  no  more  correct  than  to  say,  "  Scratch  an  American 
and  you  will  find  an  Indian."  ^  Those  who  are  so  severe 
with  the  subjects  of  the  Czar  do  not  tell  us  that  again 
and  again  Russia  had  rendered  conspicuous  services  to 
Prussia  and  that  she  saved  her  at  the  time  of  Napoleon. 
"  Did  the  Prussians  and  Austrians,"  says  Professor  Paul 
VinogradofT  of  Oxford,  "  reflect  on  the  humiliation  of  an 
alliance  with  the  Muscovites,  and  on  the  superiority  of 
the  Code  Civil,  when  the  Russian  Guard  at  Kuhn  stood 
like  a  rock  against  the  desperate  onslaught  of  Van- 
damme?    Perhaps  by  this  time  the  inhabitants  of  Berlin 

'  Autobiography,  vol.  II,  p.  26. 
150 


GERMANY  AND  RUSSIA  151 

have  obliterated  the  bas-relief  in  the  '  Alley  of  Victories  * 
which  represents  Prince  William  of  Prussia,  the  future 
victor  of  Sedan,  seeking  safety  within  the  square  of  the 
Kaluga  regiment !  "  ^ 

During  his  ambassadorship,  Bismarck  did  all  he  could 
to  secure  the  friendship  of  the  Czar,  while  later  on  he 
avoided  irritating  him  and  furthermore  helped  him  to 
subdue  the  Poles.  In  1866,  his  neutrality  enabled  Prus- 
sia to  crush  Austria.  When,  during  the  next  year, 
France  asked  Prussia  to  carry  out  Article  V  of  the 
Treaty  of  Prague,  again  Russia  gave  her  moral  support 
to  Berlin.^  In  1870,  she  influenced  Denmark  and 
Austria,  preventing  them  from  joining  France.  Emperor 
William,  after  the  war,  wrote  to  the  Czar :  "  Never  will 
Prussia  forget  that  it  is  thanks  to  you  that  the  war  has 
not  assumed  extreme  proportions.  God  bless  you.  ..." 
"  Your  eternally  grateful  friend."  ^  During  the  Franco- 
German  war,  there  is  no  favor  that  Bismarck  is  not 
ready  to  confer  upon  St.  Petersburg.  He  "  proposed 
the  opening  of  the  Dardanelles  and  of  the  Black  Sea  to 
all  nations.  It  would  probably  be  agreeable  to  Russia."  * 
Later  on,  referring  to  the  same  subject,  he  says,  "  In 
the  London  Conference  on  the  Black  Sea  Question  we 
are  to  support  the  Russian  claims  with  all  our  strength."  ^ 
Two  or  three  years  later  the  Germans  were  profuse  in 
their  flatteries  to  Russia.''  "  Never  place  us  in  the 
alternative  of  choosing  between  you  (Austria)  and  Rus- 
sia," said  he  to  Count  von  Andrassy,   the   Hungarian 

'  Paul  Vinogradoff,  The  Times,  Sept.  14,  1914. 
'  III,  73,  391- 

•  Mevil,  Op.  cit.,  p.  iv. 

•  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  vol.  II,  p.  109. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  185. 

•  III,  2,  222. 


152   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

statesman.^  In  1878,  when  the  Russians  were  excessive 
in  their  demands  from  Turkey,  someone  urged  him  to 
do  something  for  peace.  He  answered  that  he  did  not 
know  what  he  could  do,  but  he  exclaimed  Beati  possi- 
denfes,-  which  practically  meant,  leave  them  alone,  so  far 
so  good.  During  the  war  he  made  representations  to  the 
Porte  at  the  request  of  the  Russian  Government  on  ac- 
count of  the  barbarity  of  the  Turks  against  the  soldiers 
of  the  Czar,  but  had  previously  declined  to  comply  with 
a  similar  request  from  the  Sultan.^ 

The  German  press  changed  its  tone  completely  with 
the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  It  began  to  speak  of  Rus- 
sia as  a  Barbarian  nation,  but,  except  for  a  little  while, 
the  Iron  Chancellor  did  not  modify  his  attitude.  Again 
and  again,  he  expresses  his  gratitude  to  the  Russians  * 
and  in  1892  he  censures  von  Capri vi  because  he  has  pre- 
pared a  rupture  between  the  two  empires.^  At  times 
he  went  to  a  great  length  in  his  courtesies  toward  St. 
Petersburg.  When  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  the  hand- 
some Prince  of  Bulgaria,  the  victor  at  the  battle  of 
Slivnitze,  wished  to  marry  Princess  Victoria  of  Prussia, 
a  project  highly  favored  by  the  Queen  of  England,  ap- 
proved by  the  Emperor  and  by  the  royal  family,  Bis- 
marck opposed  this  step  and  carried  the  day  because  he 
did  not  wish  to  displease  the  Czar.^  While  there  were 
brief  periods  when  his  w^armth  for  Russia  lost  some  of 
its  intensity,  as  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Congress  and 

^  III,  j8,  70s. 

*  III,  26,  228. 

'  Lowe,  Op.  cit.,  p.  93. 

*  III,  103,  884. 
'  III,  112,  473. 

*  Busch,  Bismarck.  Some  Secret  Papers  of  His  History,  vol.  II, 
p.  414. 


GERMANY  AND  RUSSIA  153 

even  later,  he  was,  to  the  last,  a  partisan  of  an  alliance 
with  her  and  that  to  prevent  a  Russo-French  rapproche- 
ment and  above  all  to  keep  France  at  his  mercy.  This 
attitude  he  did  not  modify  even  during  his  last  days  at 
Friedrichsruh.^  He  knew  that  had  it  not  been  for 
Russia,  he  could  not  have  accomplished  what  he  did.^ 
Again  and  again  the  German  Government  endeavored  to 
detach  the  Czar  from  France,  but  all  in  vain.  The  Kaiser 
did  his  utmost  with  Russia,  embraced  the  Czar  again  and 
'again,  but  the  embraces,  so  potent  with  the  Turkish 
Sultan,  were  of  no  avail.  The  German  detractors  of 
Russia  do  not  realize  how  justly  irritating  to  Frenchmen 
were  German  calumnies  of  the  subjects  of  the  Czar. 

Granted  that  Russia  has  but  lately  emerged  from 
political  absolutism,  have  the  Germans,  with  all  their 
assumptions  of  superiority,  reached  anything  like  free- 
dom from  personal  government?  Do  they  ever  give 
Russians  credit  for  what  they  have  done?  The  mass  of 
Russians  are  backward,  but  where  is  there  a  country  that 
like  theirs  has,  without  a  revolution,  transformed  20,000,- 
000  slaves  into  free  landowners  like  the  Empire  of  the 
Czar?^  Where  is  the  people  that  would  have  given  up 
all  at  once  the  use  of  Vodka,  a  kind  of  Russian  absinthe, 
that  yielded  the  treasury  2.000,000,000  francs  a  year? 
This  indicates  a  self-control  not  possessed  by  nations 
boasting  of  their  enlightenment.  Russia  is  making 
progress  in  many  ways.  Her  education  is  spreading 
rapidly.  A.  Rambaud  says  that  she  had  250  lycees  and 
colleges  for  women  when  France  scarcely  possessed  any.* 

*  III,  i2g,  237. 
"  III,  143,  233- 

'  Rambaud,  A.,  Journal  des  Debals,  Oct.  6,  1893. 

*  Ibid. 


154   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

She  has  philosophers  and  scientists  of  considerable 
eminence.  Her  economist,  Novicow,  has  treated  in  a 
masterly  way  some  of  the  most  difficult  European  prob- 
lems. Russia  has  her  artists,  and  Germany  never  had 
one  more  humane  than  Vereshtchagin,  the  painter,  who 
attempted  the  impossible  task  of  making  war  seem  as 
horrible  as  it  really  is.  She  has  her  musicians,  never 
more  appreciated  than  now,  and  the  world — very  igno- 
rant of  the  Empire  of  the  Czar — was  astonished  when, 
through  Melchior  de  Vogiie,  came  a  revelation  of  the 
noteworthy  literature  of  the  country.  It  is  impossible 
not  to  agree  with  Professor  Vinogradoff  of  the  Oxford 
University  when  he  says,  "  A  nation  represented  by 
Pushkin,  Turgeneff,  Tolstoy,  Dostoyevsky,  in  literature, 
by  Kramskoy,  Vereshtchagin,  Repin,  Glinka,  Monssorg- 
sky,  Tchaikovsky  in  art,  by  Mendeleeff,  Metchnikoflf, 
Pavloff  in  science,  by  Kluchevsky  and  Solovieff  in  his- 
tory, need  not  be  ashamed  to  enter  the  lists  in  an  enter- 
national  competition  for  prizes  of  culture."  ^  One  fact 
which  is  evident  is  that  in  1866,  Austria  was  not  slan- 
dered one  whit  less  by  the  Prussians,  while  in  1870, 
France  was  represented  as  the  incarnation  of  ignorance 
and  depravity. 

The  work  of  Russia  in  the  cause  of  civilization  and 
humanity  cannot  be  overlooked.  The  great  Russian 
Jurist,  F.  de  Martens,  one  of  the  most  conspicuous 
figures  at  the  First  Conference  of  The  Hague,  has  told 
us  of  the  services  rendered  by  Catharine  II  of  Russia  to 
the  cause  of  international  progress.  In  1780,  she  made 
the  celebrated  "  declaration  of  the  rights  of  nations  and 
of  neutral  commerce  which  served  as  a  basis  to  armed 
neutrality."  Sir  J.  Harris  of  England,  later  Lord 
^  The  Times,  Sept.  11,  1914. 


GERMANY  AND  RUSSIA  155 

Malmesbury,  made  fun  of  it.  The  Empress  answered, 
"  Laugh  at  my  declaration,  call  it  if  you  like  my  armed 
neutrality,  my  armed  nullity.  It  is  a  fact  which  will 
remain."  This  principle  of  Catharine  has  entered  into 
the  body  of  international  law  recognized  by  the  world.^ 
At  the  time  of  the  invasion  of  Hesse,  in  1850,  by  the 
Austro-Bavarian  army  on  the  one  hand  and  by  that 
of  Prussia  on  the  other  the  Czar  Nicholas  said  to  them, 
"  I  shall  fire  on  the  first  who  fires."  -  In  1864,  Alexander 
II  was  prominent  among  those  interested  in  the  Con- 
ference of  Geneva  for  the  humanization  of  war.  In 
1868,  he  summoned  the  Conference  of  St.  Petersburg 
to  limit  war  excesses  and  to  prevent  the  use  of  certain 
projectiles  and  arms  ^  and  especially  of  explosive  bullets.* 
In  1875,  after  the  war  scare  created  by  Bismarck,  the 
Duke  of  Cambridge  speaking  with  Gavard  of  the  French 
Embassy  said,  "  What  a  week  we  have  just  passed !  The 
opinion,  however,  is  that  it  is  all  over  and  that  it  is 
Russia  that  has  saved  the  peace  of  Europe."  ^ 

The  Czar  rendered  then  signal  service  to  France.  He 
came  to  hold  to  the  principle  of  national  rights.  The 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  March  3,  1878,  reads,  "  The 
final  frontiers  of  the  Bulgarian  principality  shall  be 
traced  by  a  commission  which  shall  bear  in  mind  the 
nationality  of  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
frontiers."  The  great  basis  of  decision  here  is  not  strat- 
egy or  territories,  but  respect  for  the  inherent  rights  of 
men.     "If  Bismarck,"  says  again  Novicow,  "  had  sup- 

'  V,  18,  318. 

*  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  108. 

*  Higgins,  A.  P.,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  p.  6. 

*  Larousse,  Grand  dictionnaire,  ist  supplement,  p.  87. 
'  Journal  des  Debats,  Nov.  27,  1893. 


156   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

ported  Russia  at  the  Berlin  Congress  the  whole  of  Bul- 
garia, the  whole  of  Servia,  Greece  and  Albania  would 
have  been  delivered  from  the  fatal  Ottoman  yoke."  ^ 
In  1888,  at  the  time  of  the  visit  of  the  Kaiser  to  Russia, 
it  is  said  that  the  Czar  already  talked  with  him  of  dis- 
armament.^ It  was  not  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,  but  the 
Czar  Nicholas  II,  who  took  the  leadership  in  the  calling 
of  the  Conference  at  The  Hague  in  1899.  The  sovereign 
of  a  great  and  powerful  nation  proclaimed  there,  before 
the  whole  world,  "  the  necessity  for  Governments  to 
bear  in  mind  the  aspirations  and  wishes  of  peoples,  and 
to  try  to  discover  the  basis  of  a  lasting  peace  among 
them  by  a  decrease  of  military  forces."  ^  In  his  rescript, 
the  Czar,  speaking  most  wisely  of  armaments,  said,  "  It 
seems  evident  that  if  this  situation  continues,  it  will  lead 
fatally  to  that  very  cataclysm  which  one  attempts  to 
avoid,  the  horrors  of  which  cause  all  human  thought  to 
shudder  beforehand."  *  There  were  not  two  opinions 
among  the  delegates,  except  those  of  Germany,  concern- 
ing the  earnestness  of  the  Czar  whom  a  German-Ameri- 
can delegate  called,  "  The  August  Initiator  of  the  Peace 
Conference."  ^  There  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  value  of  the 
co-operation  of  Baron  de  Staal,  whom  Andrew  D.  White 
calls  "  the  foremost  diplomatist  of  this  epoch,"  or  of 
that  of  the  most  renowned  authority  on  international  law 
in  the  Empire,  Fedor  de  Martens.  It  would  be  unjust 
not  to  mention  the  presence  there  of  Jean  de  Bloch,  whose 
works  are  said  to  have  converted   the   Czar  to   peace 

'■  Novicow,  Op.  cit.,  p.  245. 
'  III,  88,  714. 
•V,  18,  us. 

*  V,  18, 333. 

'  Holls,  F.  W.,  The  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague,  N.  Y., 
1910. 


GERMANY  AND  RUSSIA  157 

ideas  while  he  left  his  fortune  to  establish  the  Peace 
Museum  of  Lucerne. 

Russia  espoused  with  singular  devotion  the  peace  and 
humanitarian  ideas  discussed  at  the  first  conference. 
She  took  a  scarcely  less  important  place  at  the  second 
conference  in  the  same  city.  At  all  times,  she  earnestly 
sustained  every  move  that  made  for  international  comity, 
for  the  humanization  of  war,  and  the  permanent  estab- 
lishment of  peace  by  reasonable  and  rational  methods. 
Dr.  Andrew  D.  White  twice  suggests,  in  his  Auto- 
biography, that  the  Czar  would  have  shown  better  his 
earnestness  at  the  time  of  The  Hague  Conference  "  by 
dismissing  from  200,000  to  250,000  troops "  from  his 
army,^  but  this  would  have  been  an  unwise  step,  as  the 
Russo-Japanese  war  has  demonstrated.  France  took 
such  a  step,  but  that  only  made  the  Germans  more  ag- 
gressive. Why  did  not  the  American  Ambassador  rec- 
ommend that  course  to  the  Germans?  Russia,  unfortu- 
nately like  all  other  Powers,  had  moments  when  she 
failed  to  show  in  practice  her  pacifistic  principles,  but  her 
efforts  have  not  been  inglorious.  "  The  Franco-Russian 
Alliance  was  not  an  alliance  made  for  revenge,"  says 
Andre  Tardieu.-  At  the  banquet  given  to  the  Czar,  at 
the  time  of  his  visit  to  Paris,  in  September,  1901,  he  said, 
"  No  doubt  can  exist  as  to  the  fact  that  the  alliance  has 
its  origin  in  the  desire  for  peace,  and  no  one  can  deny 
that  the  alliance  has  contributed  to  the  preservation  of 
the  balance  of  European  Power — the  necessary  condi- 
tion of  peace."  This  peaceful  aspect  of  Russian  aims 
appealed  very  much  to  Frenchmen,  while  the  alliance 
delivered  them  from  the  dread  of  German  aggression. 

'  Vol.  II,  p.  28. 

"France  and  the  Alliances,  p.  12. 


158        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

This  pacifistic  tendency  gave  rise  to  statements  in  the 
German  press  that  Russia  was  willing  to  take  French 
money,  but  would  not  fight  for  her  ally.  Von  Biilow 
asserts  almost  triumphantly  that  "  England,  like  Russia, 
has  refused  to  serve  the  cause  of  French  revenge."  ^ 
This,  meant  as  a  slur  upon  France,  is  by  ricochet  a  com- 
pliment to  the  peaceful  spirit  of  England  and  Russia. 

The  record  of  the  Czar's  Government  in  the  direction 
of  practical  pacific  action  is  not  insignificant.  In  1815, 
Alexander  I,  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  defended  the 
neutrality  of  Switzerland  with  energy  and  success.^  The 
Due  de  Richelieu  received  a  map  from  Alexander  I 
showing  what  the  Prussians  wanted  to  secure  from 
France — "  a  line  including  a  part  of  Franche-Comte,  the 
whole  of  Alsace,  a  great  part  of  Lorraine,  the  Trois- 
Eveches,  Stenay,  Sedan,  Mezieres,  Givet,  all  of  Hainaut, 
and  of  French  Flanders  to  the  sea."  ^  This  thirst  for 
territories  was  not  quenched  by  Russia.  Even  Nicholas  I 
did  much  to  protect  Christians  under  Turkish  rule,  and 
joined  France  and  England  on  behalf  of  the  Greeks. 
When  Bismarck  wished  to  fight  France  again  in  1875, 
the  French  Ambassador,  Gontaut-Biron,  told  the  Czar 
what  the  situation  was.  The  master  of  All  the  Russias 
answered,  "  Peace  is  necessary  to  the  world,  and  each 
nation  has  enough  to  do  at  home.  Depend  upon  me  and 
have  no  fear."  ^  He  did  what  was  essential  to  cause 
Prince  Bismarck  to  desist  from  his  purpose. 

The  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  stiff  as  it  was,  stipulated 
valuable  advantages  for  all  Christian  peoples  in  Turkey, 

•  Op.  cit.,  p.  108. 
'  V,  18,  319- 

•  Nouvelle  Revue,  Oct.  15,  1895. 

•  Broglie,  Op.  cit.,  240. 


GERMANY  AND  RUSSIA  159 

independence  for  some  of  them,  and  virtual  autonomy 
for  others.^  Russia,  in  the  flush  of  victory,  heeded 
Europe  after  San  Stefano,  and  never  was  a  menace  to 
her  western  German  friends.  She  continued  to  work 
for  the  protection  of  the  Balkan  peoples,  standing  regu- 
larly for  the  principle  of  nationalities  and  the  respect  of 
sovereignties.^  When  the  Greeks  provoked  war  with 
Turkey  in  1897  they  received  no  encouragement  and  no 
support  from  Russia.  In  1899  ^"^  1900  the  Cabinet  of 
St.  Petersburg  was  endeavoring  to  put  a  stop  to  the 
South  African  war  by  friendly  mediation.^  It  was 
agreed  by  France  and  Germany  that  the  ofifer  of  good 
cfifices  should  be  extended  by  "  Russia  alone." 

After  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  which  was  largely 
brought  about  by  the  impatience  of  Japan  and  the  slow- 
ness of  Russian  diplomatic  action — a  war  which  would 
not  have  taken  place  had  Russia's  reply,  having  already 
granted  Japan's  demands,  arrived  one  day  earlier,*  she 
not  only  came  to  terms  with  the  Japanese,  but  in  1907 
she  signed  a  treaty  with  Japan  which  established  a  per- 
fect understanding  between  the  two  countries.  Then 
came  the  remarkable  agreement  with  England  which  not 
only  put  an  end  to  the  historic  antagonism  in  the  East, 
but  prepared  the  ultimate  evolution  of  the  Entente.  In 
1908  when  Austria  annexed  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina — 
when  Europe  was  threatened  with  the  war  that  has  now 
come,  Russia  yielded,  and  in  191 1  she  reasserted  her 
desire  not  to  interfere  with  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.^ 

'  III,  103,  876. 

'  III,  los,  411. 

'  Mevil,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  55-59. 

*  Mevil,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  73-117. 

'  VI,  /.  476. 


i6o   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

When  Austria  mobilized  armies  on  the  Servian  frontier, 
she  mobiHzed  none.  During  the  first  Balkan  war  "  the 
policy  of  disinterestedness,"  presented  to  all  the  great 
Powers,  was  the  proposition  of  Russia.^  She  yielded 
also  during  the  London  Conference  to  the  unreasonable 
claims  of  Austria  in  the  matter  of  Scutari.^  When  it 
seemed  necessary  to  coerce  Montenegro  to  take  away 
all  pretexts  of  interference  on  the  part  of  Vienna,  she 
asked  France  and  England  to  join  her  in  a  demonstra- 
tion against  the  brave  little  kingdom.  When  the  Servians 
seemed  aggressive  against  the  Dual  Monarchy,  Russia 
issued  a  communique  to  the  press  which  led  the  Servians 
to  recall  their  troops.  In  July,  191 3,  she  sent  an  earnest 
appeal  to  Servia  and  to .  Bulgaria,  urging  them  not  to 
fight,^  an  appeal  from  a  friendly  country  which  ought 
to  have  been  heeded. 

In  Southern  Europe  she  has  exerted  a  kind  of  Russian 
Monroe  Doctrine,  protecting  Greek  Catholics  against  the 
Turks,  and  against  the  Roman  Catholic  inhabitants  of 
Austria-Hungary.  One  fact  is  evident.  The  peoples 
protected  by  the  Czar  have  their  autonomy  and  fullest 
independence — an  independence  which  is  far  from  bow- 
ing before  everything  Russian — while  Bosnia  and  Her- 
zegovina are  under  the  yoke  of  Austria.  In  the  days  of 
the  war  crisis,  Russia  showed  a  reasonable  spirit.  She 
offered  to  refer  the  contention  to  the  Court  of  The 
Hague,  baffled  only  by  the  determination  of  the  Dual 
Alliance  to  move  southward.  A  fact  of  great  signifi- 
cance is  that  while  Prussia  was  small  and  weak,  Russia 
never  attacked  her.     She  may  become  aggressive  and 

^  VI,  12,  470. 
^  V,  15,  234. 
'VI,  j6,  233. 


GERMANY  AND  RUSSIA  i6i 

military,  through  the  examples  and  inspiration  of  her 
western  neighbors.  The  threats  of  Pan-Germanists 
have  compelled  the  Swiss  to  arm  more  and  more,  the 
Russians  may  be  affected  in  a  similar  way.  They  may 
follow  the  example  of  Japan,  which  has  so  completely 
assimilated  Teutonic  Kulttir. 


XIII 
GERMANY,   BELGIUM   AND  ENGLAND 

For  some  years  the  scholars  of  Deutschland  have  laid 
stress  upon  the  common  ethnological  traits  of  the  British 
and  themselves  as  the  strongest  assets  on  the  side  of 
peace.  On  November  i6,  1907,  the  Kaiser,  addressing 
English  journalists,  said  to  them,  "  We  belong  to  the 
same  race  and  religion.  These  are  bonds  which  should 
be  strong  enough  to  preserve  harmony  and  friendship 
between  us."  ^  In  this  the  Emperor  of  Germany  was, 
and  should  have  been,  disappointed.  Race  and  religion 
have  seldom  prevented  peoples  from  fighting ;  on  the  con- 
trary they  have  often  brought  about  the  bitterest  con- 
flicts. The  ethnocrates  who  give  prominence  to  physical 
kinship  ought  to  remember  that,  according  to  their  the- 
ories, it  is  the  peoples  who  are  most  alike  who  are  most 
opposed  to  each  other.  In  the  struggle  for  existence  the 
species  that  are  most  similar  have  the  same  wants,  com- 
pete for  the  same  food,  and  therefore  are  the  most 
destructive  of  each  other. 

Germany,  as  usual,  makes  others  responsible  for  the 
war.  England,  according  to  the  Germans,  is  the  great 
transgressor.  They  lay  stress  upon  what  they  call  a 
"  race  treason."  ^  Their  violent  and  prejudiced  diatribes 
have  revealed  the  decadence  of  objective  thinking  in 
Germany  and  the  fact  that  they  have  been  misled  by 

'  Gauss,  p.  264. 

'  Miinsterberg,  H.,  America  and  the  War,  p.  73. 
162 


GERMANY,  BELGIUM  AND  ENGLAND    163 

the  teachings  of  Gobineau.  This  man,  a  mediocre  diplo- 
mat, advanced  theories  of  races  that  gave  the  highest 
place  among  the  peoples  of  the  world  to  the  Germans. 
Most  serious  thinkers  in  our  day  have  given  up  the  use 
of  the  word  "  race  "  as  ambiguous  and  deluding,  but  the 
Gobinists  spoke  of  what  they  called  by  that  name  as 
permanent  and  almost  unchangeable.  These  theories, 
inadequate  from  the  point  of  view  of  facts,  ethically  bad, 
and  in  their  application,  often  ridiculous,  have  been  ac- 
cepted by  almost  everyone  in  Germany,  and  have  fully 
entered  into  all  the  philosophical  and  literary  productions 
of  the  country.  Anyone  with  anything  like  independence 
of  mind  knows  that  the  nations  of  the  world  are  the 
result  of  a  mixing  process  which  has  gone  on  for  several 
hundred  thousand  years,  and  that,  as  a  consequence, 
almost  all  of  them  are  the  resultants  of  ages  of  physical 
and  moral  crossings.  According  to  Virchow  the  fair- 
haired  dolichocephalous  type,  generally  identified  with  the 
Germans,  is  observed  only  from  33  to  43  per  cent,  in 
northern  Germany,  25  to  32  per  cent,  in  the  center  and 
18  to  24  per  cent,  in  the  south. ^  There  is  no  country 
absolutely  Germanic,  or  nearly  so,  in  the  Gobinian  sense 
of  the  term,  and  no  ethical  judgment  can  rest  merely 
upon  an  ethnological  basis.  Professor  Miinsterberg  and 
Professor  Bergson,  both  of  them  Hebrews,  have  become 
so  permeated  with  the  spirit  of  the  peoples  among  whom 
they  have  lived  that  at  times  they  outdo  them  in  their 
national  characteristics.  Almost  all  the  ethnological 
twaddle  of  English  and  German  Gobinists  is  bad  philos- 
ophy and  worse  morals. 

The  charges  of  the  Teuton  allies  against  England  are 
gratuitous  and  fanciful.    The  people  really  dominated  by 
*  Fouillee,  Op.  cit.,  p.  247. 


i64   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

jealous  and  aggressive  ends  have  been  the  Germans. 
That  is  the  only  way  to  explain  their  hostility  to  England 
and  their  arraignments  of  her  past.  They  ascribe  the 
present  war  to  English  "  jealousy "  and  to  "  economic 
rivalry."  We  are  not  ready  to  say  that  these  feelings 
did  not  exist  in  England  and  that  in  some  minds  they 
have  not  determined  a  hostile  attitude,  but  had  they 
been  potent,  they  would  have  manifested  themselves  by 
means  of  parties,  by  some  Pan-British  or  anti-German 
association,  with  a  program  akin  to  that  of  Pan-German- 
ists.  No  such  party  or  even  group  existed  in  Great 
Britain,  where  every  "  ism"  from  the  upholders  of  the 
theory  of  the  "  Lost  Tribes  "  ^  to  every  form  of  theo- 
logical and  social  Utopias  have  their  organizations.  Had 
there  been  such  a  spirit  the  British  would  have  taken 
measures  in  Parliament  to  check  German  commercial 
progress,  but  where  is  there  a  single  fact  which  points 
to  the  least  truly  national  attempt  to  limit  or  hinder  the 
progressive  German  exportations  ?  Had  there  been  an 
aggressive  British  spirit,  the  English,  who  are  a  practical 
people,  would  have  prepared  for  war,  would  have  mus- 
tered large  armies,  their  arsenals  would  have  been  ade- 
quate to  war  possibilities,  their  military  stores  would 
have  been  filled  with  limitless  munitions,  provision 
would  have  been  made  for  the  landing  of  vast  military 
corps  on  the  Continent,  preparations  would  have  been 
in  readiness  for  the  use  of  French,  Belgian  and  German 
railroads,  millions  of  men  would  have  been  trained  ready 
to  be  rushed  for  continental  service.  All  this,  and  much 
more,  was  wanting.    There  can  be  no  better  refutation  of 

'  Some  years  ago  an  organization  in  Great  Britain  not  only 
gathered  data  to  identify  the  British  people  with  the  "  Lost 
iTribes  "  of  Israel,  but  propagated  the  belief  in  such  an  identity. 


GERMANY,  BELGIUM  AND  ENGLAND    165 

German  accusations.  They  who  of  recent  years  had 
provided  belligerent  Japanese,  Boers,  Tripolitans,  Turks 
and  others  with  all  possible  implements  of  war  pro- 
tested against  American  commercial  liberty,  and  charged 
the  people  of  this  land  with  a  violation  of  neutrality. 
The  very  fact  that  a  country  like  England  lacked  mu- 
nitions of  war,  when  her  industrial  capacities  along  that 
line  were  so  great,  is  an  evident  proof  that  her  people 
could  not  have  planned  an  aggression  against  Germany. 
In  any  case  such  a  proof  is  unnecessary  since  we  have 
conclusive  evidence  as  to  who  were  those  desiring  the 
war. 

Again,  in  the  Empire  of  the  Kaiser,  there  were  no 
great  protests,  similar  to  those  of  British  scholars,  of 
what  the  Tory  journals  called  the  "  Cocoa  Press,"  of 
the  peace  societies,  and  of  the  Socialists  to  avert  the 
war  as  in  Great  Britain.  The  general  attitude  of  Ger- 
many and  her  roughshod  way  of  dealing  with  France 
inspired  great  national  distrust.  The  British,  whose 
confidence  in  German  peaceful  intentions  had  been  so 
weakened  by  the  course  followed  by  Wilhelmstrasse,  felt 
that  the  interests  of  peace  were  best  safeguarded  by 
France  and  her  ally,  Russia.  Their  attitude  was  very 
much  assaulted  by  cosmopolitan  financiers  of  German 
origin  who  exerted  their  efforts  in  every  direction,  but 
especially  upon  the  Cabinet  and  most  of  all  upon  Sir 
Edward  Grey.  The  Kaiser  sent  a  letter  to  The  Times 
in  which  were  his  usual  protestations  of  his  love  of 
peace — a  letter  which  was  not  published.^  There  were 
the  frantic  efforts  of  the  good  Quakers,  of  English  paci- 
fists and  of  labor  organizations  who  failed  to  realize  that 
they  were  working  to  hand  over  France  and  Russia  to 

*  Wickharn   Steed,  Lecture  in  Paris,  May  2,  1915. 


i66        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

the  greatest  militarists  of  the  world.  American  peace 
workers,  then  in  England,  were  far  from  neutral.  Some 
of  them  would  have  allowed  the  French,  who  had  taken 
them  at  their  word,  and  attempted  to  introduce  their 
principles  into  national  politics,  to  be  crushed  by  the 
mighty  Teutons.  The  British  Government  did  nobly 
for  peace.  It  had  given  Berlin  the  assurance  that  she 
would  never  support  any  aggression  of  her  allies  against 
the  Kaiser's  people,  and  similarly  Great  Britain,  unwill- 
ing to  encourage  a  possible  "  bellicose  spirit  of  the 
French  "  or  the  martial  activities  of  the  Russians,  de- 
clined to  promise  British  co-operation  with  France.  At 
the  same  time.  Sir  Edward  had  warned  the  German 
Ambassador  that  in  case  of  a  conflict  in  which  France 
would  be  a  participant,  England  would  not  remain  neu- 
tral. No  one  could  have  done  more  to  discourage 
militants  on  all  sides  and  to  avoid  the  terrible  con- 
flict. 

It  was  only  on  August  2  that  M.  Paul  Cambon  secured 
the  pledge  from  Downing  Street  that  Great  Britain,  in 
case  of  a  German  attack  on  the  sea,  would  defend 
French  coasts.  For  some  Gallican  critics  the  apparent 
hesitation  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  unexplainable ;  the 
Germans  feel  that  Britain  ought  to  have  been  more  out- 
spoken, but  the  friends  of  peace  and  humanity  are  obliged 
to  note  that  Sir  Edward  kept  to  the  end  his  faith  in  the 
possibility  of  avoiding  the  great  international  collision. 
It  was  only  when  he  saw  the  evidence  of  the  brutal  pur- 
pose of  Germany  to  do  violence  to  Belgium  that  he  felt 
that  his  country  was  bound  to  have  her  share  in  opposing 
this  aggression.  Sir  Edward  had  earned  the  gratitude 
of  all  peace  lovers  of  the  world  by  his  practical  tact,  his 
earnestness  and  his  fairness  at  the  London-Balkan  Con- 


GERMANY,  BELGIUM  AND  ENGLAND    167 

ference.^  The  German  Chancellor,  speaking  of  his 
leadership,  at  that  time,  said,  "  Europe  will  be  grateful  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey  for  the  exceptional  zeal  and  spirit 
of  conciliation  with  which  he  directed  the  discussions 
of  London."  ^  The  same  judgment  must  be  passed  upon 
the  noble  bearing  and  the  remarkable  fairness  of  pur- 
pose which  he  displayed  at  this  time.  It  is  not  astonish- 
ing that  he  should  have  had  such  support  from  the  Brit- 
ish Parliament,  nay  from  the  whole  British  Empire. 
However,  this  is  the  man  and  his  is  the  people  that  have 
been  spoken  of  by  German  writers  in  terms  that  are  at 
once  contemptuous  and  insulting.  The  Comedy  of  1870 
was  renewed  and  England  was  treated  with  the  same  de- 
tracting spirit  wherewith  Germany  then  treated  France. 
Misrepresentations  and  the  sword  have  ever  been  two 
favorite  Prussian  weapons. 

Belgium  has  not  fared  any  better.  The  Germans  were, 
and  still  are,  supremely  incensed  against  her  people. 
The  writer,  acquainted  with  them  for  over  half  a  cen- 
tury, has  seen  them  rise  from  great  poverty  to  an  unusual 
prosperity  by  hard  work,  by  education  and  by  a  strong 
sense  of  conduct.  No  group  of  men  drawn  together  has 
had  a  deeper  consciousness  of  the  importance  of  its 
unity.  L'union  fait  la  force  is  its  motto.  The  national 
cohesion,  overcoming  ethnic  and  linguistic  dissent,  is 
paramount  with  them.  They  are  conscious  of  their 
rights  as  neutrals  and  also  of  their  obligations.  Again 
and  again  they  have  reminded  their  neighbors  of  this  by 
the  zeal  with  which  they  were  safeguarding  the  trust 
laid  upon  them  by  the  Powers  of  Europe.  Whenever 
a  Frenchman  suggested  to  Belgians  the  possible  union  of 

'  VI,  13, 477. 

'y  1, 13,956. 


i68   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

their  countiy  with  France — the  writer  has  tried  it — he 
would  receive  an  answer  that  would  lead  him  not  to 
renew  the  experience.  They  would  not  tolerate  such 
suggestions,  either,  from  Englishmen,  Dutchmen  or  Ger- 
mans. With  the  exception  of  a  few  Socialists,  they  love 
their  country  with  a  strong,  deep  and  unflinching  patriot- 
ism, capable  of  the  greatest  sacrifices.  They  were  aware 
that  the  French  and  the  English  were  friendly.  They 
trusted  the  Dutch,  whose  loyalty  is  evident.  Not  so  Ger- 
many. They  remembered  the  way  in  which  Bismarck 
threatened  them  in  1875.^  The  program  and  the  agita- 
tion of  Pan-Germanists,  who,  again  and  again,  advocated 
the  annexation  of  Belgium,  the  large  number  of  teachers, 
merchants  and  laborers  settling  there,  the  strategic  rail- 
roads started  after  the  defeat  of  the  Russians  in  Man- 
churia and,  about  191 2,  so  completed  as  to  be  able  to 
throw  an  enormous  army  into  this  little  Kingdom  in  no 
time ;  the  doubling  of  lines  having  no  economic  interests, 
the  establishment  of  enormous  military  sidings,  600,  700 
and  1,000  feet  long,  the  massing  of  five  army  corps  near 
the  frontier  of  the  neutral  country  ^  greatly  alarmed  the 
elite  of  Belgium.  No  doubt  the  Government  asked  Eng- 
land and  France  what  each  would  do  in  the  event  of  a 
German  invasion.  They  began  especial  works  of  de- 
fense in  view  of  what  seemed  an  impending  danger.  It 
would  have  been  almost  criminal  for  them  to  do  less. 
Led  by  similar  considerations  the  French  General  StaflF 
urged  France  to  fortify  the  north  of  their  country,  but 
the  pacifists  opposed  such  a  course  most  violently.  They 
found  in  the  Parliament  a  majority  to  prevent  this  most 
elementary     precaution     against     the     dangerous     and 

^  II,  9,  222;  Broglie,  Op.  cit.,  p.  192, 
'^  Le  Temps,  Dec.  22,  1911. 


GERMANY,  BELGIUM  AND  ENGLAND    169 

threatening  foe.  The  pacifists — the  writer  is  one  of 
them — ever  pleaded  extenuating  circumstances  on  behalf 
of  Germany,  and  even  when  she  was  obviously  working 
at  her  scheme  of  invasion  of  northern  France,  a  fact 
which  most  German  writers  now  admit.  The  arguments 
of  the  friends  of  Jaures  were  that  the  people  east  of  the 
Rhine  would  never  dare  to  incur  the  moral  opprobrium 
that  would  fall  upon  them  were  they  to  carry  out  the 
purpose  ascribed  to  them. 

Prussian  leaders  have  never  been  very  considerate 
for  the  rights  of  neutrals.  When,  in  1856,  the  Prussians 
sought  a  pretext  to  fight  Switzerland  they  wished  very 
much  to  go  through  Baden,  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  Nassau. 
Bismarck  was  incensed  because  Austria  supported  these 
states  in  opposing  the  transit  of  Prussian  troops  through 
their  territories.^  Then  he  went  upon  what  he  called  "  a 
simple  holiday  trip  of  pleasure "  to  France,  but  what 
in  reality  was  intended  to  secure  from  Napoleon  III 
"  the  permission  to  allow  Prussian  troops  to  cross  Alsace 
and  Lorraine,  but  the  French  Emperor  declined,  as  that 
would  arouse  too  much  feeling  in  France."  "  The  cam- 
paign contemplated  toward  the  Canton  of  Neuchatel  was 
as  outrageous  as  that  against  the  Duchies. 

In  a  similar  way  the  Germans  planned  to  reach  France 
by  first  invading  Belgium.  We  know  now  how  they  have 
dared  to  do  it,  how  they  have  burned  Louvain,  Dinant, 
Ypres,  committed  nameless  atrocities,  shot  innocent  men 
in  presence  of  wife  and  children,  executed  priests  with- 
out any  form  of  judgment,  laid  waste  a  country  culti- 
vated like  a  garden,  destroyed  most  means  of  livelihood, 
requisitioned    foodstuffs,    subjected    the    population    to 

'  Lowe,  vol.  I,  p.  217. 

*  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  vol.  II,  p.  43. 


I70        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

war  exactions  worthy  of  a  barbaric  age  and  destroyed 
venerable  institutions  of  a  region  historically  as  interest- 
ing as  classic  lands.  Some  of  the  worst  insults  to  the 
good  sense  of  the  civilized  world  are  statements  like 
the  following,  from  a  Harvard  professor,  "  Belgium  chose 
to  put  itself  on  the  side  of  France."  ^  According  to  this 
writer  there  were  only  two  sides,  the  German  and  the 
French.  He  did  not  think  of  a  third  alternative,  the 
pledged  duty  of  remaining  neutral.  Again,  "  Germany 
did  not  come  to  Belgium  as  an  enemy."  What  would 
Germany  have  done  that  she  did  not  do,  had  she  come 
as  an  enemy  ?  "  Germany  could  do  this  with  a  clear 
conscience ;  it  did  not  violate  the  higher  laws  of  honor."  ^ 
Not  satisfied  with  statements  which  betray  an  ineradi- 
cable moral  color  blindness,  the  author  hints  at  the 
duplicity  of  the  Allies,  suggests  that  the  Belgians  were 
in  league  with  them  prior  to  the  invasion.  What  could 
have  been  their  motives  for  so  doing?  What  gains 
could  they  have  made?  We  are  not  told.  His  proofs 
are  like  the  celebrated  rocher  de  bronze  of  King  Fred- 
erick William  and  of  the  Kaiser.  A  rocher  de  bronze 
is  something  like  "  German  Silver,"  like  "  Hamburg 
steak,"  like  "  German  Delft  "  something  ungenuine.  "  It 
was  reported,"  he  says,  "  that  fifty  automobiles,"  etc. 
Reported,  by  whom?  Reported  when ?  Reported  where ? 
Again,  "Everything  suggested  that."  ^  What  thing? 
To  people  of  singular  historic  misfortunes  we  should 
not  offer  German  Tartufe-casuistry.  We  owe  them  re- 
spect and  truth. 

Similarly  they  invaded  Luxemburg  early  in  the  mom- 

'  Miinsterberg,  Op.  cit.,  p.  182. 
"Ibid.,  p.  185. 
•P.  181. 


GERMANY,  BELGIUM  AND  ENGLAND    171 

ing  of  August  2,  that  is,  more  than  thirty-six  hours 
before  the  declaration  of  war  by  Germany  upon  France. 
The  pretext  here,  as  in  Belgium,  was  that  France  had 
previously  invaded  the  Duchy.  The  French  Premier 
showed  the  untenableness  of  such  an  assertion  in  his 
protestation  to  Berlin.  France,  far  from  moving  forward 
into  others'  territories,  was  keeping  her  troops  at  a 
distance  of  ten  kilometers  from  the  frontier.  She  had 
so  well  shown  her  intention  of  respecting  the  neutrality 
and  the  integrity  of  Luxemburg  that  she  tore  up  the 
railroad  on  her  side  leading  there.^  With  Belgium 
similar  German  acts  and  similar  German  pretexts.  Even 
before  reaching  Brussels,  the  Germans  reiterated  that 
they  had  proofs  of  Belgium's  agreement  to  have  England 
and  France  invade  the  country,  but  why  did  they  not 
give  those  proofs  to  the  public?  They  ransacked  the 
archives  in  Brussels  and  found  some  correspondence 
which  they  considered  as  incriminating  Belgium,  but  it 
merely  served  to  show  that  their  evidence  is  a  good  deal 
like  that  of  the  Harvard  professor.  This  gentleman  has 
also  taxed  our  credulity  by  telling  us  that  the  atrocities 
of  German  soldiers  in  Belgium — those  in  France  had  not 
taken  place  as  yet — were  only  "  hallucinatory  phenom- 
ena." ^  The  destruction  of  Tirlemont,  Termonde  and 
Louvain,  according  to  him,  were  delusions  of  the  Allies. 
It  is  remarkable  what  a  great  German  psychologist  can 
see !  It  is  no  wonder  that  the  healthy,  honest  and  ener- 
getic Belgians  dreaded  to  see  such  things  and  to  be 
compelled  by  German  science  to  see  them  like  that. 

Their  manly  courage  has  excited  the  admiration  of 
the  world.    What  will  be  the  future  of  that  noble  land? 

'  Lc  Temps,  April  7,  1915. 
=  Ibid.,  p.  177- 


172        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Will  she  be  allowed  to  restore  her  crumbled  homes  and 
to  resume  her  normal  life  so  brutally  wrecked  by  her 
soulless  conqueror?  That  will  depend  upon  the  success 
or  failure  of  the  friends  of  that  state.  In  the  case  of 
their  success,  will  the  boundaries  remain  where  they 
have  been  since  Leopold  I  ?  It  is  well  known  that  there 
is  a  part  of  the  country  east  of  the  province  of  Liege 
which  is  Walloon  and  given  to  Prussia  by  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna.  Many  foreigners  have  suggested  that  this  terri- 
tory might  be  restored  to  her  former  owner,  but  the 
Belgians  are  far  from  wishing  to  increase  the  German 
elements  among  them,  and  doubtless  would  oppose  such 
an  annexation.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  Belgium,  formerly 
able  to  take  care  of  255  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilo- 
meter when  the  Germans  complain  with  their  120  per 
square  kilometer,  will  soon  be  able  to  resume  her  former 
life,  restore  her  ruined  institutions,  live  again  her  strenu- 
ous and  progressive  history  and  call  forth  in  a  greater 
degree  still  the  admiration  of  mankind. 


XIV 

THE   REAL   ATTITUDE   OF   FRANCE 

We  have  endeavored  to  reduce  German  calumnies 
against  French  alHes  to  nought.  It  is  time  to  show  that 
France  also  has  been  treated  in  a  similar  manner. 
As  far  as  the  German  charges  of  belligerency  on  her 
part  during  the  last  forty-four  years  are  concerned,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  she  was  absorbed  to  the  ut- 
most by  her  burning  political  and  social  problems  when 
the  people  were  asking  themselves  anxiously,  Shall  we 
have  a  republic  or  a  monarchy  ? — a  liberal  or  a  socialistic 
Republic? — absorbed  by  colonial  expeditions,  those  of 
Madagascar,  of  Indo-China  and  by  the  effects  of  the 
Panic  of  Langson ; — absorbed  by  the  reform  of  her  educa- 
tion, having  to  decide  whether  it  should  be  free,  broad, 
lay  and  republican  or  otherwise ; — absorbed  by  the  Drey- 
fus question,  when  the  nation  seemed  hopelessly  divided 
over  a  question  of  practical  justice; — absorbed  when 
she  attempted  to  free  herself  from  monastic  forces  that 
were  tending  to  stifle  her  freedom; — absorbed  by  the 
gigantic  task  of  the  separation  of  Church  and  State, 
when  the  relations  that  had  so  long  existed  between  these 
two  institutions  were  torn  by  their  very  roots ; — absorbed 
by  all  these  issues  and  reforms  which  evoked  the  deepest 
passions  and  most  dangerous  enthusiasms.  How,  under 
these  circumstances,  could  the  French  have  thought  of 
waging  war  upon  their  mighty  neighbor?  Would  a 
sensible  people  have  dared  so  to  do,  even  if  that  had  been 

173 


174        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

their  aim?  Again,  their  economic  interests  were  on  the 
side  of  peace.  "  We  produce  on  a  small  scale,"  says 
V.  Berard,  "  but  handsomely,  not  for  the  human  beast, 
but  for  the  civilized  man;  the  progress  of  our  wealth 
is  bound  up  with  that  of  civiHzation."  ^ 

Their  industrial  products  are  mostly  for  the  better 
classes,  so  that  their  fine  goods  and  their  financial  in- 
vestments demand  peace  for  their  best  returns.  France 
was  therefore  held  to  a  pacific  policy  by  all  her  most 
vital  interests.  All  possible  evidences  of  national  tend- 
encies point  in  a  similar  direction.  When,  in  1907,  the 
Petit  Parisien  had  a  plebiscite  which  called  forth  15,000,- 
000  votes  upon  the  greatest  Frenchman,  the  highest  place 
was  not  given  to  a  warrior  but  to  a  scientist  who  ever 
preached  peace — Pasteur.  The  second  was  awarded  to 
Victor  Hugo — the  poet  who,  in  his  best  days,  exalted 
peace — while  Napoleon  came  only  fourth.  Another 
paper  by  the  same  process  asked,  "  Who  are  the  great 
men  not  yet  in  the  Pantheon  ? "  The  men  designated 
were  Pasteur,  Gambetta,  Thiers,  Parmentier,  Curie, 
Denfert-Rochereau,  Savorgnan  de  Brazza,  Alexandre 
Dumas  and  Lamartine.  The  only  soldier  in  this  list 
was  Denfert-Rochereau,  the  heroic  defender  of  Belfort. 
The  writer  does  not  produce  these  names  as  represent- 
ing "  the  greatest  Frenchmen  "  or  those  worthy  to  have 
above  them  the  beautiful  inscription,  "  Aux  grands 
hommes  la  patrie  reconnaissante,"  but  as  indicating  the 
peace  ideals  of  the  voters. 

There  were  many  causes  at  work  for  peace.     Those, 

even,  who  are  least  favorable  to  pacifism  must  admit  that 

idealistic   sympathies   for  judicial   ways   of   settling  fhe 

difficulties    of    nations    indicate    unfriendliness    to   war. 

*  La  France  et  Guillaume  II,  p.  89. 


THE  REAL  ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE      175 

Temperance  people  do  not  open  saloons  to  promote  the 
non-alcoholic  regime.  Orthodox  religious  people  do  not 
encourage  radical  religious  teachings  to  promote  con- 
servative religion  and  traditional  faith.  A  people  that 
outwardly  has  risen  above  aggressive  militant  feelings 
to  rational  ethics  that  proclaim  the  bankruptcy  of  war 
is  more  likely  to  be  peace-loving  than  one  that  protests 
that  war  is  "  moral,"  that  it  is  an  agent  of  justice  and  an 
historic  necessity.  That  is  the  case  with  France  as  com- 
pared with  Germany.  France,  following  Enfantin,  said, 
"If  you  want  peace  prepare  for  peace,"  while  Germany 
has  clung  to  the  old  Latin  irrational  motto.  Si  vis  pacem, 
para  bellum — in  other  words,  if  you  want  a  railroad  build 
a  canal.  The  attitude  of  Enfantin's  country  is  in  keeping 
with  her  ancient  traditions.  It  is  needless  to  lay  much 
stress  upon  the  great  scheme  of  peace  of  Sully  ^  and 
of  Henry  IV,  of  the  teachings  of  the  Abbe  de  Saint- 
Pierre,  of  the  utterances  of  Voltaire  and  of  Madame  de 
Stael,  or  the  eloquent  protestations  against  war  of  En- 
fantin and  its  sublime  condemnations  by  Victor  Hugo. 
France  has  been  led  by  her  idealism  to  enter  into  every 
movement  that  made  men  just  and  on  that  account 
lessened  the  frequency  of  war.  She  has  been  largely 
represented  at  every  international  gathering  that  made 
for  peace.  Judge  Holls  has  praised  the  great  services 
rendered  at  The  Hague  by  ]\I.  Leon  Bourgeois,  by  Pro- 
fessor Louis  Renault  of  the  Paris  Law  School,  and  by 
Baron  d'Estournelles  de  Constant. 

At  the  two  conferences  French  delegates  joined  with 
everyone  who  endeavored  to  stem  the  tide  of  inter- 
national wranglings.    They  were  as  earnest  and  as  active 

'  The  Great  Design  of  Henry  IV,  with  an  introduction  by 
Edwin  D.  Mead. 


176        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

at  the  international  peace  congresses  in  different  parts 
of  the  world  as  in  their  national  congresses  at  home. 
They  honored  at  the  Academy  of  Moral  and  Political 
Sciences  as  well  as  at  the  Sorbonne  Frederic  Passy,  the 
most  distinguished  pacifist  of  France,  the  courageous 
prophet  of  better  relations  among  men,  the  economist 
who  insisted  that  by  the  play  of  economic  and  ideal 
forces  the  reign  of  international  peace  would  come, 
that  the  Utopia  of  the  ideal  would  be  realized.  "  L'utopie 
est  le  rcve  d'aiijourd'hui  et  la  realite  de  dcmain."  They 
honored  one  of  the  noblest  sons  of  France  because  he 
voiced  her  highest  aims  and  her  hopes.  The  strength  of 
the  pacifist  movement  may  be  measured  by  the  violent 
utterances  of  the  militarists.  The  reading  of  the  address 
of  the  eminent  Catholic  educator,  Pere  Didon,  on  July  20, 
1898,  shows  the  power  of  the  ideas  which  he  combated.^ 
All  the  great  national  organizations  were  pledged  to 
peace  by  judicial  and  not  by  martial  methods.  The  ideal 
of  most  of  them  was :  la  paix  par  le  droit.  All  the  men 
who  joined  Waldeck-Rousseau,  Briand  and  Jaures  as 
the  mouthpiece  and  leaders  of  Socialism  were  equally 
decided  against  militarism,  armaments  and  war.  This 
was  an  essential  part  of  their  programme.  Can  the  Ger- 
mans point  to  a  movement  in  France  similar  to  that  of 
Bismarck,  his  alliances  and  his  Berlin  Congress  that  were 
war  machines?  Can  they  show  in  France  anything  like 
the  Navy  League  of  Germany  with  its  millions  of  mem- 
bers and  with  a  paper.  Die  Flotte,  having  a  circulation 
of  over  one-third  of  a  million  ?  ^  Can  they  suggest  any- 
thing which  corresponds  to  the  push  of  the  Colonial 
Society    or   to    the    Pan-Germanists?     The    Ligue    des 

*  Le  Temps. 

*  Barker,  J.  Ellis,  Modern  Germany,  p.  235. 


THE  REAL  ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE      177 

pairiotes  was  never  more  than  a  loud-talking  and  parad- 
ing society.  In  a  dozen  of  the  best  books,  written  by 
Americans  and  by  Englishmen,  discussing  contemporary 
France  there  is  not  a  single  reference  to  it.  The  leading 
societies  of  France,  whatever  else  they  were,  were  paci- 
fistic.    Hence  the  policy  of  a  virtual  disarmament. 

The  term  of  military  service  was  reduced,  after  1870, 
from  seven  years  to  three,  arid  in  1900  from  three  to 
two.  General  Gallieni  told  the  writer  shortly  before 
the  war  that  he  had  been  consulted  by  the  Government 
about  the  possibility  of  reducing  their  service  further  to 
one  year.  Within  a  brief  period,  the  military  drill  of 
reservists  was  shortened  from  sixty-nine  days  to  forty- 
nine.  The  Minister  of  War,  a  pacifist  like  the  rest  of  the 
Cabinet,  managed  for  some  time  to  keep  the  contingent 
of  men  in  service  to  65  per  cent,  of  legal  requirements. 
Classes  of  men  that  should  normally  have  been  held  in 
the  barracks  were  allowed  to  go  home.  France  not  only 
decreased  her  army,  but  it  was  permeated  by  the  most 
positive  and  extreme  spirit  of  pacifism  and  on  that  ac- 
count hostile  to  any  bellicose  end.  Colonel  Bonysson 
reports  that  one  of  Lis  lieutenants,  addressing  soldiers, 
began  by  saying :  "  I  am  an  anti-militarist."  ^  A  large 
number  of  the  troops  were  not  only  sociaHsts  but  positive 
internationalists.^ 

In  1913,  there  were  military  uprisings  in  Toul  and 
Belfort.^  The  Germans  then  denounced  France  as  a 
unit  of  aggressiveness  and  as  a  hotbed  of  anarchy. 
Whatever  she  was,  she  could  hardly  have  been  both. 
She  was  not  in  the  race  for  armaments;  for  while,  in 

'V,  41,  9SO. 

•  VI,  15,  710. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  712. 


178   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

1870,  her  navy  came  only  second,  now  it  stands  fourth 
or  fifth.^  This  was  not  because  she  lacked  money. 
Under  the  Combes  Cabinet,  Camille  Pelletan,  Minister  of 
the  Navy,  had  the  audacity  to  postpone  indefinitely  the 
building  of  warships  voted  by  the  Parliament.^  Thus 
while  France  was  considering  war  as  an  anachronism, 
as  a  relic  of  barbarism,  was  having  the  principle  of  arbi- 
tration and  conciliation  accepted  by  the  majority  of  her 
people,  Germany  was  idealizing  war,  defending  its  utility 
as  a  force  of  justice  and  was  arming  to  an  extent  only 
now — it  never  was  before — revealed  to  the  world  by  her 
limitless  resources  on  the  battlefield. 

At  last,  but  too  late,  France  woke  up,  and  began  to 
restore  the  three  years'  military  service,  which  was  ac- 
cepted as  a  natural  necessity  by  the  people.  The  Parlia- 
ment voted  $100,000,000  for  armaments  and  for  war 
credits.  It  recognized  that  while  pacifism  is  right,  that 
it  is  the  only  compass  whereby  a  nation  may  steer  its 
ethical  life,  it  is  a  signal  folly  for  a  neighbor  of  a 
mighty  warlike  and  belligerent  Power  to  be  alone  in  dis- 
arming. Thanks  to  the  intelligence  and  patriotism  of 
the  nation  much  was  done  to  regain  lost  time.  The 
world  at  large  may  not  have  given  France  credit  for 
heeding  absolutely  principles  that  seemed  premature,  but 
recognized  her  pacific  and  reasonable  spirit. 

The  leading  nations  of  Europe,  aware  of  the  danger 
that  threatened  that  land,  became  more  sympathetic. 
This  was  especially  true  of  English-speaking  peoples  and 
particularly  of  Great  Britain.  Von  Biilow  recognizes  this 
.evolution.  "  For  many  reasons,"  he  says,  "  English 
public  opinion  is  more  favorable  to  France  than  to  us, 

'  V,  56,  953- 
*  V,  24,  7I£K 


THE  REAL  ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE      179 

for  England  no  longer  looks  upon  her  as  a  rival,  and 
certainly  not  as  a  competitor  at  sea."  ^  Again  we  have 
the  German  monochord  idea,  ever  ascribing  one  motive 
for  an  action  that  may  have  one  hundred,  but  never  giv- 
ing the  most  evident  one.  In  the  same  way  he  deals 
with  France.  The  armaments  are  made  because  of  her 
"  hypersensitive  national  pride  "  or  upon  national  resent- 
ment against  Germany,  "  the  soul  of  French  policy."  ^ 
"  So  far  as  man  can  tell,  the  ultimate  aim  of  French 
policy  for  many  years  to  come  will  be  to  create  the  neces- 
sary conditions,  which  today  are  still  wanting,  for  a 
settlement  with  Germany  with  good  prospects  of  suc- 
cess." ^  Another  interested  calumny,  "  France  would 
attack  us  if  she  thought  she  were  strong  enough."  *  She 
is  a  nation  that  for  "  a  whole  generation  has  cherished 
one  hope  and  one  ideal,"  the  revanche.^  He  expresses  the 
charitable  thought  that  she  will  ruin  herself  in  her  com- 
petition for  armaments.  "  It  is  just  possible,"  he  says, 
"  that  the  effect  of  convulsively  straining  her  mihtary 
resources  to  the  utmost  may,  by  reacting  on  the  economic 
and  social  conditions  of  France,  hasten  the  return  of 
pacific  feelings,  and  that  once  again  the  French 
proverb  may  prove  true,  Que  I'exces  du  mal  amene  la 
gucrison."  ®  When  "  pacific  feelings  "  were  absent  it  was 
because  German  Chancellors,  and  foremost  among  them 
Prince  von  Biilow,  had  done  their  best  to  drive  them 
away.  A  most  certain  fact  is  that  her  armaments  did 
not  precede  but  succeeded  those  of  Germany.     It  was 

'  Op.  cit.,  p.  39. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  84. 

•  Ibid.,  p.   103. 

*  P.   108. 
'  P.  106. 

•  P.  103. 


i8o   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

impossible  for  her  to  do  aught  that  could  compare  with 
the  results  of  a  country  that  had  centered  its  national 
energies  upon  the  production  and  accumulation  of  war 
implements.  Her  people  remained  pacific  and,  as  a 
whole,  pacifistic,  but  the  course  of  Germany  united 
Frenchmen  under  the  sense  of  danger  as  they  never 
had  been.  Their  feelings  were  not  unlike  those  of  forty 
years  ago.  The  old  spirit  of  revanche  which  had  died 
away  was  revived.  The  Alsatian  Question,  considerably 
in  the  background,  came  again  to  the  front.  A  sense  of  a 
deep  German  ill-will  prevailed  and  there  was  the  con- 
viction that  the  mighty  and  remorseless  Goth  was  about 
to  strike,  and  so  he  did. 

France  had  not  only  professed  sound  principles  of 
international  relations  at  home  but  had  practiced  them 
abroad.  In  the  splendid  movement  of  international 
understandings  which  led  the  most  civilized  nations  be- 
tween 1904  and  1910  to  sign  over  one  hundred  treaties 
of  arbitration,  Germany  signed  none,^  but  France  was 
foremost.  She  did  much  to  reconcile  Russia  and  Japan. 
She  herself  drew  nearer  to  the  land  of  the  Mikado  and 
contributed  to  the  rapprochement  and  entente  between 
England  and  Russia  after  having  done  great  things  to 
help  the  settlement  of  the  Dogger  Bank  Anglo-Russian 
incident.  "  There  can  be  no  doubt,"  said  two  English 
writers,  "  that  French  influence  was  largely  responsible 
for  the  gradual  reconciliation  of  England  and  Russia  in 
those  years,  for  the  growth  of  a  feeling  in  both  countries 
that  their  Asiatic  interests,  hitherto  the  main  cause  of  dis- 
putes, were  by  no  means  irreconcilable."  -  She  has  dealt 
with  Italy  and  Spain  so  as  to  win  their  respect  and  their 

'  Muir,  R.,  Op.  cit.,  p.  177. 

*  French  Policy  Since  1870,  Oxford  Pamphlets,  p.  22. 


THE  REAL  ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE      i8i 

friendship.  She  had  no  great  success  in  the  Balkans — 
no  one  of  the  great  Powers  had — but  she  did  all  she  could 
to  prevent  the  first  war,  and  when  it  was  on,  to  prevent 
it  from  bringing  the  whole  of  Europe  into  a  gigantic 
conflict.  M.  Poincare,  then  Prime-minister,  on  the  first 
report  of  a  silent  compact  for  a  war  against  Turkey  by 
the  Balkan  states,  summoned  the  leading  bankers  of 
Paris  to  him  and  urged  them  not  to  lend  the  sinews  for 
an  aggressive  war  even  against  the  Turks.  As  presi- 
dent, he  centered  all  his  efiforts  upon  a  policy  of  peace. 
The  Quai  d'Orsay  sided  with  every  proposal,  even  those 
of  Count  Berchtold,^  that  tended  to  restore  normal  re- 
lations. At  the  London  Conference,  in  conjunction  with 
other  Powers,  she  moved  in  line  with  the  peacemakers, 
humoring  the  Austrians  so  as  to  keep  them  from  the 
Balkan  fray.  When  Europe  was  menaced  with  the 
greatest  catastrophe  of  history,  she  was  one  with  Eng- 
land, Russia  and  Italy  to  try  to  avert  the  nameless  crime 
which  has  soiled  the  escutcheon  of  the  two  Teutonic 
Powers.  In  the  conflict  which  was  forced  upon  her,  she 
deserved  fully  the  judgement  passed  by  the  editor  of  the 
New  York  Evening  Post,  "  The  onlookers  abroad  know 
that  France  has  borne  herself  with  rare  dignity  and  re- 
straint ;  that  her  moral  position  is  clearer  and  more  shin- 
ing than  that  of  any  other  of  the  combatants ;  that  she 
has  revealed  a  fortitude  in  defeat  and  a  resoluteness  to 
succeed  in  the  end  which,  together  with  unexpected 
qualities  of  self-control,  command  the  admiration  of  all 
who  behold  with  unprejudiced  eyes.  The  nation  of 
Lafayette,  of  De  Grasse,  of  Rochambeau,  has  lived  up 
to  its  best."  2 

•  VT.  //,  237. 

*  Villard,  Oswald  Garrison,  Germany  Embattled,  p.  loi. 


XV 

AUSTRIA  AND  THE  GERMAN  PROVOCATION 

Were  the  Austrians  to  hate  France  they  would  not  be 
without  good  reasons  from  some  points  of  view.  One 
of  the  great  services  rendered  by  her  to  Germany  was 
the  weakening  of  the  power  of  the  Hapsburgs.  The 
deliverance  of  Italy  from  its  cruel  rule  was  accomplished 
by  the  co-operation  of  Napoleon  Ill's  soldiers,  who  helped 
to  drive  the  Austrians  from  that  fair  land.  The  work 
done  so  well  and  so  long  by  France  was  continued  by 
Prussia,  practically  driving  out  Austria  from  Germany. 
After  Sadowa,  Austria  was  collecting  her  thoughts.  Bis- 
marck made  efforts  to  attract  her  and  to  prevent  an 
alliance  with  Napoleon  III.  With  his  usual  far-sighted- 
ness after  the  Austrian  defeat,  Bismarck  realized  the  im- 
portance of  Austria  as  an  ally,  and  pleaded  for  gentle 
treatment.  After  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  he  drew  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  as  well  as  the  Emperor  of  Russia  into 
the  Three  Kaiser  League.  Austria,  doomed  to  ultimate 
disruption  on  account  of  the  many  conflicting  ethnic 
elements  within  her  borders  and  feeling  her  insecurity, 
yielded.  The  Iron  Chancellor  had  a  twofold  policy  with 
these  strong  neighbors.  He  wished  to  change  the  course 
of  their  interests.  He  urged  Russia  to  move  eastward,  to 
extend  her  sway  as  far  as  possible  in  Asia,  to  establish 
herself  there  so  as  to  weaken  her  hold  in  the  West. 
This  Bismarckian  policy  was  also  that  of  the  Kaiser,  who 
encouraged  the  Czar  in  the  same  direction.    Four  months 

183 


AUSTRIA  AND  GERMAN  PROVOCATION      183 

after  the  occupation  of  Kiao-Chou,  the  Russians  were 
entering  Port  Arthur,  where  they  were  bound  to  meet 
Japanese  opposition.  The  French  Government  warned 
St.  Petersburg  of  the  grave  danger  of  a  colHsion  with 
the  Empire  of  the  East.  In  a  conversation  with  Presi- 
dent Loubet,  the  Czar  recognized  the  seriousness  of  the 
situation,  and  said  that  never  would  Russia  declare 
war  upon  Japan.^  He  was  sincere  in  his  purpose,  but 
the  force  of  events  was  stronger  than  he.  The  disaster 
of  Port  Arthur  followed,  and  the  policy  of  Germany 
bore  its  intended  fruits.  With  this  came  the  elevation 
of  Japan  to  the  rank  of  a  great  Power. 

As  to  Austria,  now  that  she  had  given  up  her  aspira- 
tions to  the  hegemony  of  German  states,  Bismarck 
wanted  to  prevent  the  return  of  her  former  ambition  and 
also  to  have  her  forget  Sadowa.  Accordingly  he  led  her 
to  give  a  complete  reversal  to  her  traditional  policy  and 
to  try  to  expand  in  the  direction  of  Slavdom.  This 
policy,  if  successful,  would  increase  the  importance 
of  the  Slav  element  in  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  ulti- 
mately might  release  the  German  populations  of  Austria 
and  incorporate  them  into  the  Empire.  For  him  the  true 
goal  for  Austria  was  the  ^gean  Sea,  and  the  ideal  sea- 
port for  her  was  Salonica.  At  the  Berlin  Congress  von 
Moltke  urged  Count  Karoly  to  advise  his  Government  to 
go  to  Salonica.  The  tempter  added,  "  We  will  approve 
you ;  better  still,  we  will  sustain  you."  ^  As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  Ballplatz  did  not  need  these  counsels.  It  had 
long  coveted  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  As  early  as  1867, 
von  Beust  had  his  eyes  turned  toward  those  provinces, 
and  this  had  long  been  known  not  only  in  Berlin  but 

'  Mevil,  Op.  cit.,  p.  79, 
» Ibid^.,  p.  8. 


i84   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

also  in  Saint  Petersburg.^  The  Iron  Chancellor  had 
prepared  everything  before  so  that  the  two  Teutonic 
Powers  should  be  gratified  at  the  Berlin  Congress.  The 
population  of  the  provinces  was  practically  handed  over 
to  Emperor  Francis  Joseph.  Having  been  oppressed  so 
long  by  the  Turks  they  deserved  a  better  fate.  They 
were  denied  the  right  to  live  their  own  national  ideals. 
They  unquestionably  gained  in  the  transfer  by  coming 
under  a  Christian  Power,  but  the  consoHng  prospects  of 
former  days  that  there  were  independence  and  freedom 
ahead  for  them  had  vanished.  Bismarck,  on  the  other 
hand,  demanded  his  pay  for  his  services  in  the  form  of 
an  alliance  by  which  Austria  was  compelled  to  defend 
Germany  in  case  she  were  attacked,  but  the  terms  were 
far  from  reciprocal.^  Many  Austrians,  but  chiefly  the 
Young  Czechs,  were  eloquent  in  their  denunciation  of 
this  agreement.^ 

In  November  1896,  Bismarck,  with  his  usual  cynicism, 
revealed  to  the  world  that,  while  he  had  made  a  treaty 
with  Austria  involving  her  support  of  the  new  German 
Empire  against  the  possible  attacks  of  the  Czar,  he  had 
at  the  same  time  a  secret  treaty  with  Russia,  against 
Austria,  covering  the  same  period.  Why  the  unscrupu- 
lous statesman  made  this  other  startling  revelation  no  one 
can  absolutely  tell.  It  is  thought  by  many  that  he  wished 
to  show  the  Germans  that  in  losing  him  they  had  been 
deprived  of  a  valuable  ally.  He  furthermore  may  have 
wished  to  have  France  doubt  the  sincerity  of  Russia.'* 
Austria,  however,  knew  nothing  of  this  double-dealing.^ 

'  in,  74,  413. 
'  III,  103,  883. 
'  III,  87, 233. 
*  III,  138,  470. 

•  III,  138, 715. 


AUSTRIA  AND  GERMAN  PROVOCATION      185 

Professor  Miinsterberg  accuses  Russia  of  "  playing  a 
double  game  "  of  late.^  That  would  be  natural,  as  the 
Czar  had  so  long  learned  practical  lessons  from  Berlin. 

Then  there  was  the  abrogation  of  Article  V  of  the 
Treaty  of  Prague.  France,  who  in  1866  had  mediated 
between  Prussia  and  Austria,  succeeded  in  having  in- 
serted in  this  treaty  a  clause  whereby  the  inhabitants  of 
Schleswig  should  have  a  vote  to  decide  to  what  country 
the  province  would  belong.  During  twelve  years,  the 
Iron  Chancellor  had  held  that  population  in  subjection 
without  ever  keeping  his  promise.  By  a  preliminary 
treaty,  October  1878,  published  in  February  1879,  the 
two  Powers  abrogated  that  part  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague  - 
and  doomed  the  Danes  of  the  province  to  become  Ger- 
man subjects. 

Meanwhile,  Austria  unquestionably  made  improve- 
ments in  the  Balkan  provinces,  but  left  no  stone  unturned 
to  assimilate  and  Germanize  them.  The  promises  of 
virtual  autonomy  and  of  a  liberal  administration  were 
never  kept.  The  Germanic  elements  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  ever  seeking  preponderance  over  other  races, 
continued  after  the  virtual  protectorate  over  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  In  1908,  the  Austrian  Government  pro- 
ceeded to  annex  the  two  provinces.  Turkey  and  Russia 
protested.  England  practically  did  the  same  thing.  Prince 
von  Billow  sums  up  the  reasons  for  his  militant  attitude 
at  this  time  as  follows :  "  The  antagonistic  policy  of  Eng- 
land seemed  aimed  less  against  Austria  than  against 
Germany,  Austria's  ally.  For  the  first  time,  the  Austro- 
German  Alliance  was  to  prove  its  durability  and  strength 
in  a  grievous  conflict. 

■  Op.  cit.,  p.  72. 
=■  III,  31,  953. 


i86       THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

"  In  my  speeches  in  the  Reichstag,  I  made  it  clear  that 
Germany  was  resolved  to  preserve  her  alliance  with 
Austria  at  any  cost.  The  German  sword  had  been 
thrown  into  the  scale  of  European  decision,  directly  in 
support  of  our  Austro-Hungarian  ally,  indirectly  for  the 
preservation  of  European  peace,  and  above  all  for  the 
sake  of  German  credit  and  the  maintenance  of  our  posi- 
tion in  the  world."  ^  Of  the  right  and  wrong  of  the  case, 
not  a  word,  but,  to  test  the  Alliance  and  for  national 
credit,  he  was  willing  to  plunge  Europe  into  a  war.  No 
one  will  be  deceived  by  his  German  cant  about  "  the 
preservation  of  European  peace,"  which  no  one  disturbed 
except  Austria  and  Germany.  Furthermore  Wilhelm- 
strasse  and  the  Ballplatz  declined  every  proposal  of  a  con- 
ference to  deal  with  this  matter.-  As  we  have  seen, 
Russia  yielded. 

The  Government  of  the  Hapsburgs  laid  its  hands  upon 
the  Serbs  of  the  annexed  provinces.  It  had  previously 
endeavored  to  have  Servia  gravitate  within  the  Austrian 
orbit.  The  wretched  King  Milan  and  his  ill-fated  son 
had  been  used  to  keep  Belgrade  under  Austrian  influence, 
but  all  in  vain.  The  people  on  both  sides  of  the  frontier 
knew  full  well  that  the  Dual  Monarchy  would  not  respect 
them  nor  their  ideals  and  traditions.  After  the  annexa- 
tion Servia,  feeling  that  she  had  been  wrongly  dealt  with, 
assumed  that  she  was  entitled  to  some  compensations, 
toward  the  Adriatic,  and  had  Austria  been  generous  she 
might  have  humored  her,  but  she  did  the  opposite.^  The 
Ballplatz  did  not  object  to  having  Servia  reach  the  ^'gean 
Sea,  for,  in  attempting  so  to  do,  she  would  have  been 

'  Op.  cit.,  p.  63. 
'  V,  49,  234. 
•  VI,  12,  479. 


AUSTRIA  AND  GERMAN  PROVOCATION      187 

crushed  by  the  Turks,  and  then  Austria  would  have  had 
her  opportunity.  It  was  the  Adriatic  that  Servia  needed  ^ 
to  escape  from  her  economic  dependence  on  Austria. 
The  Dual  Monarchy  never  tried,  we  do  not  say  gentle- 
ness, but  fairness,  with  Servia,  and  was  bitterly  opposed 
to  two  essentially  modern  principles  that  govern  the 
political  life  of  the  most  progressive  countries,  first,  the 
rights  of  democracy,  and  second,  the  building  of  a  Govern- 
ment either  upon  the  consensus  of  wills  or  upon  ethno- 
logical affinities.  When,  in  1859,  Prince  Napoleon  had  an 
interview  with  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  to  settle  peace 
conditions,  he  presented  the  French  memorandum  in  the 
following  words,  "  The  Emperor  of  Austria  surrenders 
his  rights  upon  Lombardy  to  the  Emperor  of  the  French, 
who,  according  to  the  wishes  of  the  populations,  trans- 
mits them  to  the  King  of  Sardinia."  The  Austrian  Em- 
peror protested  against  the  clause  which  we  have  itali- 
cized and  said,  "  What  you  call  '  the  wishes  of  the 
populations,'  I  call  revolutionary  rights  w^hich  I  can- 
not admit.  I  only  recognize  the  rights  inserted  in 
treaties.  From  them,  I  possess  Lombardy.  I  am 
willing,  as  a  consequence  of  the  fate  of  arms,  to  sur- 
render my  rights  to  Napoleon,  but  I  cannot  recog- 
nize the  wishes  of  populations  nor  anything  like 
that."  '  According  to  him,  then,  peoples  are  perfectly 
helpless  in  presence  of  the  decisions  of  their  supreme 
owner.  As  a  consequence  the  Dual  Monarchy  holds,  by 
force,  "  seventeen  nationalities."  ^  On  the  other  hand, 
Servia,    notwithstanding   her   limitations,    stands    for  a 

'  VI,  12,  473. 

'  Journal   dc    ma   viission   aupres   dc   I'Empcreur   d'Autriche. 
Revue  dcs  Deux  Maudes,  Aug.  i,  1909,  p.  489. 
*  Le  Temps,  March  3,  1915. 


i88   THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

modern  principle,  the  rights  of  those  that  are  governed. 
As  a  rule  she  modestly  asserted  her  claims  to  existence 
and  her  wishes  to  open  the  door  wide  to  her  kinsmen. 
At  the  London-Balkan  Conference  she  showed  an  ad- 
mirable spirit,  placing  her  case  in  the  hands  of  the 
Powers,^  while  her  opponent  was  the  only  aggressive 
nation. 

Austria,  in  the  south  of  Europe,  land-locked  on  all 
sides,  without  a  seaport  except  Trieste,  which  remains  a 
part  of  Italia  Irredenta  and  an  object  of  Italian  de- 
sires, was  unsatisfied.  That  she  should  by  loyal  means 
have  sought  a  way  south  either  by  Avlona  to  the  Adri- 
atic, or  by  Salonica  to  the  ^gean  Sea,  would  have  had 
the  approval  of  all  liberal-minded  men.  The  difficulty 
with  Avlona  was  that  the  Italians  desired  it  also,  and  that 
at  best  any  seaport  in  the  Adriatic  was  practically  bottled 
up  by  Italy.  By  an  act  of  able  and  frank  diplomacy, 
Austria  years  ago  could  have  worked  her  way  to  Salonica. 
The  Murzsteg  Agreement  between  Russia  and  Austria, 
in  1903,  might  by  its  condominium  have  paved  the  way 
for  such  a  consummation.  Mutual  concessions  of  the  two 
Powers  involved  might  have  secured  that  end.  A  nation 
of  50,000,000  of  inhabitants  should  have  its  own  free 
broad  access  to  the  waterways  of  the  world.  Her  efforts 
to  realize  this  desideratum  came  too  late,  and  the  methods 
employed  were  arrogant  and  dishonest.  After  the  occu- 
pation of  the  Sanjak  of  Novibazar  by  Montenegro  and 
Servia,  the  accepted  time  had  passed.  The  way  to 
Salonica  was  blocked.  Hence  the  greater  earnestness  not 
to  let  Avlona  escape — Avlona,  one  of  the  finest  natural 
harbors  of  the  Mediterranean. 

For  years,  Austria  had,  by  her  missionaries  and  by 
"  VI,  12,  955. 


AUSTRIA  AND  GERMAN  PROVOCATION      189 

other  agencies,  attempted  to  penetrate  Albania.  Every- 
thing that  could  be  done  was  tried  to  secure  a  great  in- 
fluence there,  but  Italy  was  watching  and  made  it  a 
matter  of  important  parleys  with  Vienna.  The  agree- 
ment reached  by  the  two  Powers  was  that  neither  of  them 
would  lay  their  hands  upon  Albania  and  that  both  of 
them  would  exclude  others  from  the  coveted  land.^ 
Austria  and  Italy,  sustained  by  Germany,  considered  that 
if  their  scheme  as  to  Albania  succeeded,  it  was  important 
that  that  kingdom  should  be  as  large  as  possible  as  a 
field  of  Austro-Italian  influence.  If  the  program 
failed,  both  countries  would  claim  the  fragments — the 
larger  the  better.^  In  either  case  Austria  wished  to  keep 
her  own  way  clear  along  the  Adriatic  while  still  clinging 
to  the  forlorn  hope  of  the  -^Egean  Sea  through  Servia. 
During  the  Balkan  war  she  assembled  an  enormous  army 
on  her  southern  frontier  and  showed  her  impatience  to 
move  ahead.  When  the  Powers  were  asked  by  Russia 
for  a  pledge  that  they  would  keep  the  peace  in  this  cam- 
paign, Austria  refused  to  give  hers.^  Count  Berchtold 
again  and  again  stated  that  she  "  reserved  to  herself 
the  defense  of  her  interests."  *  He  maintained  the  liberty 
of  fighting  if  it  was  for  his  advantage,  or  of  sharing  the 
Balkan  spoils,  and  above  all  he  was  not  wilHng  to  commit 
himself  to  the  policy  accepted  by  all  the  great  Powers 
when  they  promised  to  make  no  territorial  extension, 
to  live  up  to  what  they  called  "  the  pohcy  of  territorial 
disinterestedness."  He  was  satisfied  with  the  prolonga- 
tion of  the  war,  because  it  would  weaken  the  Balkan 

'  VI,  12,  474. 

*vi.  77,475. 

•  VI,  //,  958. 

*  VI,  12,  240,  471. 


I90        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

peoples  that  stood  in  Austria's  path.^  He  encouraged 
Bulgaria  to  resist  the  legitimate  claims  of  Servia,  bring- 
ing about  the  war  against  Greece  and  her  ally.  He 
similarly  acted  at  Bucharest  to  conciliate  Rumania.  He 
wished  to  break  the  Balkan  alliance,  he  did  break  it,  but 
in  it  Rumania  took  the  place  of  Bulgaria,  and  the  alliance 
continued.  Then  there  was  the  miserable  affair  of 
Prochaska,  the  Austrian  Consul  in  Servia,  and  his  scan- 
dalous attempts  to  blackmail  the  Servians  so  as  to  create 
a  casus  helli.^  Independent  judges  found  in  such  acts  an 
explanation  of  the  gigantic  army  which  Emperor  Joseph 
kept  along  the  Servian  frontier,  and  of  his  purpose.^ 
Austria  was  ready  at  any  instant  to  fall  upon  the  Servians 
or  the  Montenegrins  if  they  dared  to  cross  her  pros- 
pective designs.  She  was,  as  already  said,  the  cause  of 
the  second  Balkan  war.  In  the  compact  of  the  Balkan 
allies,  they  had  agreed  to  a  partition  of  conquered  terri- 
tories on  the  assumption  that  no  European  Power  would 
interfere;  but,  now,  as  Austria  had  prevented  Servia 
from  having  her  hypothetical  share,  she  demanded — and 
rightly  too,  if  we  admit  these  principles  of  territorial  par- 
tition— to  have  a  revision  of  the  agreement.  At  the 
moment  of  hesitation  Count  Berchtold  advised  Bulgaria 
not  to  yield,  and  she  did  not.  War  followed,  an  Austrian- 
Balkan  war  by  proxy.  When  King  Ferdinand  was  de- 
feated Vienna  and  Rome  threatened  to  interfere  to  pro- 
tect the  treacherous  aggressors.* 

During  the  London  Conference  Austria  did  not  become 
more  pacific.     Her  belligerent  purpose  seemed   firmer. 

'  VI,  12,  713. 

*  VI,  13,  237. 
»VI,  13,  22,7. 

*  VI,  16,  718. 


AUSTRIA  AND  GERMAN  PROVOCATION      191 

That  she  wanted  a  clash  with  Servia  seemed  more  and 
more  evident.  Sig.  GioHtti  at  a  very  important  sitting  in 
the  ItaHan  Chamber,  early  in  December,  1914,  created  a 
violent  commotion  by  an  important  communication.  The 
disclosure  which  he  made  was  that  during  the  second 
Balkan  war  Austria  intended  to  crush  Servia.  During  this 
period,  on  August  9,  1913,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano 
had  sent  a  dispatch  to  his  colleague  reading  as  follows : 
"  Austria  informs  us,  as  well  as  Germany,  of  her  in- 
tention to  act  against  Servia,  and  declares  that  such  a 
step  on  her  side  could  only  be  considered  as  defensive. 
She  hopes  to  make  the  casus  faderis  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance work,  but  I  think  this  cannot  be  made  applicable 
under  present  circumstances."  No  reasonable  doubt  can 
be  entertained  now  that  at  the  same  time  Rumania  was 
informed  of  the  aggressive  purpose  of  Austria  against 
Servia.^  The  Government  of  Bucharest  took  the  same 
stand  as  that  of  Rome."  Austria's  mobilization  seemed 
plausible  so  long  as  the  Serbians  had  not  given  up  their 
purpose  to  have  a  foothold  upon  the  Adriatic,  but  after- 
ward she  did  not  dismiss  one  man.  How  can  that  be 
explained  on  the  basis  of  a  peaceful  purpose?  At  the 
London  Conference,  the  Powers  made  concessions,  even 
against  their  better  judgment,  to  prevent  her  from  ag- 
gressive action.  She  asked  that  the  Servian  territory 
should  not  reach  the  Adriatic,  it  was  granted.  She  de- 
manded the  independence  of  Albania,  an  independence 
which  its  people  did  not  desire,  it  was  granted.  She  made 
gigantic  exertions  to  have  Ipek,  Prizrend  and  Diakova 
included  in  this  fictitious  state,  but  while  she  failed  in 
that  she  succeeded  in  maintaining  Scutari  in  it.     She 

'  Le  Temps,  Jan.  10,  191 5. 
^  Ibid.,  Jan.  27,  1915. 


192        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

took  the  initiative  of  a  naval  demonstration.^  Its  pur- 
pose was  not  doubtful,  but  its  obviously  dangerous  char- 
acter was  eliminated  by  having  other  Powers  take  part 
in  it.  In  the  matter  of  Scutari,  she  wanted  to  use  force 
against  King  Nicholas,  demanding  that  he  relinquish  it, 
but  the  Powers  settled  it  by  diplomatic  action.^  She 
antagonized  the  Servians  at  every  point.  Their  legitimate 
ambition  to  reach  the  sea  was  foiled,  while  her  pet  scheme 
to  create  an  Albanian  state  was  carried  out,  to  prove  a 
most  humiliating  failure. 

'  VI,  13,  235. 
''Ibid.,  473. 


XVI 
THE  INITIATORS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

The  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  under 
Austria  had  the  benefit  of  a  government  that  could  not  but 
be  an  improvement  upon  that  of  the  Porte,  but  they  did 
not  enjoy  self-government.  They  were  treated  as  the 
Italians  had  been,  in  an  oppressive  way  and  as  conquered 
peoples.  The  national  attainments  of  Servia  in  various 
ways  and  her  recent  victories  made  the  Serbs  of  these 
provinces  proud.  They  naturally  enough  wished  to  be 
united  with  the  Serb  family  politically  represented  by 
Servia.  It  would  be  impossible  to  prevent  a  certain 
agitation  among  such  a  population  and  to  banish  proselyt- 
ing. A  people  like  this,  largely  kept  by  themselves,  de- 
spised by  haughty  masters  indifferent  to  their  interests 
and  their  aims,  could  not  but  be  hostile  to  their  oppress- 
ors. There,  as  in  all  countries  under  similar  circum- 
stances, the  Tugendhund  in  Germany  in  1808,  and  the 
Carbonari  in  Italy,  secret  societies  were  working  in  con- 
cealment to  secure  justice  refused  to  them  openly,  and 
which  could  not  be  obtained  in  any  other  manner.  It 
would  have  been  impossible  to  cut  off  Servia  from  sym- 
pathetic touch,  and  from  social  co-operation,  with  these 
peoples.  Fear  could  not  be  a  permanent  barrier.  One 
can  no  more  crush  these  deep  national  desires  and  long- 
ings by  force  of  arms  than  eradicate,  by  the  same  means, 
their  language  and  their  religion. 

Austria  was  bitterly  disappointed  with  the  Bulgaro- 

193 


194        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Turkish  Treaty  ^  and  perhaps  even  more  so  with  the 
Treaty  of  Bucharest.  She  displayed  her  insincerity  to 
the  extent  of  objecting  to  it  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a 
violation  of  the  terms  of  the  Berlin  Congress.  Her 
friends  disregarded  them  in  1886  -  and  she  herself  had 
been  the  flagrant  delinquent  in  that  respect  by  annexing 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.^  She  blamed  Servia  for  most 
of  her  own  failures,  for  only  a  war  that  would  have 
shattered  the  Belgrade  Government  and  opened  the  way 
to  Salonica  would  have  satisfied  the  belligerent  clique 
of  Vienna.  She  was  hostile  to  her  nominal  Serb  sub- 
jects, who  generously  retaliated.  The  contempt  for  these 
jnen,  voiced  in  many  ways,  expressed  itself  in  most  of 
the  schools.  In  some  of  them  the  language  against  the 
Servians  exceeded  all  measure.  Feelings  ran  high,  es- 
pecially among  the  young.  Borne  onward  by  the  sense 
of  injustice  and  outrage,  thousands  of  young  people 
were  ready  to  give  their  lives  to  avenge  the  wrongs  done 
to  Servia  and  to  themselves.  The  Austrians  were  not 
calmer.  Having  been  baffled  all  along,  they  had  ex- 
pected to  secure  a  footing  in  Servia  during  the  two 
wars.  Then  they  had  some  hope  of  penetrating  by 
means  of  a  Roman  Catholic  protectorate  over  Servia,  that 
is,  to  be  made  the  custodians  of  Catholics  in  that  Ortho- 
dox country.  Here  again  the  Ballplatz  men  missed  their 
mark.  The  Vatican  signed  a  Concordat  with  Servia 
regulating  the  affairs  of  the  Church  in  that  country.  This 
added  to  the  Austrian  anger.  The  Archduke  Ferdinand 
was  known  as  an  anti-Serb.  He  was  going  south  to 
direct  Austrian  maneuvers  close  to  the  country  to  which 

•  VI,  17,  716. 
'  III,  72,  234. 

'  VI,  16,  955. 


INITIATORS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR       195 

he  was  hostile.  This  was  enough  to  make  him  the  butt 
of  the  murderous  aims  of  Bosnian  avengers.  The  prince 
and  his  wife  lost  their  lives  in  the  city  of  Serajevo,  June 
2^,  1914.  The  violence  of  the  Serbs  was  more  than 
matched  by  that  of  the  Austrians.^ 

Notwithstanding  the  inquiries  and  explanations  of  Bel- 
grade, the  repeated  assertions  of  its  Government  that  it 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  events  of  the  Bosnian  capital 
and  that  it  was  ready  to  punish  any  of  its  subjects,  a 
party  to  the  crime,  the  Ballplatz  remained  mute  as  death. 
What  could  Servia  have  gained  by  such  a  monstrous 
act?  It  was  cruel  to  let  this  painful  period  of  suspension 
oppress  those  who  had  so  many  reasons  to  fear.  The 
pretext  so  long  sought  for  the  invasion  of  Servia  had 
come  at  last.  Mr.  Oswald  Garrison  Villard,  in  his  re- 
markable book,  Germany  Embattled,  says,  "  It  is  beyond 
all  question  that  the  Austrian  military  party  sought  war 
with  Servia  not  once,  but  three  times,  and  finally  brought 
it  about,  thanks  to  the  Archduke's  assassination."  -  We 
would  say  that  for  a  long  time  the  ravenous  wolves 
of  Vienna  were  constantly  watching  for  an  opportunity. 
Now  circumstances  seemed  favorable.  The  representa- 
tives of  most  Governments  were  away.  The  nations  of 
the  Entente  were  harassed  by  vexatious  problems, 
finances  in  Russia,  thz  Irish  question  in  Great  Britain,  the 
Caillaux  excitement  in  France,  and  the  labor  difficulties 
in  all  of  them.  This  seemed  for  her  the  time  to  strike. 
Therefore,  she  sent  the  famous,  or  infamous,  ultimatum 
so  much  in  keeping  with  her  ways.  After  the  settlement 
of  the  Balkan  conflicts,  the  Albanians  attacked  the 
Servians  in  their  territories.     They  were  defeated,  and 

'  VI,  2^,  470. 
=  P.  164. 


196        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

in  their  retreat  they  were  pursued  by  the  Servians,  who 
then  occupied  insignificant  parts  of  the  fictitious  Albania, 
and  made  the  statement  that  this  was  temporary. 
Austria,  without  consulting  the  Powers,  sent  Servia  an 
ultimatum  to  leave  the  occupied  points  within  eight  days.^ 
She  acted  in  the  same  way  with  Greece  in  reference  to 
Epirus.^  When  Prince  von  Wied  went  to  Albania  he 
seemed  the  agent  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  rather  than  that 
of  the  Powers.^ 

The  fatal  ultimatum  of  July  2^,  1914,  was  the  cul- 
minating point  in  the  unreasonable  course  of  Austria,  and 
was  calculated  to  bring  war,  and  war  it  did  bring.^  It 
had  been  prepared  by  Count  Tisza,  the  Hungarian  states- 
man, more  Austrian  in  his  foreign  politics  than  the  most 
Chauvinistic  Austrian,  by  Count  Forgach,  the  former 
Minister  to  Servia,  celebrated  for  the  Fried jung  for- 
geries, and  by  Tchirschky,  the  German  Ambassador,^ 
but  it  was  a  virtual  repetition  of  a  similar  message  sent 
to  the  King  of  Sardinia  in  1859.  This  also  accused  Sar- 
dinia of  being  the  home  of  conspirators  and  assassins.* 
In  this  document,  probably  sketched  before  the  tragedy 
of  Serajevo,  Austria  boldly  asserted  the  guilt  of  Servia 
without  giving  any  fair  and  adequate  evidence.  She  con- 
demned Servia's  anti-Austrian  tendencies,  but  this  little 
country  could  have  turned  the  tables  upon  Austria  on 
reciprocal  grounds.  The  charges  were  in  themselves  acts 
of  international  discourtesy.  The  acts  of  the  Serbs 
under  Austria  and  of  the  Servians  were  manifestations 

'  VI,  18,  237. 
'  VI,  18,  473. 

*  VI,   22,   240. 

*  VI,  22,   711. 

"  Le  Tevips,  Jan.  29,  1915. 

*  The  Thnes,  July  30,  1914. 


INITIATORS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR       197 

of  public  opinion  that  no  country,  except  Austria,  would 
have  attempted  to  stop.  The  accusations  against  Servian 
officials  were  merely  the  assertions  of  Austrian  agents 
that  had  nothing  judicial  in  them.  Among  other  things 
she  demanded  the  suppression  in  Servia  of  anything 
hostile  to  her  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
This  would  have  been  like  the  Germans  demanding  in 
France  the  suppression  of  papers  hostile  to  their  pos- 
session of  Alsace.  She  enjoined  the  dissolution  of  the 
Narodna  Odhrana,  the  removal  from  the  army  of  anyone 
implicated  in  the  Bosnian  agitation  of  the  Serajevo 
murder,  and  the  acceptance  of  "  agents  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  in  the  suppression  of  the  sub- 
versive movement  directed  against "  Austria,  etc.  The 
Ballplatz  gave  Belgrade  just  forty-eight  hours  to  answer 
this  humiliating  order.  The  difficulties  for  the  friends  of 
peace  were  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  ultimatum 
was  communicated  to  the  Powers  only  twenty-four  hours 
after  it  was  sent  to  the  Servian  Government.  When  the 
document  was  received,  one  of  the  ambassadors  asked 
that  the  time  be  extended,  but  the  Austrian  official 
answered  that  the  note  to  the  Powers  was  only  for  their 
information,  and  that  the  question  was  exclusively  a 
matter  between  the  Dual  ^Monarchy  and  Servia.  Con- 
scious of  the  strength  of  the  Triplice,  he  practically  said 
to  the  Powers,  "  Hands  off !  "  There  was  in  Vienna  the 
usual  diplomatic  cant  about  having  sufficient  territory 
and  coveting  none — the  usual  formula  of  all  land  grabbers 
in  all  countries.  We  know  what  that  means.  There  has 
not  been,  in  recent  times,  such  an  unscrupulous  and 
arrogant  proceeding. 

The  poor  Servians,  poor  at  the  outset,  impoverished  by 
two  wars,  were  in  a  most  trying  position.    The  ultimatum 


198        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

would  tolerate  no  delay,  and  their  answer  must  be  yes 
or  no.  In  either  case  their  independence  seemed  in 
hopeless  danger.  They  were  conciliatory  to  the  utmost. 
They  granted  all  demands  except  those  involving  sover- 
eign rights.  These  they  were  ready  to  discuss  in  a 
friendly  way  or  refer  them  to  The  Hague.  Never  did  a 
little  people  humble  itself  more  to  placate  a  great  Power. 
It  was  the  old  story  of  the  Wolf  and  the  Lamb.  The 
Austrians,  like  the  Germans,  repeated  that  it  was  a  ques- 
tion of  life  and  death,  a  most  absurd  assertion.  A  great, 
rich  people  of  50,000,000  of  inhabitants  having  enjoyed 
half  a  century  of  peace  and  prosperity  could  not  resist 
the  action  of  4,500,000  Servians  exhausted  by  two  ter- 
rible wars !  It  was  as  if  the  old  whale  had  said,  "  I  must 
swallow  Jonah,  otherwise  Jonah  will  swallow  me."  In 
all  her  steps  Austria  was  supported,  and  possibly  inspired, 
by  Germany  from  the  Conference  of  Berlin  to  this  time. 
There  was  the  same  concerted  purpose  among  these 
Teuton  allies  to  put  down  Servia,  to  reach  the  ^'gean 
Sea,  and  some  think,  Constantinople. 

A  study  of  all  the  diplomatic  documents  will  convince 
one  that  the  Teutonic  Alliance  was  unfriendly  to  inter- 
national action  for  peace.  Germany  maintained  that  the 
Austro-Servian  quarrel  was  eminently  Austria's  concern, 
while  modern  opinion  more  and  more  claims  that  war  is 
everybody's  business.  The  whole  human  society  suffers 
from  it,  and  hence  has  a  right  to  protect  itself.  Four 
of  the  Great  Powers,  Italy,  France,  England  and  Russia, 
did  their  utmost  to  avert  the  conflict.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
proposed  many  ways  out  of  the  situation  which  would 
have  succeeded  with  Governments  really  desiring  peace. 
After  great  efforts  for  an  honorable  and  just  solution, 
the  English  statesman  asked  Germany  to  propose  some 


INITIATORS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR       199 

means  whereby  the  situations  might  be  saved,  but  she 
showed  a  faint-heartedness  which  cannot  be  explained 
except  on  the  assumption  that  she  was  bellicose.  One  is 
forced  to  agree  with  M.  Rene  Viviani,  who  said,  "If 
Germany  really  loved  peace  she  might  have  had  it  simply 
by  accepting  pourparlers  at  London  on  July  29,  or  two 
days  later  by  accepting  the  Czar's  call  for  an  appeal  to  The 
Hague  Tribunal,  or  on  July  31,  Great  Britain's  call  to 
suspend  military  operations  in  view  of  negotiations  at 
London."  ^ 

In  her  diplomatic  papers  Germany  claimed  to  have 
exerted  all  possible  influence  for  peace  in  Vienna,  but 
none  of  her  dispatches  to  that  effect  has  been  published 
in  her  White  Papers.  Would  it  not  be  remarkable  that  in 
such  a  publication,  to  justify  her  pacific  attitude,  to  ex- 
hibit her  work  in  avoiding  the  present  war,  there  should 
not  be  a  document  showing  that  she  even  tried  to  influence 
the  war  clique  of  Vienna?  She  became  menacing  when 
the  Powers  were  only  taking  the  most  elementary  precau- 
tions in  view  of  all  possible  war  eventualities.  On  July 
2y,  Francis  Joseph  published  a  manifesto  addressed  "  To 
my  peoples  "  which  also  resembles  that  of  1859  to  Sar- 
dinia. The  documents  are  almost  identical  in  spirit, 
in  the  statement  of  grievances  and  in  their  abusive  lan- 
guage.^ On  the  next  day,  he  declared  war  on  Servia. 
On  July  29,  the  Kaiser  demanded  that  Russia  should 
suspend  her  mobilization  and  on  August  i  he  declared 
war.  Three  days  after,  he  attacked  France,  whose  troops, 
notwithstanding  German  concentration  of  forces,  had 
remained  at  a  distance  of  ten  kilometers  from  the 
frontier.     On   August  2,   the   imperial   troops   entered 

'  Statement  in  Paris,  Feb.  25,  1915. 
"  The  Times,  July  30,  i9iS- 


20O        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

Luxemburg  and  then  Belgium.  Then  followed  the  un- 
speakable horrors  of  the  present  war. 

Germany  had  hoped  that  the  land  of  Cavour  would 
join  the  Teuton  allies,  but  in  this  they  were  disap- 
pointed. The  Quirinal  was  perfectly  av/are  of  the  ag- 
gressive move  of  the  two  Powers.  The  withdrawal  of 
Italy  from  the  Alliance  was  a  virtual  proclamation  that 
the  act  of  Germany  and  of  Austria  was  criminal.  With 
this  there  was  a  growing  national  consciousness  that  the 
Germans  had  already  made  the  economic  conquest  of 
their  country,  had  secured  the  control  of  their  banking 
institutions  and  of  their  navigation  companies,  had  done 
there  what  they  had  already  accomplished  in  Belgium 
and  in  Turkey.  They  remembered  how,  in  former  days, 
Austria  had  treated  them  as  now  she  wished  to  do  with 
Servia — they  remembered  the  inhuman  torments  of 
many  victims  such  as  Maroncelli  and  Silvio  Pellico,  con- 
demned to  death,  and  when  this  was  commuted,  subject- 
ing them  to  moral  tortures  a  hundred  times  worse  than 
death — they  remembered  that  the  Dual  Monarchy  still 
holds  under  her  sway  their  kindred  who  long  to  be 
under  the  green,  red  and  white  flag  of  Italy — they  re- 
membered that  France  had  helped  them  to  secure  their 
independence,  and  that  both  lands  were  among  the  best 
supports  of  liberal  civilization.  National  feelings  were 
deepened  by  appeals  of  leading  literary  men,  among  whom 
was  Gabriele  d'Annunzio.  The  movement  became  hostile 
to  neutrality  and  demanded  action  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  Government  had  to  heed  it  and  to  head  it. 

To  oppose  this  really  national  movement,  Germany 
sent  to  Rome  her  ablest  Dernburg,  Prince  von  Biilow. 
Ever  ready  for  concessions  at  the  expense  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  he  attempted  to  bring  back  the  Italians,  by 


INITIATORS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR       201 

making  promises  to  them  which  were  far  from  agreeable 
to  Vienna.  He  did  not  ask  them  to  join  the  hosts  of 
the  Kaiser,  but  attempted  to  make  their  neutraHty  a 
virtual  adherence  of  Italy  to  a  fictitious  Triplice.  The 
end  of  this  was  not  only  to  stem  the  movement  of  practi- 
cal sympathy  with  the  Allies,  but  it  looked  beyond  also  to 
the  conclusion  of  the  war.  In  the  international  congress 
which  will  unquestionably  modify  the  map  of  Europe, 
Italy  would  support  Germany.  Austria  was  equally 
desirous  of  securing  this  peculiar  kind  of  Italian  neutral- 
ity, but  in  the  diplomatic  conferences  which  took  place 
she  asked  for  "  freedom  of  action  in  the  Balkans,"  show- 
ing that  whatever  was  her  attitude  toward  Italia  irredenta, 
she  had  not  given  up  her  purpose  of  a  move  southward 
to  the  -^gean  Sea.  The  aged  Austrian  Emperor  made  a 
positive  refusal  as  to  the  concessions  proposed  by  the 
German  Envoy  on  behalf  of  the  Italians,  who  were  not 
asking  favors,  but  the  restitution  of  their  own  kindred, 
not  lands  so  much  as  men.  They  demanded  for  these  the 
right  to  live  under  institutions  of  their  choice — a  conten- 
tion similar  to  that  of  France  for  Alsace.  They  asked 
military  frontiers  taking  the  place  of  those  imposed  upon 
them  in  1866,  and  their  preponderance  in  the  Adriatic. 
They  were  true  to  their  old  vindications  against  Austria 
and  perhaps  to  their  old  hatred.  At  last,  they  broke  ofif 
all  relations  and  took  their  stand  by  the  Allies. 

The  spirit  of  hatred  and  aggressive  purpose  so  strenu- 
ously cultivated  first  in  Prussia,  and  then  in  Germany, 
has  borne  its  fruits.  The  long  and  systematic  provoca- 
tion of  France  has  brought  allies  to  her  side.  The 
German  abuses  against  them  have  been  as  painful  to 
Frenchmen  as  those  against  themselves.  The  awful 
crash  so  desired  by  the  enemies  of  the  land  of  Poincare 


202        THE  PROVOCATION  OF  FRANCE 

has  come.  The  civihzed  world  has  expressed  its  judg- 
ment upon  those  responsible  for  the  Great  War.  The 
manner  of  waging  it  has  met  with  a  similar  condemnation. 
Denials  of  atrocities  were  to  be  expected.  These  abomi- 
nations have  been  established  by  evidence  which  no 
philosophical-minded  man  will  refuse  to  accept.  The 
countrymen  of  Bismarck  will  discover  now — if  not 
now,  some  day — that  there  is  a  sovereign  justice  which 
has  its  supreme  hour  of  reckoning.  Has  that  hour  come  ? 
Events  will  soon  tell.  General  Jofifre,  avaricious  of 
words,  has  said  that  it  would  be  long,  dur,  sur. 


vJ   '" 


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